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ABSTRACT 
 
Theoretically, entrepreneurship has been deemed crucial to economic growth. 
However, the literature has failed to give governments clear guidance on 
policy since the empirical evidence linking entrepreneurship to economic 
growth has been mixed.  We suggest that part of the reason for these 
contradictory findings could be that entrepreneurship has been mispecified in 
the economics literature as entry density or R&D. We propose that a more 
accurate characterisation of entrepreneurship at the macro-level is EO. Using 
a sample that covers data of 93 countries over the period 1980-2008, firstly, we 
employ factor analysis to confirm EO as an aggregate level, reflective, 
unidimensional second-order construct with three indicators that covary: risk 
taking, innovativeness and proactiveness. Secondly, we use system GMM 
analysis to investigate the determinants and drivers of EO. We find that the 
control of corruption, banking development and human capital influence the 
level of EO that countries possess. However, this impact is non-linear with 
threshold effects and is contingent on the level of development and 
institutions, which are in turn shaped by inequality. Thirdly, we establish that 
EO and its deviation, positively predict growth and that this association is 
enhanced by policies and institutions. Moreover, our results suggest that the 
control of corruption, banking development, inequality and human capital are 
the determinants of EO and not economic growth as policies and institutions 
by themselves do not increase output. Innovative, risk taking and proactive 
entrepreneurial firms and entrepreneurs do. The results of this study suggest 
government officials, who wish to promote entrepreneurship and economic 
growth, should revisit their emphasis on promoting policies that erroneously 
encourage entry density and consider encouraging innovativeness, proactiveness 
and risk taking. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
The causes and sources of economic growth have occupied scholars since Adam 
Smith (1776) published the “inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of 
nations”. In 1956, Robert Solow (1956) developed the seminal neoclassical growth 
model which advanced our knowledge of the growth process. The neoclassical 
model explicates how capital and labour link to produce output. However, after 
accounting for labour and capital, a significant residual, called technological 
progress, remained when trying to attribute growth to its underlying sources 
(Griliches, 1996).  Thus, Solow’s neoclassical growth model neglected to clarify fully 
the origins of economic growth (Larroulet and Couyoumdjian, 2009).  
Romer (1990) sought to address Solow’s (1956) shortcomings and developed 
endogenous growth theory which adds knowledge to the traditional factors of 
production, labour and capital. Endogenous growth theory seeks to explain the 
residual that cannot be attributed to labour and capital in the neoclassical model. 
Romer (1990) argued that technological progress is fostered by knowledge which is 
non-rival and non-excludable, thus generating positive externalities within an 
economy (Arrow, 1962a). He deemed R&D and human capital as crucial drivers of 
economic development through knowledge spill-overs. However, Romer (1990) 
could not explain how this knowledge is diffused. Analogous to Solow’s (1956) model 
where technological progress was exogenous, in Romer’s (1990) model knowledge 
diffusion is also exogenous (Braunerhjelm, 2008).   
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Audretsch and Keilbach (2005) have sought to address the shortcomings of 
endogenous growth theory by clarifying how knowledge is diffused. They follow 
Schumpeter (1942) who delineated an economic process of creative destruction 
fostered by competitive, innovative firms that propelled the dynamic development of 
the economy. Audretsch and Keilbach (2005) add to Schumpeter’s insights by 
proposing the idea of a knowledge filter which prevents basic knowledge from being 
economically beneficial. Transforming this basic knowledge into firm-specific 
knowledge requires effort and resources, and entrepreneurship serves as a conduit 
that penetrates this knowledge filter serving as a link between new knowledge and 
economic growth. Thus innovative firms propel the dynamic development and growth 
of the economy by penetrating the knowledge filter. In this model, entrepreneurship 
is the vital link in knowledge diffusion and consequently, technological progress and 
economic development. 
Thus theories of economic growth, from Solow (1956) to Audretsch and Keilbach 
(2005), have identified essentially the outcomes of entrepreneurship- technological 
progress, innovation and knowledge diffusion- as the main sources of economic 
growth. However, at the macro-level, what is entrepreneurship? Further, what are its 
antecedents and consequences? Moreover, how does a nation’s incentive structure 
and institutional design affect the relation between entrepreneurship and economic 
growth? 
1.2 Entrepreneurial orientation (EO) 
Entrepreneurship can be defined as new entry into competitive markets such as 
business founding, new product introductions and globalization (Miller, 2011). The 
process of that new entry, that is, the how has been defined as entrepreneurial 
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orientation (EO). Miller (1983, p. 771) submits that an entrepreneurial firm is “one 
that engages in product-market innovation, undertakes somewhat risky ventures and 
is first to come up with ‘proactive’ innovations, beating competitors to the punch”. 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996, p. 136–137) characterise EO as “the processes, practices, 
and decision-making activities that lead to new entry”.  
The sub-constructs of EO have also been defined in literature. Innovativeness can 
be described as an inclination to experiment and be creative that leads to new goods 
and/or services (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). Proactiveness is characterised as a 
tendency to aggressively pursue new opportunities rather than those of reaping 
widely known existing opportunities or cost-cutting (Miller, 1983). Lastly, risk taking is 
the propensity of an economic agent “to make bold moves, those that risk significant 
capital and face a good deal of uncertainty” (Miller, 1983, p. 771). 
1.2.1 Unit of analysis 
An important consideration when investigating entrepreneurship is the unit of 
analysis. Entrepreneurship and EO have been studied at different levels of 
aggregation: individuals, groups and firms.  Kilby (1971) associated entrepreneurship 
with individuals because of its relation with radical invention. Some scholars apply it 
to small businesses because of small businesses’ linkages to economic growth 
(Birch, 1979). Lumpkin and Dess (1996) contend quite strongly that “new entry” as 
the critical manifestation of entrepreneurship is primarily a firm-level phenomenon. 
However, Miller (2011) has noted that innovative entry could be by a new firm, by an 
existing firm (intrapreneurship) and/or by a nation state. The essential question we 
ask is: can one nation state devote more resources to innovative activity, take risks 
and invest more in longer term, uncertain outcomes as well as be more pro-active in 
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diversifying its economic base than others? We believe the answer is yes and agree 
with Miller (2011) that EO can manifest at the level of the nation state. Thus, we 
adopt it as the unit of analysis in our study.  
1.2.2 Why EO?  
Entrepreneurship at the aggregate (national) level has traditionally been measured 
as a stock variable, which is, counting the number of “entrepreneurs”. The Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor’s (GEM) primary measure of entrepreneurship is the Total 
Early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) Index. The TEA measures the incidence 
of start-up businesses (nascent entrepreneurs) and new firms (up to 3.5 years old) 
among the adult population (i.e., individuals aged 18–64 years). Further, the self-
employment ratio, defined as the proportion of the labour force who are self-
employed or business owners (Audretsch, Keilbach and Lehmann, 2006, Gleaser, 
2007 and Carree, Van Stel, Thurik and Wennekers, 2002) and the private 
employment ratio, characterised as the percentage of the labour force that is hired 
by the private companies (Li, Yang, Yao and Zhang, 2009 and Li, Yang, Yao, Zhang 
and Zhang, 2012) have also been used as  measures of entrepreneurship at the 
macro-level. However, these measures do not accurately quantify the innovative new 
combinations that foster the dynamic growth of the economy as argued by 
Schumpeter (1934). Nor do they measure Solow’s (1956) technological progress, 
Romer’s (1990) knowledge or Audretsch and Keilbach’s (2005) knowledge diffusion.  
The main argument that economists make is that entrepreneurship drives economic 
growth by improving total factor productivity or Solow’s residual. However, recent 
studies grounded on GEM evidence suggest the relationship between 
entrepreneurial activity and a country’s level of economic development is U-shaped 
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(Wennekers, van Stel, Thurik and Reynolds, 2005). Further, in developing countries, 
entrepreneurship and job creation are positively associated only if self-employment 
and informal companies are disregarded from the data (Ghani, Kerr and O’Connell, 
2011a and 2011c). This raises the question: do all small business owners, some of 
whom may be necessity entrepreneurs who enter a new business because they 
need an income to survive, for example street vendors (Sonobe, Akoten and Otsuka, 
2011), improve productivity? The evidence suggests not and we propose that a more 
accurate characterisation of entrepreneurship at the macro-level is EO. Further, the 
manifestation of this EO (i.e., innovative activity, risk taking and proactiveness) is the 
critical variable that defines whether a country is entrepreneurial or not. 
1.2.3 Context  
As Miller (1983, 2011) contends, EO and its drivers are unique in diverse kinds of 
context. Further, as we have suggested, entrepreneurship at the macro-level 
encompasses innovation, proactiveness and risk taking. However, we expect that 
the entrepreneurial processes, as Schumpeterian theory submits, would appear 
differently in dissimilar contexts. At the country level, national laws, financial 
development, corruption, policies and levels of institutional development can impact 
the character of entrepreneurship (Johns, 2006). We would therefore, for example, 
expect EO to manifest differently in Zimbabwe than in Germany.  Thus, the 
categorisation of countries as low income and/or developed may result in more 
precise and scientifically legitimate knowledge that takes into account the distance to 
the technological frontier and the level of institutional development (Aghion and 
Howitt, 2009). 
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1.3 The Drivers of EO  
We have a limited understanding of why rates of EO would vary across countries 
and why some countries may be more innovative, risk taking and pro-active than 
others. A greater understanding of these differences may assist firms, investors and 
government policy makers in spurring economic growth. Abramovitz (1994, p. 24) 
suggests, the determinants and drivers of technological upgrading can be 
characterised as the “countries’ level of education and technical competence, the 
commercial, industrial and financial institutions that bear on their abilities to finance 
and operate modern, large-scale business, and the political and social 
characteristics that influence the risks, the incentives and the personal rewards of 
economic activity”. Therefore, we investigate financial market development, social 
cohesion, human capital and the control of corruption as potentially important factors 
that may affect the rate of entrepreneurship across countries (Biggs and Srivastava, 
1996, Aterido et. al, 2009). These institutional constraints may be particularly 
important in developing countries where entrepreneurs face a hostile environment in 
comparison with developed economies (Vivarelli, 2012). 
1.3.1 Financial Market Development 
 Joseph Schumpeter (1912) was one of the originators of the idea that financial 
institutions are critical because they appraise and finance entrepreneurs’ innovation 
and the launching of new products to market. King and Levine (1993) also adopt a 
similar line of reasoning and argue that the evaluation and sorting of entrepreneurs 
by financial institutions lowers the cost of enabling productivity improvement and 
fuels economic development. Empirically, Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) find that 
financial institutions have a large, positive impact on total factor productivity growth, 
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thus influencing overall economic growth. In addition, countries with high levels of 
financial market development are better able to support the growth of capital 
intensive industries (Rajan and Zingales, 1998 and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven 
and Levine, 2008). Further, financial institutions and markets ease the trading, 
hedging, and pooling of risk, thus impacting economic growth by varying savings 
rates and resource distribution. This encourages investment in projects with higher 
risk and superior expected returns (Devereux and Smith, 1994; Obstfeld, 1994 and 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998). In contrast, developing countries are unable to support 
infant industries since firms are credit and equity rationed (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Maksimovic, 2008). Thus, financial sector distortions or underdevelopment can 
inhibit entrepreneurship and consequently decrease the rate of economic growth 
(King and Levine, 1993).  Levine (2005, p. 85) concludes that “the preponderance of 
evidence suggests that both financial intermediaries and markets matter for growth 
even when controlling for potential simultaneity bias”. 
1.3.2 Social Cohesion 
Maxwell (1996, p. 13) describes social cohesion as “the processes of building shared 
values and commonality of interpretation, reducing disparities in wealth and income, 
and generally enabling people to have a sense that they are engaged in a common 
enterprise, facing shared challenges, and that they are members of the same 
community”. Easterly (2006, p. 4) defines social cohesion as “the nature and extent 
of social and economic divisions within society”. Ritzen and Woolcock (2000, p. 9) 
suggest “social cohesion is a state of affairs in which a group of people demonstrate 
an aptitude for collaboration that produces a climate for change”. Further, Easterly 
(2006) suggests socially cohesive societies are more likely to promote growth, 
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ensure that both the rich and poor share the sacrifices and rewards of change, offer 
equal opportunities for all citizens and facilitate greater social mobility. For example, 
inequality may signal lack of access to finance resulting in fewer opportunities to 
invest in education and entrepreneurship (Berg and Ostry, 2011).  
Moreover, inequality makes it difficult for government to adjust to shocks (Rodrik, 
1999) and leads to comparatively harsh debt crunches (Berg and Sachs, 1988). It 
follows that corruption by economic elites could create inefficiencies and, thus lead 
to decreased economic growth (Barro, 2000). In contrast, socially cohesive countries 
are more likely to support EO because of their greater ability to collaborate and 
develop innovations. Furthermore, the risks inherent in uncertain, long-term 
investments are more likely to be borne by all members of society, not just the poor. 
Lastly, the proactive actions necessary to attack new markets require purposeful, 
cohesive action that is more likely in cohesive societies with agreed on long-term 
objectives than other scenarios. 
1.3.3 Human Capital 
Becker (1964) defines “human capital as skills and knowledge that individuals 
acquire through investments in schooling, on-the-job training and other types of 
experience”. Additionally, Pfeffer (1994) has suggested that education, knowledge, 
experience and skills are important for the success of entrepreneurial firms. 
Empirically, Millán, Congregado, Román, Praag and Stel (2012) analyse to what 
extent the education levels of employees may affect the entrepreneur’s productivity 
and find support for the hypothesis that education positively impacts entrepreneurial 
success. They find that a high share of people in a region holding tertiary education 
is positively associated with the entrepreneur’s productivity. As a result, venture 
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capitalists seek management teams with solid management skills and experience 
(Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000) in countries with high-end human capital (Aizenman 
and Kendall, 2008). Moreover, Sonnentag and Frese (2002) suggest that human 
capital might be even more crucial in the future since work environments are 
becoming more knowledge-intensive. An inference that can be drawn from the 
preceding literature is that levels of EO could be influenced by human capital and 
higher education.  
1.3.4 Corruption   
Baumol (1990) contends that based on the quality of existing political, economic and 
legal institutions, entrepreneurship can be productively innovation or unproductively 
rent seeking, corruption or organized crime. Further, he suggests that this allocation 
is greatly affected by incentives society offers to such activities. Empirically, Olken 
and Pande (2012) find evidence that, as Baumol (1990) suggests, corruption 
responds to incentives. However, they also note that over time, corrupt officials 
change their strategies to pursue rents. Similarly, Anokhin and Schulze (2009) find a 
positive relationship between the control of corruption, productivity and investment in 
innovation and entrepreneurship. Likewise, positive associations between the control 
of corruption and total factor productivity (Lambsdorff, 2003; Rivera-Batiz, 2002), per 
capita growth in GDP (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2003), bond spreads (Ciocchini, Durbin 
and Ng, 2003), capital investment and foreign direct investment (Lambsdorff, 2003), 
have been established. It seems self-evident that good institutions and low levels of 
corruption would support EO, thus facilitating higher rates of economic growth. 
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1.4 The consequences of EO 
Extensive research has been conducted on the performance consequences of EO at 
the firm level. The majority of EO researchers have used the Resource Based View 
(RBV) theory to argue that EO provides a sustainable competitive advantage to firms 
(Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin and Frese, 2009). The RBV view suggests that learning, 
knowledge and information acquired from exploring entrepreneurial opportunities 
generate resources that are inimitable, rare and valuable. These resources help 
firms attain a competitive advantage and achieve superior performance outcomes 
(Barney, 1991). Raunch et al. (2009) performed a meta-analysis on 51 studies that 
explored the performance implications of EO. Their findings suggest that there is a 
significant correlation between EO and firm performance. 
Tang, Tang, Marino, Zhang and Li (2008) have examined the EO-performance 
relationship in emerging markets, with somewhat interesting results. They conducted 
the study in China and found an inverted U-shaped, curve-linear relationship.  Low-
EO and high-EO firms showed poor performance. In contrast, middle-level EO firms 
had a positive relationship with performance. Su, Xie and Li (2011) also confirm 
these findings. However, they note that the EO-performance relationship is positive 
in established firms. They submit that these results indicate that new firms suffer 
from “the liability of newness” (Freeman, Carroll and Hannan, 1983). 
However, minimal research has been conducted on EO at the aggregate level. As 
we have argued before, theories of economic growth, from Solow (1956) to 
Audretsch and Keilbach (2005), have identified essentially the outcomes of 
entrepreneurship, technological progress, innovation and knowledge diffusion as the 
main sources of economic growth. EO, as the manifestation of entrepreneurship, 
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would be expected to improve economic growth and therefore, the impact of EO on 
economic growth needs to be investigated. 
1.5 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this research is to define and measure entrepreneurial orientation 
(EO) at the aggregate level. Furthermore, we investigate the potential institutional 
drivers of EO at the aggregate level such as financial market development, social 
cohesion, human capital and the control of corruption. Lastly, we examine the 
performance implications of EO and its’ determinants on economic growth.  
1.6 Problem statement 
Theoretically, entrepreneurship has been deemed crucial to economic growth 
(Audretsch and Keilbach, 2005) and government policy makers have sought to 
encourage entrepreneurship, in order to foster development, to varying degrees of 
success. However, literature has failed to give governments clear guidance on policy 
since the empirical evidence linking entrepreneurship to economic growth has been 
mixed. For example, recent studies based on GEM data have identified a U-shaped 
relationship between a country’s rate of entrepreneurial activity and its level of 
economic development (Wennekers, van Stel, Thurik and Reynolds, 2005).  
We suggest that part of the reason for these contradictory findings could be that 
entrepreneurship has been mispecified in the literature as entry density. We propose 
that a more accurate characterisation of entrepreneurship at the macro-level is EO 
and argue that the manifestation of this EO (i.e., innovative activity, risk taking and 
pro-activeness), is the critical individual variable that defines where a country is 
entrepreneurial or not. However, EO has not been defined at the national level nor 
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have its drivers been explicated. Further, its outcomes have also not been 
investigated. 
1.6.1 Objectives of the study 
 The first objective is to define and develop a measure of EO at the aggregate 
level. 
 The second objective is to test whether financial market development, social 
cohesion, human capital and the control of corruption (the hypothesized 
drivers of EO) have a positive association with EO. 
 The third objective is to test whether EO has a positive influence on economic 
growth. 
 The fourth objective is to ascertain whether the hypothesized enablers of EO 
enhance the EO-growth relation. 
1.7 Research Questions 
In other words, the research questions implicit in the two stated objectives of the 
study are: 
1. Does entrepreneurship manifest at the aggregate level as EO? 
2. Does EO have a positive impact on economic growth at the aggregate 
level? 
3. Is this growth impact context dependent? That is, does it vary depending 
on the proximity of a country to the technological frontier? 
4. Further, what are the institutional drivers of EO at the aggregate level? 
5. Lastly, do these institutional enablers enhance the EO-growth relation? 
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All these questions relate to the importance of entrepreneurship to economic growth. 
Further, financial market development, the control of corruption, human capital and 
inequality are also potentially important factors that can affect the rate of 
entrepreneurship across countries (Biggs and Srivastava, 1996, Aterido, Hallward-
Driemeier and Pagés, 2009). These institutional factors and policies may be 
particularly important in developing countries where entrepreneurs face a more 
constraining environment than in with developed economies where entrepreneurs 
are generally enabled by a supportive environment (Vivarelli, 2012). Thus a 
reasonable set of answers to these questions would assist firms, investors and 
government policy makers in spurring economic growth across all levels of 
development. 
1.8 Significance of the study 
First, we make an important theoretical contribution to economics and 
entrepreneurship theory by defining EO at the aggregate level and linking it to 
growth. We investigating the nation state as our basic unit of analysis and  ask: can 
one nation state devote more resources to innovative activity, take risks and invest 
more in longer term, uncertain outcomes, and be more pro-active in diversifying its 
economic base than others? We agree with Miller (2011) and believe that the answer 
is: yes EO can manifest at the level of the nation state.  
Second, we make a significant methodological contribution by devising aggregate 
level, objective secondary measures of EO and its’ sub-constructs (risk taking, 
innovativeness and proactiveness). Entrepreneurship at the aggregate level has 
traditionally been measured as a stock variable (i.e., counting the number of 
“entrepreneurs”) or classified as innovation.  The self-employment ratio, defined as 
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the proportion of the labour force who are self-employed or business owners 
(Carree, Van Stel, Thurik and Wennekers, 2002; Audretsch, Keilbach and Lehmann, 
2006; Gleaser, 2007), and the private employment ratio, characterised as the 
proportion of the labour force that is employed by the private sector (Li, Li, Yao, 
Zhang, and Zhang, 2009 and Li, Yang, Yao, Zhang and Zhang, 2012) have also 
been used as  measures of entrepreneurship at the macro-level. We propose that a 
more accurate characterisation of entrepreneurship at the macro-level is EO and 
argue that the manifestation of this EO reflected variously in innovative activity, risk 
taking and pro-activeness, is the critical variable that defines whether a country is 
entrepreneurial or not. Aggregated theory-based single synthetic indicators such as 
EO, GDP and the Human Development Index (HDI) help us understand our 
economic and social realities and therefore, can assist policy makers devise 
strategic interventions. For example, GDP highlights aggregate income in a country 
whereas the HDI enlightens us about the overall well-being of the population. 
Similarly, EO informs us whether a country is entrepreneurial or not. 
Lastly, we make significant empirical contributions to literature by first, evaluating the 
EO-growth relation. Second, by assessing whether policies and institutions, such as 
banking development, human capital, social cohesion and the control of corruption 
are drivers of EO. Third, by determining whether indeed these hypothesized 
enablers, enhance the EO-growth relation. A greater understanding of these 
associations may assist firms, investors and government policy makers in spurring 
economic growth. Moreover, potential drivers of EO such as financial market 
development, a transparent regulatory environment and the control of corruption are 
potentially important factors that can affect the rate of entrepreneurship across 
countries (Biggs and Srivastava, 1996, Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier and Pagés, 
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2009). Consequently, ascertaining their relevance would enable countries to 
implement appropriate policies for entrepreneurship led growth. 
1.9 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we have introduced the key elements of this study, EO and the 
entrepreneurship-growth relation. Further, we discussed how EO might help clarify 
this relationship. In Chapter 2 a detailed review of literature is conducted to explicate 
the important issues around EO and the entrepreneurship-growth nexus, as to 
identify the gap in literature. The methodological paradigm and development of the 
measures of EO and its’ sub-constructs, are discussed in Chapter 3. Chapters 4 and 
5 are self-contained analysis and empirical results evident from the two main 
objectives of the study. In Chapter 6 we conclude. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
 
Adam Smith (1776) argued that the average level of prosperity in a country could be 
measured by the annual produce of labour that could be saved and/or consumed. In 
economics literature this annual produce or annual gross domestic product (GDP) is 
a proxy for economic well-being and a measure of prosperity. This GDP’s growth 
determines the well-being of billions of people and enables under-developed 
countries to escape poverty and achieve prosperity (Sorensen and Whitta-Jacobsen, 
2010). For example, in North America and Western Europe, GDP per capita is 
several multiples greater than what it was only a hundred years ago. Likewise, 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan have achieved developed status through high economic 
growth. In these developed countries, GDP growth has improved individual welfare, 
increased life expectancy, and enabled the population to live a longer, healthier and 
more meaningful life.  
Some developing countries are following suit. Rapid economic growth in China has 
also reduced the number of people living in poverty from 53 percent of the national 
population to 8 percent (Ravallion and Chen 2007). In 2010, Brazil and India grew at 
6.6% and 8.8% respectively, lifting millions of people out of poverty. In contrast, the 
relative absence of economic growth in some poor countries, especially African 
countries, has left millions of people hungry and living in abject conditions. What 
accounts for these cross country differences in growth outcomes and how can this 
process of economic growth, which leads to a higher GDP per person and increased 
welfare, be initiated? Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004, p.132) suggest “it is 
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hard to think of any question in economics that is of greater intellectual significance, 
or of greater relevance to the vast majority of the world’s population”.  
To answer this question, we resort to the Schumpeterian paradigm which suggests 
that growth is generated by a random sequence of quality-improving innovations and 
embodies Schumpeter’s (1942) idea of “creative destruction”. In this paradigm 
entrepreneurship and innovation are deemed crucial to growth since entrepreneurial 
firms facilitate economic growth by innovating, taking risks and proactively building 
new markets (Schumpeter, 1934). Therefore they are a crucial conduit for 
developing, assimilating and diffusing knowledge and technology. In addition, as the 
world economy becomes more knowledge-based and globalised, Gilbert, Audretsch 
and McDougall (2004) argue that entrepreneurship policy may emerge as the key 
policy instrument for promoting economic development, similar to monetary and 
fiscal policies which were the mainstays for enabling employment creation and 
economic growth in the post-war industrial economy. Thus the success or failure of a 
developing economy depends on its’ entrepreneurial dynamics (McMillan and 
Woodruff, 2002). 
However, economic growth in Schumpeterian theory is highly context-dependent. 
Howitt (2000) submits that countries behind the technological frontier, will exhibit 
more replicative entrepreneurship than countries that are well developed and 
technologically sophisticated which tend to focus on radical innovation, that is, they 
launch innovations that surpass the best technology available before the innovation. 
Similarly, Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) suggest that capabilities related to the 
exploitation and generation of knowledge have become vital for economic 
performance recently, in both developed and developing countries, particularly when 
such know-how is broadly defined. Likewise, Lee and Kim (2009) pinpoint higher 
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education and R&D as the binding constraints to long run economic growth for 
middle-to-high income countries. 
In the following paragraphs we evaluate four major economic growth paradigms, 
namely: the Neoclassical Growth Model, the AK Model, The Product Variety Model 
and The Schumpeterian Model. We review literature on these models and also 
discuss a relatively new addition to growth theory, the Knowledge Spill-over Theory 
of economic growth. 
2.1 The Neoclassical Growth Model 
The neoclassical model, developed by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), is the 
dominant theory in growth economics.  Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) assume that 
markets are perfectly competitive and the rate of technological change is determined 
exogenously by noneconomic forces. Aghion and Howitt (2009) submit that in the 
neoclassical model the growth process is described by two equations namely:  
 first, a production function where aggregate output GDP is equated to a 
function of aggregate capital and labour according to a Cobb Douglas function 
with diminishing returns to capital(K) and labour(L) and a constant productivity 
parameter,  
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝛼 𝐿1−𝛼,                                                                                                                          (1) 
where 0 < 𝛼< 1 such that output involves decreasing returns to capital and A 
is a productivity parameter.  
 Secondly, a law of motion that equates capital accumulation to investment 
and capital depreciation, 
     ∆𝐾 = 𝑠𝑌 − 𝛿𝐾,                                                                                                                           (2) 
where sY indicates aggregate savings and 𝛿K represents capital depreciation. 
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This model implies that in the long run per capita GDP (Y/L) does not depend on 
economic conditions but that rather it is driven by productivity parameter A. Without 
technological progress the economy can grow only by accumulating capital.  
However, this capital accumulation eventually dissipates due to diminishing marginal 
returns of capital. Thus, in the long-run changes in aggregate per capita national 
income are caused by exogenous technological change and the growth rate of the 
population.  The neoclassical model was further developed to integrate endogenous 
consumer optimization (Cass, 1965 and Koopmans, 1965), government spending, 
debt and the deficit (Blanchard, 1985), uncertainty (Brock and Mirman, 1972) and 
human capital as a third factor of production (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992). 
In spite of these developments, the neo-classical model still does not account for 
how technological progress occurs (Aghion and Howitt, 2009). Further, the process 
of innovation and technological diffusion is not specified. Moreover, Aghion and 
Howitt (2009) argue that these innovations and efforts to diffuse them are economic 
decisions since they imply costs and benefits, and are therefore made by economic 
agents seeking profit. In addition, Jones and Manuelli (2005) question why, if cross-
country differences in economic growth rates and welfare are merely due to 
differences in access to innovations, should access to these innovations differ 
amongst various countries? The neoclassical model leaves the rate of technological 
change and innovation exogenous and hence unexplained. Therefore the model 
cannot explain sustained long-run growth and cross-country differences in growth 
outcomes. This basic weakness in the Solow-Swan (1956) model was the driving 
force behind the development of endogenous growth models (Aghion and Howitt, 
2009). 
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2.2 Endogenous Growth Models 
. 
Technological change, as previously argued, depends on economic decisions 
because industrial innovations, the accumulation of human capital, the funding of 
science and the diffusion of technology require the commitment of financial 
resources (Aghion and Howitt, 2009). Endogenous growth theories take some of this 
endogeneity into account in modelling the long-run growth rate.  Further, by 
integrating endogenous technology into growth theory, endogenous growth models 
imply that economic agents must have an economic incentive to improve technology. 
In contrast, in the neoclassical model all economic output accrues to labour and 
capital and none to innovation (Aghion and Howitt, 2009).  
2.2.1 The AK Model 
The first endogenous growth model, the AK model which is based on Arrow’s 
learning by doing theory, maintained the competitive equilibrium assumption of the 
neoclassical model and endogenised growth by relying on external accumulation of 
knowledge by firms. Arrow (1962) argued that technological progress is attained 
through a process of learning-by-doing by a collective of firms in the production 
process. However, this learning by doing was deemed exogenous to individual firms 
in their own production of capital goods.  
Formally, the aggregate production function in the AK model is linear in the 
homogeneous stock of capital: 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾,                                                                                                                                                    (3) 
with A the productivity parameter and capital accumulates according to the same 
transition equation as the neoclassical equation:  
∆𝐾 = 𝑠𝑌 − 𝛿𝐾                                                                                                                                               
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And thus the economy’s long-run growth rate is: 
𝑔 =
∆𝐾
𝐾
= 𝑠𝐴 − 𝛿                                                                                                                                    (4)   
The AK model, unlike the neoclassical model, suggests that capital accumulation 
and the resultant learning-by-doing during the accumulation process causes 
technological progress that increases the marginal return to capital and, thereby 
counteracting the effects of decreasing marginal returns to capital noted by Solow 
(1956). Further, the model implies that by increasing savings and improving the 
efficiency of resource allocation, countries can attain a higher long-run growth rate.  
However, the AK model does not differentiate between capital accumulation and 
technological change.  The physical and human capital that is accumulated as well 
as the intellectual capital that results from externalities are aggregated as the same 
variable. Therefore, when using this model, we can’t determine whether economic 
growth is due to capital accumulation and/or innovation and similar to the 
neoclassical model, technology is not endegonised. Firms maximise their profit by 
merely paying labour and capital their marginal products, without offering any 
additional payment for innovation (Aghion and Howitt, 2009).  
The AK model was initially developed by Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) and 
advanced by other scholars to account for inter-temporal consumer maximization 
(Romer, 1986), human capital accumulation (Lucas, 1988), the impact of fiscal policy 
(King and Rebelo, 1990) and the terms of trade (Acemoglu and Ventura, 2001) on 
growth. 
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2.2.2 The Product Variety Model 
 
The shortcomings of the AK paradigm led scholars to develop innovation-based 
growth models. Romer (1987), using the monopolistic competition framework 
developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), introduced an endogenous model of growth 
based on increasing product variety. The production function takes the form: 
𝑌𝑡 = ∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑡 
∝
𝑁𝑡
0
𝑑𝑖                                                                                                                                       (5)  
 
 
Where 𝑁𝑡 denotes different varieties of intermediate product and K𝑡 the capital 
stock. Aggregating, the production function yields: 
 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝑁𝑡
1−𝛼𝐾𝑡
∝                                                                                                                                         (6)  
                             
Based on Young’s (1928) argument that increased specialisation stimulates and 
supports growth, Romer (1990) submitted that productivity growth comes from an 
expanding variety (𝑁𝑡) of specialized intermediate products (innovations) and the 
growth rate of 𝑁𝑡 determines the growth of output per capita. He argued that an 
increase in 𝑁𝑡 increases output by allowing a given capital stock to be shared 
amongst an increased number of products that display diminishing marginal returns. 
In this model technology is a non-rival, partially excludable good and thus, perfectly 
competitive markets are rejected. Each novel innovation is compensated by 
monopoly rents and it is the expectation of these rents that encourages 
entrepreneurs and research activities aimed at finding new varieties.  Moreover, a 
growing set of product varieties of the same quality prevents aggregate capital from 
running into diminishing returns, hence sustaining long-term economic growth.  
34 | P a g e  
 
Romer’s (1990) thesis was based on, firstly, the premise that technological change is 
crucial to economic growth. Secondly, on the assumption that technological change 
results from the intentional actions of profit maximising economic agents. Lastly, on 
the notion that the defining characteristic of technology is that it can be reproduced 
at zero cost once the initial fixed development costs have been incurred (Aghion and 
Howitt, 2009).  
The main inferences that can be derived from the product variety model are that an 
economy with a higher stock of human capital will exhibit faster growth, the rate of 
technological change is susceptible to the rate of interest and lastly, free 
international trade can enable faster growth (Romer, 1990). Empirical papers have 
tested Romer’s (1990) product variety model with mixed results. Broda, Greenfield 
and Weinstein (2006) used trade data to test whether imported goods that result in 
greater product variety increased productivity and found support for the effects of 
product variety on productivity levels and growth.  The results suggest that imported 
variety has a small impact on productivity in developed countries whereas the impact 
of new varieties in developing countries is substantially higher.  
However, Aghion and Howitt (2009) suggest that product-variety model seems 
significant because it assumes away the obsolescence of old intermediate inputs. 
They observe that if old technology was rendered redundant by new innovations, the 
product variety parameter in Solow residual would decline thus increasing the impact 
of diminishing returns to capital and reducing per capita growth. In addition, they 
note that the model suggests that exit is damaging to growth because it diminishes 
product variety. However, Comin and Mulani (2007) and, Fogel, Morck and Yeung 
(2008) have found that both exit and entry and the turnover of dominant firms are 
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positively associated with innovation and per capita GDP growth, supporting Aghion 
and Howitt’s (2009) basic thesis.  
2.2.3 The Schumpeterian Model 
The shortcomings of the Romer (1990) approach led Aghoin and Howitt (2006) to 
develop a model of endogenous growth based on Schumpeter’s (1934) notion of 
creative destruction that could account for the impact of entry and exit on the growth 
process. In Schumpeterian growth theory, growth comes from quality-improving 
innovations and key economic variables such as the country's distance to the 
technological frontier or how its degree of financial development affect economic 
growth have an impact on the rate of economic growth (Aghoin and Howitt, 2006). In 
particular, the Schumpeterian paradigm implies that faster economic growth 
generally implies a higher rate of firm turnover, because a process of creative 
destruction generates entry of new innovators and exit of former innovators.  
Schumpeterian theory begins with a production function specified at the industry 
level: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡=𝐴𝑖𝑡
1−∝𝐾𝑖𝑡  
∝ ,           𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 <∝< 1                                                                                               (7)   
 
𝐴𝑖𝑡 is a productivity parameter for industry i at time t. In this equation  𝐾𝑖𝑡 is the 
capital stock used in this industry. Schumpeterian theory assumes that all sectors 
are similar. Thus, aggregate output is merely the summation of sector specific output  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 . Thus aggregate output is basically the Cobb-Douglas aggregate production 
function: 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐴𝑡
1−∝𝐾𝑡
∝,                                                                                                                                         (8) 
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where the technology parameter ,  𝐴𝑡 , is the weighted aggregate sum of industry 
specific 𝐴𝑖𝑡‘s. Similar to Solow’s model, economic growth depends on the growth of 
the productivity parameter 𝐴𝑡.  
The Schumpeterian paradigm submits that growth is generated by a random 
sequence of quality-improving innovations. It embodies Schumpeter’s (1942) idea of 
“creative destruction”. Thus, growth results from innovations that raise productivity by 
improving the quality not merely the quantity of product varieties. The entrepreneurial 
process is endogenised by taking into account the costs of research and the likely 
rewards of successful innovation. Further, Schumpeterian theory suggests that there 
are two inputs to the innovation process, namely: 
 “the private expenditures made by the prospective innovator, and 
 the stock of innovations that have already been made by past innovators”.  
 
Therefore a country can merely be implementing existing technologies (𝑈𝑛) or 
conducting radical innovation(𝑈𝑚). The adjustment in the aggregate technology 
parameter 𝐴𝑡  is: 
 
𝐴𝑡+1 − 𝐴𝑡 =  𝑈𝑛(𝛾 − 1)𝐴𝑡 + 𝑈𝑚(?̅? − 𝐴𝑡)                                                                                 (9) 
 
And the economic growth rate: 
𝑔𝑡 = (𝐴𝑡+1 − 𝐴𝑡 )/𝐴𝑡 =  𝑈𝑛(𝛾 − 1) + 𝑈𝑚(𝑎
−1 − 1),                                                               (10) 
where 
𝑎𝑡= 𝐴𝑡/?̅? 
is a measure of relative development or the distance to the technological frontier. 
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Schumpeterian theory also suggests that the stock existing of innovations and the 
incremental innovations facilitated by private expenditures made by entrepreneurs, 
are both factors that affect the rate of innovation. The theory further implies that 
countries that are well developed and technologically sophisticated tend to focus on 
radical innovation, that is, they launch technological innovations that surpass the 
best technology available. Conversely, developing countries are in catch-up mode 
and as a consequence, they tend focus on assimilating existing innovations that help 
them draw near the global technology frontier. In the latter case the innovation is just 
implementing technologies that have been developed elsewhere. Therefore, growth 
in Schumpeterian theory is highly context-dependent. Accordingly, the theory is well 
suited to assessing how a country's growth outcomes will differ with its closeness to 
the technological frontier and the degree to which the country is likely to converge to 
that frontier and critically, what kinds of economic policy adjustments are necessary 
to maintain growth as the country approaches the frontier (Aghoin and Hewitt, 2006).  
Moreover, the Schumpeterian growth paradigm emphasizes creativity and 
innovation. In contrast, the AK approach emphasizes saving and capital 
accumulation as important to growth. Further, unlike the product variety model, 
where innovation causes productivity growth by creating new, but not necessarily 
improved varieties, the Schumpeterian model explicitly models radical innovation 
and assigns an important role to entry and exit of firms and the mobility of workers. 
This is supported by Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, and Prantl (2004) who 
investigated the effects of technologically advanced entry-threat on average TFP 
growth of incumbent UK manufacturing establishments.  They found that entry-threat 
tends to increase the average productivity growth of existing firms.  Similarly, Comin 
and Mulani (2007) have found that industry turnover is positively related to earlier 
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R&D. In addition to these results, Fogel, Morck and Yeung (2008) studied large 
corporate firms in 44 different countries over the 1975-1996 period and found that 
GDP growth is positively associated with the turnover of dominant firms.  
2.3 The Knowledge Spill-over Theory of Entrepreneurship 
 
Although the Schumpeterian paradigm takes into account quality-improving 
innovations that raise productivity by improving the quality and not merely the 
quantity of product varieties, it does not account for how these quality improving 
innovations are disseminated. Similarly, the Solow, AK and product variety models 
also do not explain how new knowledge is dispersed. They assume that innovation 
automatically spills-over and is commercialized. These models infer investments in 
R&D and human capital mechanically impact output and that new knowledge is 
equivalent to economic knowledge.  
However, Audretsch and Keilbach (2005) contend that new knowledge which is 
generated by innovation is not merely non-excludable and non-exhaustible but it also 
has a greater degree of uncertainty, higher asymmetries and greater transactional 
costs than the other factors of production such as labour and capital. Further, they 
note that when it comes to innovation, there is also uncertainty about the production 
process and as a result, whether sufficient demand for the new product exists. In 
addition, Anselin, Varga and Acs (2000) and Cohen, Goto, Nagata, Nelson and 
Walsh (2002) find that knowledge diffusion is constrained by geography and 
transaction costs. Therefore, acquiring technological capabilities through knowledge 
diffusion is not costless and thus is endogenous. Knowledge diffusion mechanisms 
that have been identified in literature are: 
 the scientific literature and patents ( Deng, 2007),  
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 networks, spin-offs from firms and knowledge institutions (Audretsch and 
Feldman, 1996 and Powell , Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996), 
  human capital mobility (Moen 2005), 
  international trade, foreign direct investments and direct communication 
(Branstetter, 2006 and Soete and Ter Weel, 1999). 
In addition, Audretsch and Keilbach (2005) note that there is a gap between 
investments in knowledge and the commercialization of knowledge, or economic 
knowledge. This gap is characterised as the knowledge filter. It is the existence of 
the knowledge filter, or knowledge not commercialized by existing firms, that 
generates the knowledge spill-over entrepreneurial opportunities. Audretsch and 
Keilbach (2005) contend that only entrepreneurship can penetrate the knowledge 
filter. Entrepreneurs use knowledge generated in one organizational context to 
create a new firm thus facilitating the spill-over of knowledge and permeating the 
knowledge filter (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2005).  
Moreover, they observe that entrepreneurship and the knowledge filter as well as its 
impact varies across specific contexts and depends on a broad range of factors, 
spanning individual characteristics, institutions, culture and laws. As an example they 
suggest that the differing growth outcomes between the West and the former Soviet 
Union and her Eastern European allies were due to the Wests’ superior institutional 
context to support entrepreneurship and commercialize investments in new 
knowledge. They argue that although both the West and the former Soviet Union 
invested in the creation of new knowledge, the divergence in growth and economic 
performance emanated from differences in the knowledge filter and the superior 
capacity in the West for entrepreneurship to help surmount that knowledge filter 
(Audretsch and Keilbach, 2005). Consequently, by serving as a conduit for 
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knowledge spill-overs, entrepreneurship provides the missing link between 
investments in new knowledge and economic growth (Audretsch and Keilbach, 
2005). Accordingly, entrepreneurship is an important mechanism permeating the 
knowledge filter to facilitate the spill-over of knowledge and ultimately generate 
economic growth. 
The knowledge spill-over theory of entrepreneurship endogenised the dissemination 
of innovations that are not appropriated by institutions that discover them. It 
challenges the assumptions made by Schumpeterian, product variety and AK growth 
theories that innovation is equivalent to economic knowledge and further, that this 
new knowledge automatically spills over. The gap between innovation and new 
economic knowledge (the knowledge filter), results in a lower level of knowledge 
spill-over. An entrepreneur is an agent of change, who recognizes an opportunity, 
penetrates the knowledge filter and ultimately chooses to act on that opportunity by 
starting a new firm.  
What have we learned from reviewing the literature on models of economic growth? 
The neoclassical model taught us that in the long run, per capita GDP (Y/L) depends 
on exogenous technological change and the growth rate of the population. The AK 
model aggregated capital accumulation and technological progress and suggests 
that increasing savings and improving the efficiency of resource allocation is 
important for a higher long-run growth rate. Romer (1990) submitted that productivity 
growth comes from an expanding variety of innovations. Thus countries that seek to 
attain a higher level of growth should invest in R&D and human capital to increase 
their product variety.   
The Schumpeterian paradigm submits that growth is generated by a random 
sequence of quality-improving innovations. It embodies Schumpeter’s (1942) idea of 
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“creative destruction”. Thus, growth results from innovations that raise productivity by 
improving the quality not merely the quantity of product varieties. The Schumpeterian 
model explicitly models radical innovation and assigns an important role to entry and 
exit of firms and the mobility of workers. Further, the theory distinguishes between 
implementing existing innovations and developing new innovations. This implies that 
countries that are well developed and technologically sophisticated tend to focus on 
radical innovation and conversely, developing countries are usually in catch-up 
mode. Audretsch and Keilbach (2005) note that there is a gap existing between 
investments in knowledge and the commercialization of knowledge (or economic 
knowledge) because knowledge spill-overs are bounded by geography and 
transaction costs (Anselin et al., 2000 and Cohen et al., 2000). Audretsch and 
Keilbach (2005) contend that only entrepreneurship can penetrate the knowledge 
filter as entrepreneurs use knowledge generated in one organizational context in 
another, to create a new firm, thus facilitating the spill-over of knowledge and 
permeating the knowledge filter. 
The following section reviews entrepreneurship theory at the firm level. We discuss 
the nature of opportunity; whether opportunities are discovered or created and link 
those debates to economics literature. Further, we also formally introduce the 
construct EO, discuss its dimensions and performance implications; and link it to the 
aggregate level. 
2.4 Entrepreneurship theory 
Opportunity is the central construct of entrepreneurship theory (Venkataraman, 
1997). Schumpeter (1942) suggested that that creative destruction processes occur 
when new opportunities displace existing business models. Entrepreneurs are said 
to find, make and recognize these opportunities (Alvarez and Barney, 2007; 
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Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri and Venkataraman, 2003). Eckhardt and Shane (2003, 
p. 336) suggest opportunities are “situations in which new goods, services, raw 
materials, markets and organizing methods can be introduced through the formation 
of new means, ends, or means-ends relationships.” According to Sarasvathy et al. 
(2003, p. 142), “An entrepreneurial opportunity consists of a set of ideas, beliefs and 
actions that enable the creation of future goods and services in the absence of 
current markets for them”. Likewise, Shane (2003, p. 22) submits that 
entrepreneurship is “an activity that involves the discovery, evaluation, and 
exploitation of opportunities to introduce new goods and services, ways of 
organizing, markets, processes, and raw materials through organizing efforts that 
previously had not existed.”  In fact, Busenitz, West, Shephard, Nelson, Chandler 
and Zacharakis (2003) contend that opportunity is an important concept that frames 
the boundary and exchange conditions of the entrepreneurship field.  
Entrepreneurship can manifest at different levels of analysis. Amit, Glosten, and 
Mueller (1993) contend that entrepreneurship can happen within an incumbent firm. 
In addition, opportunities can also be sold to existing organizations or to other 
individuals. Shane and Venkataraman (2000) assert that entrepreneurship does not 
necessitate, but may include, the formation of new firms. Further, they maintain that 
even though finding an opportunity is a necessary prerequisite for entrepreneurship, 
it is not sufficient. They argue that it is the uniqueness of opportunities themselves 
that persuade people to exploit them. Following the discovery of an opportunity, an 
entrepreneur must still decide whether to exploit the opportunity or not. Additionally, 
Shane and Venkataraman (2000) suggest that the development of an 
entrepreneurial opportunity necessitates that the entrepreneur believes that the 
expected discounted value of the entrepreneurial endeavour will be sufficient to 
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offset the opportunity cost of other opportunities foregone, the lack of liquidity of the 
investment of time and money and a premium for bearing risk (Kirzner, 1973; 
Schumpeter, 1934). They further note that the exploitation of opportunities by 
entrepreneurs is shaped by the following factors: 
 “Large expected demand  (Schmookler, 1966; Schumpeter, 1934),  
 high industry profit margins (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1988), 
 a young technology life cycle  (Utterback, 1994), 
 the density of competition in a particular opportunity space is neither too low 
nor too high (Hannan and Freeman, 1984), 
 that the cost of capital is low (Shane, 1996), and 
 population-level learning from other entrants is available (Aldrich and 
Wiedenmeyer, 1993)”.  
Thus research at the firm level has demonstrated that, on the aggregate, 
entrepreneurs develop opportunities with greater expected value. However, what are 
the factors that shape how entrepreneurial opportunities are created or discovered?   
Literature suggests that decision biases that affect strategic decision makers (Gaglio, 
2004), the availability of social capital (De Carolis and Saparito, 2006), engagement 
in behavioural, cognitive and action learning (Lumpkin and Lichtenstein, 2005) and 
past experiences (Bingham, Eisenhardt and Furr, 2007) are some of the factors that 
have an impact on the discovery, creation and implementation of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. In addition, Shane (2001) shows that prior distribution of knowledge 
decides who detects opportunities. Opportunity recognition has also been associated 
with pattern recognition (Baron and Ensley, 2006) and the ability to observe and 
experiment (Dyer, Gregersen and Christensen, 2008). Although considerable efforts 
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have been made to understand the antecedents of opportunities, this research has 
mainly been conducted at the individual level of analysis. We are still not clear about 
how opportunities are discovered and exploited at the aggregate level.  
Moreover, scholars have also investigated the potential moderators of the individual-
opportunity nexus. Moderators include individuals’ ability to develop social capital as 
well as their cognitions (De Carolis and Saparito, 2006), firm age (Patterson, 1993), 
low opportunity costs (Amit, Muller and Cockburn, 1995), risk and uncertainty 
(McMullen and Shepherd, 2006) and at the level of the firm, the skills needed to 
identify opportunities (Hitt, Ireland, Camp and Sexton, 2001). Lastly, research 
suggests that the outcomes of opportunity development are firm founding (Shane, 
2001), small firm growth (Davidsson, 1991) and new venture growth (Thakur, 1999). 
The emphasis in literature on new firm creation emanating from opportunity 
exploitation is inspired by Schumpeter’s (1934) notion of creative destruction.  
2.4.1 Discovery or Creation 
 
As previously stated, opportunity is the fundamental construct of entrepreneurship 
theory and there is broad consensus in literature that entrepreneurship entails the 
finding of opportunities as well as the exploitation of those opportunities 
(Venkataraman, 1997). However, entrepreneurship literature differs on how these 
opportunities manifest. Are they discovered or created (Alvarez and Barney, 2007)? 
Thus there is no agreement regarding the nature of opportunities (Hansen and 
Shrader, 2007). Opportunities are depicted as either existing certainties ready to be 
discovered or as a representation of an entrepreneur’s distinctive vision (Alvarez and 
Barney, 2007).  
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Discovery theory posits that vigilant entrepreneurs systematically search the 
environment for opportunities to provide new services or products. Shane (2003) 
suggests that political as well as regulatory vagaries, technological transformations, 
and social and demographic vagaries are a source of these opportunities. 
Conversely, Sarasvathy and Venkataraman (2011) question how and by whom are 
these opportunities left for the vigilant entrepreneur to find and cash in?  In contrast 
to discovery theory, they suggest that opportunities emanate from the 
entrepreneurial process itself. Therefore, creation theory submits that the 
entrepreneurial process is the vital source of these economic opportunities. In this 
model, entrepreneurs do not wait for exogenous shocks to form opportunities and 
then provide agency to those opportunities, they act (Baker and Nelson, 2005; 
Sarasvathy, 2001a).  
Short, Ketchen, Shook and Ireland (2010) suggest that literature will converge to a 
balanced position that acknowledges that some opportunities are created whereas 
others are discovered. This debate is analogous to the debate in economics 
literature that questions whether innovative or imitative entrepreneurship facilitates 
economic growth. Schumpeterian growth theory suggests that entrepreneurship is 
highly context-dependent. Consequently, in well developed countries, where the 
focus is on radical innovation that can’t be merely observed by alert entrepreneurs, 
the emphasis would be on exploration and creation. In contrast, alert entrepreneurs 
in developing countries that are in catch-up mode, can recognise and implement 
innovations from advanced countries that help their nations draw near the global 
technology frontier. Thus, literature at both the aggregate and the firm-level seems to 
be converging towards the same understanding.  
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2.5 Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) 
In the preceding section we have reviewed literature on the individual-opportunity 
nexus and addressed whether these opportunities are created or discovered. In this 
section we review the literature on firm-level entrepreneurship in particular, EO and 
link EO to the aggregate level.   
Lumpkin and Dess (1996, p. 136) define EO as “the processes, practices and 
decision-making activities that lead to new entry”.  Pearce, Fritz and Davis (2010, p. 
219) characterize EO as “a set of distinct but related behaviours that have the 
qualities of innovativeness, proactiveness, competitive aggressiveness, risk taking 
and autonomy.” Gartner (1988) contends that entrepreneurship manifests through 
actions. This implies that EO is behaviour that can be observed through the display 
of sustained innovation, risk taking and action that is crucial to the exploration, 
creation and exploitation of opportunities (Covin and Lumpkin, 2011).  
Covin and Lumpkin (2011) assert that the occasional exhibition of entrepreneurial 
behaviour is insufficient to infer the existence of an EO. This entrepreneurial 
behaviour has to persist over time for entities to be deemed entrepreneurial. Miller 
(1983) posits that EO is a construct that encapsulates what it means to be 
entrepreneurial.   Covin and Lumpkin (2011) concur that the construct of EO signifies 
what it means for a firm to be entrepreneurial at the most basic level.  Thus EO is the 
manifestation of what it means to be entrepreneurial, represented by behaviour 
sustained over time, which is shared by entities exhibiting entrepreneurship. Table 1 
lists the definitions of EO as they have evolved from the early 1970s till today. 
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Table 1: Definitions of Entrepreneurial Orientation 
Mintzberg (1973)  
 
Miller and Friesen 
(1982) 
“In the entrepreneurial mode, strategy-making is dominated by the active search for new 
opportunities” as well as “dramatic leaps forward in the face of uncertainty” (p. 45). 
“The entrepreneurial model applies to firms that innovate boldly and regularly while taking 
considerable risks in their product-market strategies” (p. 5). 
Miller (1983)  “An entrepreneurial firm is one that engages in product-market innovation, undertakes 
somewhat risky ventures, and is first to come up with ‘proactive’ innovations, beating 
competitors to the punch” (p. 771). 
Merz and Sauber 
(1995) “. 
“Entrepreneurial orientation is defined as the firm’s degree of proactiveness 
(aggressiveness) in its chosen product-market unit (PMU) and its willingness to innovate 
and create new offerings” (p. 554) 
Lumpkin and 
Dess (1996) 
 “EO refers to the processes, practices, and decision-making activities that lead to new 
entry as willingness to innovate and take-risks, and a tendency to be aggressive toward 
competitors and characterized by one, or more of the following dimensions: a propensity to 
act autonomously, a proactive relative to marketplace opportunities” (pp. 136–137). 
Zahra and 
Neubaum (1998) 
EO is “the sum total of a firm’s radical innovation, proactive strategic action, and risk taking 
activities that are manifested in support of projects with uncertain outcomes” (p. 124) 
Voss, Voss, and 
Moorman (2005), 
“We define EO as a firm-level disposition to engage in behaviours [reflecting risk-taking 
innovativeness, proactiveness, autonomy, and competitive aggressiveness] that lead to 
change in the organization or marketplace” (p. 1134, [ ] added). 
Cools and Van 
den Broeck 
(2007/2008) 
“Entrepreneurial orientation (EO) refers to the top management’s strategy in relation to 
innovativeness, proactiveness and risk taking” (p. 27). 
Pearce, Fritz and 
Davis (2010)  
“An EO is conceptualized as a set of distinct but related behaviours that have the qualities 
of innovativeness, proactiveness, competitive aggressiveness, risk taking, and autonomy” 
(p. 219). 
Source: Covin and Wales (2012, p.3) 
Although EO has mainly been researched as a firm-level phenomenon (Covin and 
Lumpkin, 2011), it can also manifest at different levels of aggregation. For example, 
EO can be exhibited by a firm (Keh, Nguyen and Ng, 2007), a spin-off (Walter et al., 
2006) and/or an individual (Poon, Ainuddin and Junit, 2006). In addition, as Miller 
(2011) has suggested, EO can also manifest at the aggregate level. Further, we note 
48 | P a g e  
 
the anomaly that although the corporate entrepreneurship literature has converged 
on EO as the appropriate description of entrepreneurial behaviour, literature at the 
aggregate level, which purports to aggregate firm level behaviour, still measures 
entrepreneurship as a stock variable and considers only one of the composite 
elements, innovation, as reflective of entrepreneurial behaviour. Risk taking and 
proactiveness are ignored. Therefore, in this study, we address this anomaly and 
view EO as aggregate level sustained behaviour and the appropriate unit of analysis 
is the nation state. Consequently, we analyse the content of entrepreneurship at the 
aggregate level.  
2.5.1 The Dimensions of EO 
 
The dimensionality of EO has not been resolved in the literature. At the firm level, 
Miller (1983) has suggested it is a unidimensional construct with the expectation that 
all three dimensions innovativeness, risk taking and proactiveness are 
simultaneously displayed. Therefore, we embrace Miller’s (1983) conception of EO 
as a composite of three dimensions: innovativeness, risk taking and proactiveness 
(Miller, 1983, Covin and Slevin, 1997).  
2.5.2 Innovativeness 
 
The first of the three dimensions, innovativeness, is defined by Lumpkin and Dess 
(1996, p. 142) as a firm's inclination “to engage in and support new ideas, novelty, 
experimentation and creative processes that may result in new products, services or 
technological processes”. Innovation is classified as either product-market innovation 
and/or technological innovation and it is an important element of how firms explore or 
create opportunities and thus it is a vital element of EO.  
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At the aggregate level, innovation has also been deemed crucial for growth. 
Theoretically, the Schumpeterian paradigm suggests vertical innovations that 
replace existing products are the main sources of economics growth. Similarly, 
Romer (1990) also noted that productivity growth comes from an expanding variety 
of innovations. Freeman and Soete (1997) concur with the assertion that 
innovativeness is positively related to growth. However, they contend that innovation 
is also shaped by the external environment. They argue that innovation interacts with 
institutions, culture and policies to impact economic growth and therefore it is the 
broader national systems of innovation that facilitates development, not merely R&D.  
The innovation-output nexus also has been empirically verified in the literature 
(Mansfield, 1981; Hall and Mairesse, 2006). Hasan and Tucci (2010) use global 
patent data to evaluate the association between both the quality and quantity of 
innovation as well as economic growth.  Employing a sample of 58 countries 
between 1980 and 2003, Hasan and Tucci (2010) show that both innovation input 
and output are positively related to GDP growth nearly across all economic stages of 
economic development. They argue that firstly, countries that host entrepreneurial 
firms with superior quality patents grow faster and secondly, that an increase in the 
rate of patenting results in higher GDP per capita.  
Innovativeness enhances development by facilitating knowledge flows and 
technological spill-overs that benefit all enterprises (Griliches, 1992), and improving 
productivity as well as new firm formation (Kirchhoff, 1994). Similarly, Wennekers 
and Thurik (1999) find that innovation spurs economy wide productivity, new 
business formation, employment growth as well as output growth by encouraging 
entrepreneurial firms to upgrade and diffuse their technological capabilities 
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(Audretsch, 1995). Therefore, innovativeness is important for countries that seek to 
increase their product variety and consequently attain a higher level of growth.  
2.5.2 Risk taking 
The second of the three dimensions, risk taking, is defined by Miller (1983) as the 
preparedness to commit resources to opportunities and accept business risk without 
the certainty of knowing whether those resources will be recovered. Shapira (1995) 
suggests that risk reflects the distribution of uncertain outcomes and their 
probabilities. Therefore, a risky investment is one for where the variance in outcomes 
is large. Since decision makers prefer low compared to higher risk (Shapira, 1995), 
precarious investments in innovation and its diffusion may as a result suffer from a 
lack of investment. Di Gregorio (2005) suggests that entrepreneurial firms are adept 
at coping with and surmounting uncertainty. They ameliorate risk by adopting 
strategies that exploit the existence of uncertainty and the maximization of upside 
risk. They employ arbitrage/prediction, real options, control and adaptation to exploit 
opportunities and maximise upside risk. Therefore, firms that employ these 
entrepreneurial risk management strategies enable investment leading to economic 
growth.  
Furthermore, Comin and Philippon (2006) suggest that firm level risk taking 
enhances economic growth by reducing aggregate level volatility. Risk taking and 
the resultant increase in firm level volatility reduce aggregate level volatility by 
decreasing the correlation of growth rates amongst different firms. Empirically, 
Comin and Philippon (2006) find that firm correlation with the rest of the economy is 
somewhat moderated by new firm entry as well as high variance enhancing R&D 
activity. Similarly, Chun, Ha and Kim (2014) confirm a link between firm 
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heterogeneity and long-run economic growth. Using U.S. firm-level data they 
demonstrate that firms' technological heterogeneity enables R&D financiers to 
diversify, resulting in higher R&D investment and as a consequence, higher long-run 
economic growth. Therefore, firm heterogeneity occasioned by risk taking may 
reduce aggregate volatility and enhance economic growth due to the diversification 
benefit which enables the financing of even more risk taking! 
Empirical literature has investigated possible barriers to such investment and risk-
taking, such as the lack of financial development. Financial development facilitates 
risk taking by enabling entry of new competitors as well as reducing collateral 
constraints (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1996), leading to lower aggregate 
volatility and higher growth. King and Levine (1993) have argued that financial 
intermediaries are useful at identifying entrepreneurs who can manage risks and 
improve the rate of technological innovation. They analysed cross-country data and 
found that financial development correlates with long-run economic growth, capital 
accumulation and productivity growth. Similarly, Rajan and Zingales (1998) used 
cross-industry sectoral-level data and found that growth in sectors that relied on 
external finance was positively related to financial development. Thus investment, 
risk taking and antecedents to risk taking, such as a financial market development, 
are clearly associated, according to the literature, with economic growth. 
2.5.3 Proactiveness 
The third and last of the three dimensions, proactiveness, is defined by Miller (1983) 
as the tendency to engage in strategies of proactive engagement to build the 
business rather than those of harvest or retrenchment (Miller, 1983).  Lumpkin and 
Dess (1996) suggest that being proactive implies taking initiative to anticipate and 
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pursue new opportunities. In addition, Venkataraman (1989, p. 949) has described 
proactiveness as “seeking new opportunities which may or may not be related to the 
present line of operations, introduction of new products and brands ahead of 
competition, strategically eliminating operations which are in the mature or declining 
stages of life cycle". Therefore, using Venkataraman’s (1989) definition, we assert 
that proactiveness relates to activities of search and discovery of opportunities.  
Firm level literature has positively associated EO with international search and 
discovery activities such as exporting (Ibeh and Young, 2001), internationalization 
preparation (Knight, 2001), export performance (Mostafa, Wheeler and Jones, 2005) 
and global technological competencies and unique products development (Knight 
and Cavusgil, 2004). At the aggregate level, Schumpeterian growth theory provides 
support for these activities of search and discovery. It suggests that growth can 
emanate from implementing existing innovations discovered by alert countries. 
Pietrobelli (1996) suggests that countries that are proactive and engage in activities 
of search and discovery access existing innovations through:  
 “The movement of goods through international trade;  
 The movement of capital through inward and outward foreign direct investment 
(FDI and OFDI) 
 The movement of people through migration, travel, and foreign education of 
students and workers; 
 international research collaboration and; 
 diffusion through media and internet of disembodied knowledge”;  
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2.5.4 EO and Performance 
 
Literature on the EO-performance relationship has been mainly at the firm-level. We 
highlight some of the literature that may have relevance for our study. Rauch et al. 
(2009) carried out a meta-analysis of 51 research papers that investigated the EO-
performance association and they found the “true” correlation between EO and firm 
performance is 0.24. The EO-performance association has also been examined in 
emerging economies, with quite fascinating results. Su, Xie and Li (2011) and Tang, 
Tang, Marino, Zhang and Li (2008) investigated the role of EO in firm performance in 
a Chinese context.  Both studies established that the EO–performance relationship is 
inverse U-shaped in new businesses whereas it is positive in established firms. They 
submit that this is “because new ventures suffer from the liability of newness” 
(Freeman, Carroll and Hannan, 1983 p. 559) and that “established firms have the 
resources, legitimacies and social ties and role formalization” that new ventures lack.  
Rauch et al. (2009) argue that EO exhibits a comparable relation between perceived 
financial performance, perceived nonfinancial indicators of performance, and archival 
performance at the firm-level. Further, they suggest that “the EO-performance 
relationship remains robust to modifications in performance dimensions and common 
method variance, memory decay or social desirability concomitant with self-reporting 
of performance does not generally constitute a peril to the validity of the EO-
performance relationship” (p. 780). It is importance to note that this EO-performance 
relation has been only established at the firm level. What are the aggregate level 
implications?  
To conclude, we view EO as a composite of innovativeness, risk taking and pro-
activeness. Further, it aggregates the important variables the different economic 
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schools of thought seem to emphasize: risk taking (the AK model), proactiveness 
(Schumpeterian model) and innovativeness (Romer’s product variety model). In 
addition, we deem EO to be a sustained behaviour not disposition, unidimensional 
and the unit of analysis is the aggregate level. Further, we argue that at the 
aggregate level EO is best characterised as a joint function of innovation, 
proactiveness and risk taking.  We suggest that this is the appropriate definition of 
entrepreneurship at the aggregate level and that entrepreneurial countries manifest 
innovative, risk taking and proactive behaviour. Further, context matters at the 
aggregate level. This is consistent with the arguments of Miller (1983) and Covin and 
Slevin (1989) and Schumpeterian theory. In the following paragraphs, we will review 
literature on the entrepreneurship growth-nexus and ask: do countries that innovate, 
take risks and act, achieve higher GDP per capita growth? 
2.6 The entrepreneurship growth-nexus  
Entrepreneurship is deemed important to economic growth. Audretsch, Keilbach and 
Lehmann (2006, p. 5) argue that “entrepreneurship makes an important contribution 
to economic growth by providing a conduit for the spill-over of knowledge that might 
otherwise have remained un-commercialized.” Entrepreneurs are deemed to engage 
in innovation and business activities that lead to knowledge spill-over, technological 
progress and innovation (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996), thus facilitating economic 
growth. In empirical analyses Audretsch and Keilbach (2004) find that 
entrepreneurship has a positive relationship with growth in industrial and transition 
countries. Similarly, Berkowitz and Dejong (2005) find that entrepreneurship in post-
Soviet Russia, subject to institutional and policy constraints, is positively related to 
growth. Further, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) compare entrepreneurship in four 
transition economies and find that the relative success of a transition program is 
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shaped by the quality of entrepreneurs in the transition economy.  Likewise, Acs, 
Audretsch, Braunerhjelm and Carlsson (2012) investigate the relation in 18 countries 
using panel data and find that entrepreneurship; R&D and human capital are 
positively associated with economic growth. Lastly, van Praag and Versloot’s (2007) 
meta-analysis of 57 studies finds that entrepreneurs contribute to employment 
creation, productivity growth and innovation. 
However, van Stel, Carree and Thurik (2005) suggest that the entrepreneurship-
growth nexus is non-existent in developing or poorer countries and the impact of 
entrepreneurship on growth seems to depend on context. Wong, Ho, and Autio 
(2005) submit that entrepreneurial activities in developing countries do not equate to 
higher economic growth. Larroulet and Couyoumdjian (2009) suggest that in Latin 
American countries the link between entrepreneurship and growth is low since the 
high levels of entrepreneurship exhibited do not lead to high levels of economic 
growth. Naude (2011) submits that this weak relationship in developing countries is 
largely because most entrepreneurs in poor countries operate in the informal sector 
and informality in poor countries is a way of escaping poverty and starvation. Naude 
(2011) contends that given the nature of informality, necessity entrepreneurial 
endeavors are less likely to be productive, compared to opportunity 
entrepreneurship. Similarly Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) posit that 
informal entrepreneurs are generally not seen as drivers of economic growth and 
consequently, Banerjee and Duflo (2007, p. 162) warn that “it is important not to 
romanticize these penniless entrepreneurs.”  
In spite of the preceding paragraph, the inconsistent link between entrepreneurship 
and growth is not merely because of the presence of informal sector entrepreneurs 
in poor countries.  Koellinger (2008) suggests that the majority of business start-ups 
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in developed countries also engage in marginal, replicative economic activity or fail 
soon after their foundation. Further, he notes that the potential impact of these 
marginal entrepreneurs on the macro-economy is trivial. Likewise, Bowen and de 
Clercq (2008) submit that marginal entrepreneurs are motivated by a lack of 
employment alternatives and thus, an upsurge in unemployment during recessions 
prompts growth of marginal entrepreneurship (Thurik, Carree, Van Stel and 
Audretsch, 2008 and Faria, Cuestas and Mourelle, 2010). In both developed and 
developing economies, informal replicative entrepreneurs who are not innovative 
proliferate. Baumol, Litan and Schramm (2007, p. 3) note that “replicative 
entrepreneurship is important in most economies because it represents a route out 
of poverty, a means by which people with little capital, education, or experience can 
earn a living. But if economic growth is the object of interest, then it is the innovative 
entrepreneur who matters.” Clearly, this implies that the causes of the weak link 
between entrepreneurship, defined as a stock variable, and growth are less causal 
and deeper than the informal sector in poor countries.  
We submit that the confusion emanates from the theoretical and empirical 
misunderstanding of the entrepreneurship-growth nexus.  In economics literature, the 
Solow model (1956), Romer’s (1990) product variety model and the Schumpeterian 
growth model, economic growth is generated by technological change. Whereas 
Solow’s model does not account for how technological change comes about, Romer 
(1990) endogenizes technological change by submitting that it is a result of 
knowledge and human capital accumulated within the economy. The Schumpeterian 
model adds vertical innovation to the endogenous growth model based on 
Schumpeter’s (1934) notion of creative destruction that could account for the impact 
of entry and exit on the growth process. Thus the theoretical literature on 
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endogenous growth submits that technological change, which is occasioned by 
entrepreneurship, is vital for economic growth.  
However, in some empirical work this technological change is merely defined as 
expenditure on R&D. This characterization does not explain how innovation is 
diffused. As Schumpeter (1912, pp. 88-89) noted:  
“Economic leadership in particular must hence be distinguished from ‘invention’. As long as they are not 
carried into practice, inventions are economically irrelevant. And to carry any improvement into effect is 
a task entirely different from the inventing of it, and a task, moreover, requiring entirely different kinds of 
aptitudes. Although entrepreneurs of course may be inventors just as they may be capitalists, they are 
inventors not by nature of their function but by coincidence and vice versa ... it is, therefore, not 
advisable, and it may be downright misleading, to stress the element of invention as much as many 
writers do”.  
Minniti and Lévesque (2010) argue that literature on economic growth concentrates 
on R&D since historically there has been a positive association between growth and 
sustained research investments (Peretto, 1999). However, Acs, Arenius, Hay and 
Minniti (2005) note that countries, such as Sweden and Japan, which have large 
R&D expenditure compared to China, have experienced zero or low growth whereas 
China has grown significantly with minimal R&D expenditure (Hsiao and Shen, 
2003).   
Where researchers have also sought to directly measure entrepreneurship, 
Koellinger and Thurik (2012) contend that the definition of entrepreneurship they use 
seems to change to fit the results. They argue that scholars have erroneously used 
the self-employment ratio, R&D expenditure, total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) of 
the GEM, opportunity entrepreneurship and the ratio between necessity and 
opportunity as an indicator of entrepreneurship only if it seems positively associated 
with economic growth. The only common factor with these measures is that they 
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deem entrepreneurship to be a stock variable or they only consider one of the 
composite elements, innovation, as a reflection of entrepreneurial behaviour. Risk 
taking and proactiveness are ignored. 
However, as we have argued in the preceding paragraphs, at the aggregate level 
entrepreneurship is best characterized as EO. Therefore, innovative countries also 
have to assume risks, invest and proactively attack international and domestic 
markets in diffusing the technologies in order to grow. It follows that merely counting 
the number of new firms and/or the number of self-employed will tell us very little 
about innovation, risk taking and pro-activeness and consequently nothing about 
entrepreneurship and growth. As we have noted in the preceding paragraphs, 
marginal entrepreneurs, for example street vendors (Sonobe, Akoten and Otsuka, 
2011), do not innovate, do not take risks and are certainly not proactive. Thus, the 
studies assessing the entrepreneurship-growth nexus have shown conflicting results 
precisely because they have not been studying what they are purporting to study. 
Moreover, although the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth 
is often assumed, the exact nature of such a relationship is still unknown (Minniti and 
Lévesque, 2010), since EO has not been investigated at the aggregate level. 
2.7 Institutional and policy drivers of entrepreneurship 
 
We have a limited understanding of why rates of EO vary across countries and why 
some countries may be more innovative, risk taking and pro-active than others. As 
previously stated, EO has been researched mainly as a firm level phenomenon and 
antecedents such as firm size, technology and environmental hostility have been 
identified (Raunch et al., 2009). However, at the aggregate level potential drivers 
have not been investigated. 
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Entrepreneurship literature suggests institutions and policy variables such as the 
stock of human capital are possible antecedents of entrepreneurship. Economic 
growth in Schumpeterian theory is highly context-dependent, thus we would expect 
the effect of institutions and the stock of human capital on entrepreneurship to vary 
depending on the distance to the technological frontier. Naude (2011) argues that 
institutions help create an environment where entrepreneurship can thrive and help 
economic growth. Vivarelli (2012) suggests that institutions may be particularly 
important in developing countries where entrepreneurs face a hostile environment in 
comparison with developed economies. Howitt (2000) submits that countries behind 
the technological frontier, will exhibit more replicative entrepreneurship partly 
because of institutional barriers and poor education. Larroulet and Couyoumdjian 
(2009) contend that weak institutions occasion risk-averse investment behavior as 
seen in societies with financial-market constraints and politic instability. In addition, 
they note that the quality of entrepreneurship also varies because of international 
differences in the stocks of human capital. Therefore, they assert that the lack of 
human capital as well as weak institutions may explain the weak relationship 
between entrepreneurship and economic growth in poor countries.  
Although institutions may indeed be important in shaping entrepreneurship, Naude 
(2011) argues that a number of dynamics muddle our understanding of the role of 
institutions. Firstly, he suggests that institutions are endogenous and as a result are 
a product of economic development; secondly, entrepreneurs themselves may 
shape institutions; thirdly, policy reforms required to create good institutions may be 
contingent and subject to other factors; fourthly, institutional reform may result in the 
further entrenchment of parasitic elites and a rise in rent seeking behavior and lastly, 
inequality may impact institutional reforms and institutional building. 
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Nevertheless, institutions and policies have largely been investigated in literature as 
determinants of economic growth. However, we argue they are, correctly, the 
determinants of risk taking, proactiveness and innovativeness, and not necessarily 
direct determinants of economic growth. Therefore, institutions and policies enable 
EO, thus facilitating economic growth.  As Abramovitz (1994, p. 24) suggests, the 
determinants and drivers of technological upgrading can be characterised as the 
“countries’ level of education and technical competence, the commercial, industrial 
and financial institutions that bear on their abilities to finance and operate modern, 
large-scale business, and the political and social characteristics that influence the 
risks, the incentives and the personal rewards of economic activity”. Therefore, we 
investigate financial market development, social cohesion, human capital and the 
control of corruption as potentially important factors that may affect the rate of 
entrepreneurship across countries (Biggs and Srivastava, 1996, Aterido et. al, 2009). 
In the following section, we will review literature on these potentially important 
determinants and drivers of EO. 
2.7.1 Financial Market Development 
 
To begin with, Schumpeter (1912) made the theoretical argument that financial 
institutions are important for growth because they evaluate and finance 
entrepreneurs’ innovation and launching of new products to market and thus their 
absence would inhibit EO and consequently decrease the rate of economic growth. 
Levine (2005, p.6) concurs and posits that “financial development involves 
improvements in the (i) production of ex ante information about possible 
investments, (ii) monitoring of investments and implementation of corporate 
governance, (iii) trading, diversification, and management of risk, (iv) mobilization 
61 | P a g e  
 
and pooling of savings, and (v) exchange of goods and services”. Thus financial 
institutions, through executing these functions, may affect savings and investment 
decisions and consequently economic growth.  
The relation between financial development and growth has also been evaluated 
empirically. King and Levine (1993) evaluate the relation between financial 
development and growth amongst 77 countries during the 1960 to 1989 period. They 
find that financial development is positively associated with long-run growth across 
developed and developing countries as well as sub-Saharan African countries. Beck, 
Levine and Loayza (2000) employ panel VAR estimates and show a similarly 
significant, positive causal effect of financial development on economic growth. 
Furthermore, countries with high levels of financial market development are better 
able to support the growth of capital intensive industries (Rajan and Zingales, 1998 
and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2008). In contrast, developing 
countries are unable to support infant industries since firms are credit and equity 
rationed (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008).  
Financial institutions and markets ease the trading, hedging, and pooling of risk, thus 
impacting economic growth by varying resource distribution and savings rates. This 
encourages investment in projects with higher risk and superior expected returns 
(Devereux and Smith, 1994; Obstfeld, 1995 and Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Thus, 
financial sector distortions can inhibit entrepreneurship and consequently decrease 
the rate of economic growth (King and Levine, 1993). Levine (2005, p. 85) 
summarises the empirical literature on the link between financial development and 
growth and concludes that “the preponderance of evidence suggests that both 
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financial intermediaries and markets matter for growth even when controlling for 
potential simultaneity bias”. 
However, Khan and Senhadji (2003) question the association between banking 
development indicators and economic growth. They show that when using panels to 
estimate growth equations, this relation becomes statistically insignificant. Likewise, 
Zhang (2003) employ both panel data and time-series data for 8 Asian countries for 
the1960-99 period and demonstrate that banking development hinders economic 
growth. Levine (2002) suggests that these contradictory results could be because 
banks with market power may extract a greater share of future profits from firms than 
they should; secondly, banks are conservative and thus a large banking sector may 
hinder firm innovation and growth; and lastly, in firms with poor cooperate 
governance, banks may connive with inefficient managers if these managers serve 
their interests (Black and Moersch 1998).  
Shen and Lee (2006) also investigate the relationship between financial 
development and real GDP per capita growth in 48 countries. They demonstrate that 
only stock market development has a positive relation with economic growth. On the 
other hand, banking development hinders growth especially in middle-income, Latin 
American, Sub-Saharan African and East Asian countries. Lee and Mathews (2010) 
argue that for developing countries, it’s not only the size of the banking sector that 
matters but the manipulation of interest rates. Interest rates should be kept low for 
industries targeted for catch up and allowed to float higher in non-targeted sectors. 
They note all the successful countries of northeast Asia followed this policy of 
“financial restraint” (Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 1997). 
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2.7.2 Social Cohesion 
Social cohesion is defined by Easterly (2006, p. 4) as “the nature and extent of social 
and economic divisions within society”. Baumol et al. (2007) posit that in many 
unequal societies the existence of unproductive, parasitic elites may frustrate 
entrepreneurship. Similarly, Persson and Tabellini (1991) submit that inequality is 
harmful to economic growth. Using two data sets, the first one pools data from the 
19th century for the U.S. and eight European countries and the second one is 
comprised of data from a broad section of both developed and developing countries. 
They find that for both samples inequality is negatively related to economic growth. 
Persson and Tabellini (1991) argue that this negative relation exists since in a 
society with distributional conflict growth promoting activities such as the 
accumulation of capital and the production of knowledge are likely to be constrained. 
Socially cohesive countries are therefore more likely to support EO because of their 
greater ability to collaborate and develop innovations. Further, the risks inherent in 
uncertain, long-term investments are more likely to be borne by all members of 
society, not just the poor. Moreover, the proactive actions necessary to attack new 
markets require purposeful, cohesive action that is more likely in cohesive societies 
with agreed on long-term objectives than other scenarios. 
In contrast, Forbes (2000) finds a positive relationship between inequality and 
growth. Banerjee and Duflo (2003) suggest changes in inequality in either direction 
lower growth. Similarly, Barro (2000) also finds that association between inequality 
and growth depends on the level of economic development. He finds that higher 
inequality lowers growth in poor countries whereas it promotes growth in developed 
countries. He submits that the Kuznets curve, which implies a decline in inequality 
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with rising income, is a clear empirical regularity. Shin (2012) explains Barro’s (2000) 
findings by suggesting that in developed countries the rich save more than the poor, 
thus enabling the capital accumulation necessary for growth. Therefore any income 
redistribution would reduce the savings needed for investment and growth. In 
contrast, the poor are under credit constraint in developing countries. As a result 
they do not participate in investing or production activity. Further, in volatile and poor 
countries, income inequality may lead to political and social instability that causes 
economic growth to decline. Likewise, Berg and Ostry (2011) suggest that higher 
inequality is robustly associated with a lack of growth persistence. They note that 
even poor countries have been able to attain high rates of growth for a few years. 
However, these countries have lacked the ability to sustain it. Berg and Ostry (2011) 
submit that closing the inequality gap could help poor countries enjoy longer growth 
spells.  
2.7.3 Corruption 
 
Baumol (1990) argues that corruption has a negative impact on entrepreneurship, 
which we define as EO. He contends that based on the quality of prevailing 
economic, political and legal institutions, entrepreneurship can be productive 
(innovation) or unproductive (rent seeking, corruption or organized crime). Likewise, 
Anokhin and Schulze (2009) note that high corruption may increase levels of 
uncertainty and transactions cost for an entrepreneur and consequently reduce the 
number of positive net present value opportunities that can be exploited. Thus 
reducing corruption may increase the number of innovative opportunities that are 
exploited. In empirical analysis, Anokhin and Schulze (2009) find a positive 
association between the control of corruption, productivity and investment in 
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innovation and entrepreneurship. Likewise, a positive relationship between the 
control of corruption and capital investment and foreign direct investment 
(Lambsdorff, 2003), per capita growth in GDP (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2003), bond 
spreads (Ciocchini, Durbin and Ng, 2003), and total factor productivity (Lambsdorff, 
2003; Rivera-Batiz, 2002), has been established.  
However, Ehrlich and Lui (1999) argue that higher corruption does not necessarily 
have a negative impact on economic growth. They find that corruption mediates the 
relation between growth and bureaucratic inefficiency such that, in countries with 
inefficient administration, corruption may facilitate growth. Similarly, Aidt, Dutta and 
Sena (2008) show that when corruption reduces bureaucratic meddling, its negative 
impact on growth is reduced. Further, Olken (2005) suggests that the majority of 
empirical studies do not measure objective corruption instead they calibrate people’s 
subjective perceptions of corruption. He examines villager’s perspective on 
corruption using both perception-based and objective measures. He finds that 
perceptions of corruption amongst villagers are affected by social trust and ethnic 
heterogeneity and cautions that using perceptions to measure corruption in countries 
that are not socially cohesive may lead to misleading results.  
Evrensel (2010) suggests the relationship between high corruption and growth may 
be more nuanced. He argues that high corruption may have negative relations with 
both economic growth and economic growth volatility. Evrensel (2010) uses the 
Ehrlich–Lui (1999) framework to study the corruption-economic growth volatility 
relation, using a cross-section dataset that contains 121 developed and developing 
countries. He finds that a higher control of corruption leads to reduced growth 
volatility. He posits that corruption may lead to increased growth volatility because 
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corrupt bureaucrats arbitrarily change economic policy, resulting in higher 
uncertainty and lower expected returns for investment. In particular, he contends that 
corruption may increase political instability which would then result in increased 
growth volatility. 
 
2.7.4 Human Capital 
 
Policy variables such as human capital have also been strongly associated with 
innovation and growth. Becker (1964) defines human capital as skills and knowledge 
that individuals acquire through investments in schooling, on-the-job training and 
other types of experience. Borensztein, Gregorio, and Lee (1998) find that human 
capital accumulation is crucial in absorbing spill-overs from FDI. Dakhli and De 
Clercq (2004) find strong support for the positive relationship between human capital 
and innovation. Millán, Congregado, Román, Praag and Stel (2012) find that a high 
share of people in a region holding tertiary education is also positively associated 
with the entrepreneur’s productivity. Further, Baptista and Mendonça (2010) posit 
that local access to knowledge and human capital significantly affects entry by 
knowledge-based firms. In particular, high stocks of human capital enhance the 
relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth by enabling 
entrepreneurs to pursue better quality opportunities (Larroulet and Couyoumdjian, 
2009).  
Schumpeterian models suggest that human capital is the critical factor that 
determines a country’s ability to imitate and learn advanced foreign technologies 
(Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Stokke, 2008). Unlike Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001), who emphasize the importance of institutions, Glaeser, Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2004) argue that Western colonizers facilitated development in 
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their colonies through the higher human capital they possessed, not institutions. Lee 
and Kim (2009) also argue that human capital is an important policy variable that 
facilitates technological upgrading amongst countries, therefore facilitating economic 
growth. They suggest that policy differences such as encouraging tertiary education 
and innovation can help explain the divergent outcomes in growth between East 
Asian economies and other middle income countries. Further, in empirical analysis 
using cross-section, fixed-effects panel and system-GMM estimations, Lee and Kim 
(2009) find that whereas secondary education and institutions are significant in 
enabling growth in lower-income countries, improving innovation and higher 
education is the “binding constraint” in upper middle-to- high income countries. An 
implication that can be drawn from the preceding literature is that levels of EO could 
be influenced by human capital since firstly, by definition EO is entrepreneurship and 
secondly, human capital directly impacts one of the composite elements of EO, 
innovation.  
2.8 Summary and Conclusion of literature review 
 
Schumpeter (1942) delineated an economic process of creative destruction and 
where the competitive entry of innovative new firms propelled the dynamic 
development of the economy. But how can this process of economic growth, which 
leads to a higher GDP per person and increased consumption, be initiated?  To 
answer this question, we adopt the Schumpeterian paradigm which suggests that 
growth is generated by a random sequence of quality-improving innovations and 
embodies Schumpeter’s (1942) idea of “creative destruction” together with a 
knowledge spill-over theory of economic growth that suggests that entrepreneurship 
is crucial to both imitation and dissemination of new innovations.  
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Moreover, we investigate the nation state as our basic unit of analysis. We ask: can 
one nation state devote more resources to innovative activity, take risks and invest 
more in longer term, uncertain outcomes and be more pro-active in diversifying its 
economic base than others? We also note the anomaly that although corporate 
entrepreneurship literature has converged on EO as the appropriate description of 
entrepreneurial behaviour, literature at the aggregate level, which purports to sum 
firm level behaviour, still measures entrepreneurship as a stock variable and further, 
considers only one of the composite elements, innovation, as a reflection of 
entrepreneurial behaviour. Risk taking and proactiveness are ignored.  
Furthermore, we proceed to review empirical literature on the entrepreneurship-
growth nexus and ask: How do entrepreneurial countries perform? We find an 
inconsistent link between entrepreneurship and growth is not merely because of the 
presence of informal sector entrepreneurs in poor countries. The literature suggests 
that the causes of the weak link between entrepreneurship, defined as a stock 
variable, and growth may be broader than the informal sector in poor countries since 
developed countries also show similar and inconclusive results.  
In conclusion, the main insight we ascertain from the review of literature is that 
theory suggests that entrepreneurship causes growth. However, the empirical results 
are inconclusive. We posit that the weak empirical link between entrepreneurship 
and growth emanates from the theoretical and empirical misunderstanding of the 
entrepreneurship-growth nexus. To remedy this concern, we propose EO as the 
manifestation of entrepreneurship.  Thus, we define and measure EO at the 
aggregate level and assess its’ impact on economic growth.                                      
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Chapter 3 
           DEFINING AND MEASURING EO AT THE AGGREGATE LEVEL 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we define the sub-constructs of EO, and carefully and methodically 
confirm both the validity and dimensionality of the second-order construct. EO as 
composite of innovativeness, risk taking and pro-activeness aggregates important 
variables that the disparate economic schools of thought seem to emphasize but 
view as distinct: risk taking (the AK model), proactiveness (Schumpeterian model) 
and innovativeness (Romer’s product variety model).  
As we discussed in the review of literature, the theoretical literature on endogenous 
growth submits that technological change, which is occasioned by entrepreneurship, 
is vital for economic growth. However, in empirical work this technological change 
has been reduced to invention without explaining how innovation is diffused. Where 
researchers have argued that entrepreneurship is critical for diffusing knowledge, 
they have measured entrepreneurship as a stock variable without justifying how 
simply increasing the number of self-employed linearly, inevitably results in 
technological change. 
Moreover, we note the anomaly that although corporate entrepreneurship literature 
has converged on EO as the appropriate description of entrepreneurial behaviour, 
literature at the aggregate level, which purports to aggregate firm level behaviour, 
still measures entrepreneurship as a stock variable and considers only one of its 
composite elements, innovation, as reflective of entrepreneurial behaviour. Risk 
taking and proactiveness are ignored. We argue that invention is not 
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entrepreneurship and therefore it is not sufficient to drive technological change. 
Innovations are by definition risky and need investment to be turned into products, 
firms or divisions of firms. Further, these products may still need to be proactively 
marketed in order to secure both domestic and international markets. Therefore, we 
address this anomaly and view EO as aggregate level sustained behaviour that is a 
composite function of innovativeness, risk taking and proactiveness.  
We define EO at the aggregate level as a joint function of enhancing innovative 
capabilities, investing in risky, unique and uncertain sectors, and proactively seeking 
new markets and advanced technology. We suggest that this is the appropriate 
definition of entrepreneurship at the aggregate level and it delineates whether 
countries are entrepreneurial or not.                      
3.1   Research Design 
The research design involves secondary, longitudinal, panel data.  Brooks (2008) 
notes that panel data contains both cross-sectional and time series elements and 
thus enables us to study our subject of interest over time. He suggests that the 
advantages of using panel data are that: 
 firstly, it allows us to study a broader range of problems compared to pure 
time series or cross sectional data, 
 secondly, it allows us to study how relationships between variables change 
over time and, 
 thirdly, it enables us to counter the impact of omitted variable bias in 
regression results. 
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In addition, secondary data is non-reactive, has high face validity and is quantifiable 
and thus there is no response bias (Nadler, 1977). The potential limitations of 
secondary data are:  
 it is difficult to access,  
 it has potential validity problems, and  
 it can lead to coding and interpretation errors.  
We note these concerns and proceed to construct a secondary data set from the 
CANA panel database and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). 
The CANA database is a recently constructed dataset comprising of 41 indicators for 
134 countries for the period 1980-2008 which contains no missing data (Castellacci 
and Natera, 2011). Castellacci and Natera (2011) posit that missing data results in 
developing and less developed economies being neglected when undertaking 
quantitative studies of innovation, growth and development. They employ Honaker 
and King’s (2010) imputation procedure to estimate these missing values and thus 
obtain a complete dataset. To ensure reliability, they:  
 first, compare the descriptive statistics of the complete versus the original 
data; 
 second,  they conduct a graphical inspection of their kernel density graphs 
and 
  third, they evaluate the respective correlation tables to ensure that the 
complete data set and the original dataset come from the same distribution. 
Reliability analysis of the imputed CANA dataset confirms that its’ statistical 
distribution is similar to that of the original data.  
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The indicators of the imputed CANA dataset measure innovation, social capital, and 
economic competitiveness, the quality of institutions, human capital and 
infrastructures.  Thus the variables royalty and license fees payments, US patents, 
scientific and technical journal articles, R&D, domestic credit, secondary enrolment 
ratio, tertiary enrolment ratio, Internet users, the control of corruption and our 
measure of inequality, the Gini Index, are all sourced from the CANA database. 
High-technology exports, agricultural value added, foreign direct investment,  exports 
of goods and services, internet users per 1000 people, gross domestic savings, 
gross capital formation, GDP per capita in US 2005$, natural resources rents, new 
business registration density and population growth were all sourced form the World 
Bank’s development indicators database. 
3.2 Population and Sample 
A population of interest is “the total collection of elements about which we wish to 
make some inferences” (Cooper and Schindler, 2011 p. 364). In our study the 
population of interest is all nation states including both developing and developed 
countries. Our sampling frame is the 134 nation states that have been in existence 
for more than 10 years and are represented in both the CANA and WDI databases. 
Further, as we use a non-probability, convenience sample due to practical 
considerations such as a lack of data for some countries for EO and inequality 
measures, regression analysis includes only countries that have data for EO and its 
determinants. The complete sample (illustrated in Appendix A1) covers data on 93 
countries, of which 16 are African. Cooper and Schindler (2011) caution that such a 
convenience sample is more likely to be biased compared to a random sample and 
that this bias may distort the findings of the study.  
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3.3 Measuring EO 
The majority of EO research investigates firms and as a result relies on the 
responses of senior executives. In contrast, this research studies the manifestation 
of EO at the aggregate level and therefore we develop, using secondary data, 
objective measures of EO and its sub-constructs. EO is evaluated based on Miller’s 
(1983) conceptualization as a joint function of innovativeness, pro-activeness and 
risk taking. The implicit assumption we make is that the indicators of EO covary, that 
is, they are complementary and not substitutes. We therefore measure the 
manifestation of entrepreneurship by operationalizing these three sub-constructs. 
Entrepreneurship is a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon that varies according to 
culture, geography, policies and institutions. Therefore, a single aggregated measure 
such as EO may not capture all its heterogeneous aspects. Although there may be 
social, cultural and regional variation within countries, we assume that the nation 
state is still a meaningful statistical unit of analysis. In addition, due to data 
limitations and the need to include developing countries in our composite measure, 
certain indicators are excluded from the analysis. However, despite these constraints 
due to heterogeneity and data limitations, Archibugi and Coco (2005) suggest 
aggregated theory-based single synthetic indicators such as EO, GDP and the 
Human Development Index (HDI) help us understand our economic and social 
realities and therefore, can assist policy makers devise strategic interventions. For 
example, GDP highlights aggregate income in a country whereas the HDI enlightens 
us about the overall well-being of the population. Similarly, EO informs us whether a 
country is entrepreneurial or not. 
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 3.3.1 Innovativeness   
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) defined innovativeness as an inclination to experiment 
and be creative that leads to new products, services or technological processes. 
Teece (1986) proposes that “an innovation consists of technical knowledge about 
how to do things better than the existing state of the art.”  Rogers (1995) defines 
innovation as a process that results in the creation of new ideas, objects and 
practices. At the firm level, innovation is classified as either product-market 
innovation and/or technological innovation, and it is an important element of how 
firms explore or create opportunities. At the aggregate level, it may indicate a 
product or process that is novel and unique in that specific country and context 
rather than the world as a whole (Rogers, 1995). In particular, at both levels of 
aggregation, innovativeness may occasion discontinuous change through a process 
of creative destruction (Nadler and Tushman, 1999).  
There is debate in literature about which indicator is an appropriate proxy for 
innovation. Schmookler (1966) has argued that investment in R&D is an input rather 
than an outcome of the innovation process and therefore it is a poor indicator of 
innovativeness. Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) have questioned the utility of 
patents as a proxy of innovation.  Pakes and Griliches (1980, p. 378) concur with 
Hall et al. (2001) and suggest that “patents are a flawed measure (of innovative 
output) particularly since not all new innovations are patented and patents differ 
greatly in their economic impact.”  
In order to address these concerns and triage the measurement of innovativeness, 
we operationalise innovativeness as a composite of innovative input, scientific output 
and technological output. Firstly, innovative input is defined as the total efforts and 
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investments made to enhance its innovative capability and therefore, following 
Hasan and Tucci (2010), we measure innovative input using investments in R&D as 
a percentage of GDP. Secondly, scientific output is characterised as outcomes of 
research and innovation activities undertaken by academic institutions and following 
Castellacci and Natera (2013), we use the number of scientific and technical journal 
articles published per million people as an indicator of scientific output. The 
advantage of the journal article data is that they are gathered in a consistent manner 
and from trustworthy sources for all countries. Thirdly, technological output is defined 
as the aggregate technological output produced by the private sector firms and thus, 
following Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1999); we employ US patents granted per country of 
origin as a measure of technological output. This measure is defined as the number 
of utility patents granted by the United States Patent Office (USPTO) by year and 
inventor's country of residence per inhabitant. US patents enable scholars to assess 
the quantity as well as the quality of innovation (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999). 
3.3.2 Proactiveness  
As previously elucidated in the review of literature, we adopt Venkataraman’s 
characterisation of proactiveness as an activity of search and discovery. 
Venkataraman (1989, p. 949) defines proactiveness as “seeking new opportunities 
which may or may not be related to the present line of operations, introduction of 
new products and brands ahead of competition, strategically eliminating operations 
which are in the mature or declining stages of life cycle".  Lumpkin and Dess (1996) 
concur and suggest that being proactive implies taking initiative to anticipate and 
pursue new opportunities.  
76 | P a g e  
 
At the aggregate level, we assume that scanning activity and new opportunities will 
be at the international level. Therefore, we argue that opportunity search and 
discovery implies aggressively seeking internationally both new technology and 
markets. Archibugi and Coco (2005) concur and note that although some countries 
may be heavy producers of new knowledge but they may be sluggish in applying it 
whereas other countries may quickly appropriate technology developed elsewhere. 
Essentially, a country which appropriates and diffuses knowledge through an active 
outward strategy is more proactive than an insular country. Pietrobelli (1996) 
suggests that international scanning for technology and markets may involve:  
 “The movement of goods through international trade;  
 The movement of capital through inward and outward foreign direct investment 
(FDI and OFDI) 
 The movement of people through migration, travel and foreign education of 
students and workers; 
 international research collaboration and; 
 diffusion through media and internet of disembodied knowledge”;  
Therefore, we follow Pietrobelli’s (1996) theorising and adopt FDI, the export/GDP 
ratio, internet users per 1000 people and royalty and license fees payments as 
measures in order to operationalise proactiveness. Other theoretically justified 
indicators such as outbound skilled mobility and international research collaboration 
are excluded due to insufficient data.  
The four indicators’ definitions were sourced from the WDI database. Firstly, FDI is 
defined as the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 
percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than 
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that of the investor and is divided by GDP. FDI helps us gauge the degree to which a 
country has access to foreign technology and managerial knowledge and 
consequently, the potential impact of knowledge spill-overs on technological 
upgrading. We find additional support for this measure in both Lall’s (1992) and 
Dunning’s (1994) findings that FDI facilitates the transfer of technological and 
managerial knowledge as well as financial capital from developed to developing 
countries.   
Secondly, we employ the exports of goods and services to measure the outward 
orientation of country. The exports of goods and services denote the value of all 
goods and other market services provided to the rest of the world. However, they 
exclude factor services and transfer payments and to get the export ratio, we divide 
by GDP. We find support for this measure in Frankel and Romer’s (1999) assertion 
that the export and import channel facilitates the acquisition of technology and 
knowledge from foreign sources. 
Third, we employ royalty and license fees as an indicator of proactiveness. Royalty 
and license fees payments are characterised as payment per authorized use of 
intangible, non-produced, non-financial assets and proprietary rights and for the use, 
through licensing agreements, of produced originals of prototypes, per GDP. The 
indicator helps us assess the degree of application, externalisation and 
dissemination of high technology goods, unlike the export ratio which measures a 
general outward orientation.  
Lastly, we utilise internet users, defined as people with access to the worldwide web 
network divided by the total amount of population, to evaluate the degree to which a 
country assimilates and disseminates a general purpose technology (GPT). 
Mazzucato (2011) explains general purpose technologies as technologies that are 
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pervasive such that they spread to many industries, improve over time and facilitate 
innovation and the development of new products or processes. For this reason, a 
country linked to international knowledge flows and proactively upgrading its 
technological base would quickly disseminate a general purpose technology such as 
the internet.  
In sum, proactiveness at the aggregate level implies firms in a country will seek out 
technology, export and internationalising opportunities more than firms in countries 
that are not pro-active. Therefore, these four measures help us identify countries that 
are upgrading their technological bases through firstly, applying and diffusing 
knowledge spill-overs and secondly, through proactively seeking new markets 
through a committed external strategy.  
3.3.3 Risk Taking 
Miller (2011) suggests that risk taking is the propensity to invest and risk large 
amounts of capital and as a result, potentially face a lot of uncertainty. Shapira 
(1995) suggests that risk reflects the distribution of uncertain outcomes and their 
probabilities. Therefore, a risky investment is one for which the variance in outcomes 
is large. John, Litov and Yeung (2008) use a country average of the volatility of firm 
earnings to measure risk taking. However, as we have noted in the review of 
literature, this might not be appropriate since risk taking at firm-level should, through 
the diversification effect, result in lower volatility at the aggregate level (Comin and 
Philippon, 2006). Thus a country with innovative, risk taking firms that pursue 
aggressive strategies should develop a diversified industrial and export base that 
lowers aggregate risk. To capture this diversification effect, we reverse score 
agricultural value-added as a percentage of GDP. Agricultural value-added is defined 
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as the net output of the agricultural sector summing outputs and subtracting 
intermediate inputs. Agriculture includes forestry, hunting and fishing in addition to 
cultivation of crops and livestock production. The line of argument is that countries 
with a declining share of agricultural value-added are diversifying their industrial 
base through risk taking and investment whereas those that have a high share of 
agricultural value-added are not.  
In the preceding paragraph we dealt mainly with the uncertainty element of risk 
taking. However, as Miller (2011) suggests, besides uncertainty, risk taking also 
implies investing significant capital, suggesting that this construct has a size 
dimension. At the aggregate level, the magnitude of investment may best be 
exemplified by the combined private sector and public sector investment practices of 
that country operationalised as gross fixed investment. Gross fixed investment 
encapsulates investment in land improvements, plant, machinery and equipment 
purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, as well as schools, offices, 
hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. 
Therefore, we would expect a higher gross investment to GDP ratio in 
entrepreneurial countries that take risks compared to countries that do not. 
Nevertheless, a major limitation of this measure is that it aggregates investment. 
Madsen (2002) finds that it is investment in plant machinery and equipment that 
drives economic growth whereas investment in property is caused by economic 
growth. However, since we do not have segregated investment data for all countries, 
we thus use the gross investment ratio to capture the magnitude of risk taking.  
In order to triage risk taking and address the temporal dimension as well as our 
concerns with the gross investment indicator, we employ the domestic savings rate 
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as an additional indicator. The savings rate is calculated as GDP less final 
consumption expenditure divided by GDP and indicates the willingness of a country 
to forgo current consumption to fund long-term investment. It helps explain the 
portion of investment that is funded from domestic sources which, it is argued, is less 
volatile than investment financed from foreign sources. Prasad, Rajan and 
Subramanian (2007) find that foreign capital flows cause currency overvaluation 
leading to decreased manufacturing exports, higher macro-economic volatility and 
reduced growth. In addition, Aizenman, Pinto and Radziwill (2004) find that over 90 
per cent of the physical capital stock in developing countries is funded from domestic 
sources. Therefore, the domestic savings rate may indicate the degree to which the 
economy has access to less volatile sources of long-term funding necessary for EO.  
In sum, based on our definition and measurement of the construct, it should be self-
evident that risk taking is not capital accumulation. Correctly defined, risk taking is 
capital accumulation in highly uncertain sectors where the variance in outcomes is 
large. Adjusted agricultural value-added reflects the propensity to diversify and invest 
in risky sectors, the domestic savings rate reflects the ability to do so over time and 
gross investment is an imperfect measure of the magnitude of investment. Hence, 
we use all three variables to operationalise risk taking. 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the indicators of the sub-constructs of 
EO. We begin with assessing whether the indicators meet the normality 
assumptions. Adjusted agricultural value added and domestic savings are negatively 
skewed whereas all the other variables are positively skewed. Additionally, all the 
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indicators of the sub-constructs are largely leptokurtic and the Bera-Jarque statistic 
firmly rejects normality (p<0.01) for all the indicators of the sub-constructs of EO.  
Furthermore, we analyse the first and the second moments of the indicators of risk 
taking, innovativeness and proactiveness.  The average country in the sample saves 
19.45% and invests 21.38% of GDP, agriculture adds 14% to the value of GDP and 
it exports 35.49% whilst receiving 2.89% of its GDP as FDI. In addition, our 
hypothetical average country invests 0.77% of GDP in R&D whilst earning 0.25% of 
GDP in royalties and producing 0.17 scientific journal articles per 1000 people as 
well as receiving 0.18 US patents per 10000 people. The average internet 
penetration at 7.94% of the population is misleadingly low since in most of the 
countries the internet technology only became available in the 1990s. Therefore this 
statistic should be interpreted with caution.  
We proceed to analyse the second moment of the variables and note that 
interestingly, the innovativeness indicators as well as internet absorption and royalty 
fees have a relatively elevated standard deviation suggesting that there is large 
variation amongst countries in innovative effort. In contrast, the volatility of the other 
variables is modest.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the indicators of innovativeness, risk taking and proactiveness 
  Adjagric Savings Investment FDI Exports Internet Royalties R&D Journals Patents 
 Mean 
85.96 19.45 21.93 2.89 35.49 7.94 0.25% 0.77% 0.17 0.18 
Median 
89.81 20.70 21.38 1.47 29.92 0.04 0.12% 0.47% 0.02 0.00 
 Max 
99.96 61.14 65.56 51.90 230.27 90.00 11.24% 4.86% 1.28 3.07 
 Min 
27.97 -103.42 2.65 -12.21 2.52 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0.00 
Std. Dev. 
12.39 14.24 6.37 4.42 24.79 17.18 0.75% 0.81% 0.28 0.43 
 
Skewness -1.38 -2.16 1.22 4.15 2.96 2.64 9.81 1.65 1.78 3.56 
Kurtosis 
4.93 16.46 7.93 30.41 18.28 9.45 112.77 5.65 5.13 17.29 
 
          Jarque-
Bera 1071.36 21143.86 3177.08 82408.68 28175.75 7904.45 1412383.00 2037.47 1956.83 28958.29 
Prob 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
           Sum 
194962.40 49406.87 55183.92 6972.12 89333.59 21653.01 6.92 2101.04 0.47 0.05 
Sum Sq. 
Dev. 347868.60 515181.90 101984.40 47085.57 1545840.00 803857.90 0.15 1787.14 0.00 0.00 
 
            
Obs 2268.00 2540.00 2516.00 2411.00 2517.00 2726.00 2726.00 2726.00 2726.00 2726.00 
  
3.5 Estimation Methodology 
As discussed in the preceding section, the indicators of EO and its sub constructs 
were developed from economics and entrepreneurship literature. We adopt Miller’s 
(1983) conceptualisation of EO as a reflective, unidimensional, second order 
construct with three sub-constructs (indicators): risk taking, innovativeness and 
proactiveness. In this section, we use correlations and exploratory factor analysis to 
assess both the validity and dimensionality of EO. Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson 
(2010) submit that if we have a strong theoretical basis for understanding the 
relationships between variables, then these indicators, for example, R&D, scientific 
journals and US patents may correspond to concepts that cannot be described by a 
single variable such as innovativeness. Hair et al. (2010) suggest that factor 
analysis, by grouping variables that are highly correlated as factors, helps us 
determine the underlying relationships amongst the variables being analysed. 
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Therefore, we employ factor analysis to create new composite measures for risk 
taking, innovativeness, proactiveness as well as EO.  
3.5.1 Validity 
We begin by evaluating the validity of EO. Validity is defined as the ability of the 
indicators to measure the concept of interest, that is, the latent constructs (Cooper 
and Schindler, 2011). Construct validity evaluated by assessing convergent validity, 
content validity and discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2010). Hair et al. (2010) 
suggests that a reflective construct is based on the notion that a latent construct 
such as EO causes risk taking, proactiveness and innovativeness. Therefore, the 
casual directionality indicates that entrepreneurial countries exhibit risk taking, 
proactiveness and innovativeness. The sub-constructs are merely symptoms of EO.  
Furthermore, for a reflective, second order construct such as EO, all its sub-
constructs are expected to move together. Thus in order to evaluate convergent 
validity, we assess whether the sub-constructs of EO have a high proportion of 
common variance (Hair et al., 2010). Consequently, we assess the correlations 
amongst the sub-constructs with EO. Hair et al. (2010) suggest that they should be 
greater than 0.3. As Table 3, indicates the correlations between EO and its sub-
constructs are high (>0.65), thus establishing convergent validity.  
In addition, EO’s content validity was assessed. Content validity tests whether every 
indicator sufficiently characterises the constructs under study (Cooper and Schindler, 
2011). Our indicators reflecting risk taking, proactiveness and innovativeness were 
evaluated by the author’s supervisor and his assistant to ensure that indicators 
sufficiently represent constructs, ensuring content validity (Cooper and Schindler, 
2011). 
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Table 3: Correlation matrix for assessing the discriminant validity of EO  
    
 EO INNOV PROACT RISK HIGH_TECH 
EO  1.00     
      
Innov  0.68*** 1.00    
      
Proact  0.78*** 0.27*** 1.00   
      
Risk  0.81*** 0.36*** 0.46*** 1.00  
      
High_Tech  0.53*** 0.38*** 0.47*** 0.35*** 1.00 
      
 
 
 
     
 Notes: 
1. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
2. Proact represents proactiveness, Risk represents risk taking, Innov represents innovativeness and High_Tech represents high 
technology exports. 
 
To gauge discriminant validity, we use high technology exports to evaluate to what 
extent EO truly differs from its sub-constructs (Hair et al., 2010). We would expect 
high technology exports to be the joint outcome of innovativeness, risk taking and 
proactiveness. Therefore, we test whether EO has a higher correlation with high 
technology exports than any of its sub-constructs.  As Table 3 shows, EO has a 
higher correlation with high technology exports than any of its sub-constructs, thus 
establishing discriminant validity. Hair et al. (2010) argue that if a high order factor 
such as EO explains theoretically related outcomes as well as or better than 
innovativeness, proactiveness and risk taking, then the higher order construct EO is 
validated and supported.  
3.5.2 Unidimensionality 
Dimensionality evaluates the association between the indicators of a construct and 
to what extent they represent a single construct (Hair et al., 2010). The 
unidimensionality of EO is assessed through exploratory factor analysis. But before 
we can evaluate the dimensionality of EO, we must first establish its sub-constructs. 
Hair et al. (2010) recommend that before a researcher performs factor analysis he 
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must firstly, ensure that a strong theoretical foundation exists to support the 
hypothesised structure amongst the indicators and secondly, that the measure of 
sampling adequacy (MSA) values must be greater than 0.50 for both the overall test 
and each individual indicator. They recommend that variables with MSA values 
smaller than 0.50 should be deleted. As illustrated in Table 4, a satisfactory Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin MSA (0.79) indicates that sufficient correlation exists between the 
indicators of risk taking, proactiveness and innovativeness, and individually for each 
of the variables, to proceed with factor analysis (Hair et al., 2010) and consequently, 
none of the indicators are omitted. 
Table 4: KMO MSA of the indicators of innovativeness, proactiveness and risk taking 
 MSA   
ADJAGRIC 0.88* 
DOMESTIC_SAVINGS 0.73* 
EXPORTS 0.71* 
FDI 0.64* 
GROSS_INVESTMENT 0.66* 
INTERNET_USERS 0.91* 
R_D_INVESTEMENT 0.76* 
ROYALTY_PAYMENTS 0.75* 
SCIENTIFIC_JOURNALS 0.81* 
US_PATENTS 0.84* 
KAISER'S MSA 0.79* 
  
Notes: 
1. * In the table indicates MSA values >0.5. 
Table 5 illustrates the number of factors extracted and the factor loadings. Principal 
factors and varimax orthogonal rotation methods were used to extract the factors 
and clarify the underlying relationships. Hair et al. (2010) advance that factor rotation 
maximises the significant loadings of an indicator on each factor allowing easier 
factor identification, and assisting in achieving a simpler, theoretically sound factor 
structure. In addition, they recommend that for samples greater than 350 factor 
loadings that exceed 0.3 are significant. Therefore, we deem indicators with factor 
loadings greater than 0.3 and factors with eigenvalues higher than 1, significant.  
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As Table 6 shows, the variables loaded on three factors. Firstly, scientific journal 
articles, US patents and R&D expenditure loaded cleanly on to factor 1, with 
loadings greater than 0.3 and no significant cross loadings. These results support 
our assertion that innovativeness is a composite of innovative input, scientific output 
and technological output and consequently, we labelled factor 1 innovativeness.  
Secondly, as expected FDI, exports and royalty payments and license fees loaded 
cleanly on factor 2, with factor loadings higher than 0.3 and no significant cross 
loadings. In contrast, internet users cross loaded on both innovativeness and factor 
2. We suggest that this cross loading may be due to internet users being highly 
correlated with the level of per capita GDP and thus with innovativeness. However, 
we cannot make nor do we find in literature the theoretical argument that internet 
users are a measure of innovative capacity or its outcomes. We have suggested that 
it is more appropriate as an indicator of how countries proactively appropriate and 
diffuse general purpose technologies. This contention is supported by internet users 
loading on factor 2 with a loading that is higher than the required minimum 0.3. Thus, 
using theoretical arguments that are supported by empirical results, we adopt 
internet users, FDI, exports and royalty payments and license fees as indicators of 
factor 2 and we label this factor proactiveness.  
Thirdly, domestic savings and gross investment load cleanly and significantly on 
factor 3. On the other hand, adjusted agricultural value-added cross loads on both 
innovativeness and factor 3. As we have previously noted, Hair et al. (2010) argue 
that a researcher needs to ensure that a strong theoretical foundation exists to 
support the hypothesised structure amongst the indicators. In our case, this 
conceptual foundation posits that the reverse scored agricultural value-added as a 
percentage of GDP is more suitable as a measure of a diversified industrial base that 
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lowers aggregate risk. To support our argument Table 6 indicates that adjusted 
agricultural value-added’s loading on factor 3 exceeds the required minimum of 0.3. 
Therefore we adopt adjusted agricultural value-added, domestic savings as well as 
gross investment as measures of factor 3 and label this factor risk taking. 
Table 5: Exploratory factor analysis of innovativeness, proactiveness and risk taking 
Factor Method: Principal Factors    
       F1 F2 F3 Communality Uniqueness 
ADJAGRIC 0.60** 0.18 0.25 0.46 0.54 
DOMESTIC_SAVINGS 0.36* 0.33* 0.37* 0.37 0.63 
EXPORTS 0.35* 0.62** -0.02 0.51 0.49 
FDI 0.24* 0.48* -0.30 0.38 0.62 
GROSS_INVEST 0.15 0.38* 0.16 0.19 0.81 
INTERNET_USERS 0.62** 0.07 -0.20 0.43 0.57 
R_D_INVESTEMENT 0.86** -0.30 0.03 0.83 0.17 
ROYALTY_PAY 0.32* 0.37* -0.20 0.28 0.72 
SCIENTIFIC_JOURN 0.85** -0.27 -0.05 0.79 0.21 
US_PATENTS 0.75** -0.38 -0.03 0.71 0.29 
      
Factor Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion Cumulative 
F1 3.21 3.21 1.87 0.65 0.65 
F2 1.34 4.55 0.94 0.27 0.92 
F3 0.40 4.95 --- 0.08 1.00 
Total 4.95 4.95  1.00  
      
 Model Independence Saturated   
Discrepancy 0.08 5.03 0.00   
Parameters 37.00 10.00 55.00   
Degrees-of-freedom 18.00 45.00 ---   
      
      
Notes: 
1. ** In the table indicates factor loadings >0.5 and * in the table indicates factor loadings >0.3. 
 
Table 6: Rotated factors using orthogonal varimax rotation 
Notes: 
1. ** in the table indicates factor loadings >0.5 and * in the table indicates factor loadings>0.3 
 
        
 F1 F2 F3 
ADJAGRIC 0.46* 0.20 0.45* 
DOMESTIC_SAVINGS 0.17 0.16 0.56** 
EXPORTS 0.05 0.60** 0.37* 
FDI 0.03 0.61** 0.04 
GROSS_INVESTMENT -0.03 0.25 0.36* 
INTERNET_USERS 0.55** 0.36* 0.04 
R_D_INVESTEMENT 0.91** 0.03 0.11 
ROYALTY_PAYMENTS 0.15 0.49** 0.10 
SCIENTIFIC_JOURNALS 0.88** 0.09 0.06 
US_PATENTS 0.84** -0.03 0.00 
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With the sub-constructs of EO established and clearly defined, we proceed to assess 
the unidimensionality of EO through exploratory factor analysis. As previously stated, 
we adopt Miller’s (1983) conceptualisation of EO as a reflective, unidimensional, 
second order construct. As a second order construct, EO’s indicators are risk taking, 
innovativeness and proactiveness. Additionally, these sub-constructs are expected 
to covary.  We commence by extracting factor scores that are a composite measure 
of each sub-construct of EO, using as a guide, the results of exploratory factor 
analysis described in the previous paragraph. Before we proceed with factor 
analysis, we note Hair et al.’s (2010) caution that a researcher must ensure that a 
strong theoretical foundation exists and MSA values are higher than 0.50 for both 
overall test and each individual indicator. As illustrated in Table 7, a satisfactory 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin MSA (0.63) indicates that sufficient correlation exists amongst 
indicators of EO, and individually for each of the sub-constructs, to retain all the 
indicators. As a result none are omitted and we proceed with factor analysis (Hair et 
al., 2010). 
Table 7:  KMO MSA of the indicators of EO 
  
   MSA   
Proact 0.63* 
Risk 0.60* 
Innov 0.68* 
Kaiser's MSA 0.63* 
Notes: 
1. * In the table indicates MSA values >0.50. 
2. Proact represents proactiveness, Risk represents risk taking and Innov represents innovativeness. 
 
Hair et al. (2010) suggest that unidimensionality implies that indicators are strongly 
associated with each other and represent a single latent construct. Further, they 
argue that factor analysis can assist in deciding whether a construct is 
unidimensional or not by determining the number of factors extracted and the loading 
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of each indicator on the factor. Hair et al. (2010) propose that the test of 
unidimensionality is that:  
 indicators should be loading highly on a single factor,   
 factor loadings >0.50 are considered significant and,  
 the percentage of variance explained should be >0.60. 
Table 8: EO principal factors 
    
 Loadings     
 F1 Communality Uniqueness   
Innov  0.48*  0.23  0.77   
Proact  0.56**  0.32  0.69   
Risk   0.61**  0.37  0.63   
      
Factor Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion Cumulative 
F1  0.92  0.92 ---  1.00  1.00 
Total  0.92  0.92   1.00  
      
Notes: 
1. ** in the table indicates factor loadings >0.5 and * in the table indicates factor loadings>0.3 
2. Proact represents proactiveness, Risk represents risk taking and Innov represents innovativeness 
 
As Table 8 illustrates, the results for EO largely meet all these recommendations. 
The sub-constructs all load cleanly on one factor, the factor loadings are all close to 
or greater than 0.5 and the percentage of variance explained by this factor is 0.92. 
Thus we conclude that this factor is unidimensional and label it EO.  
So far in this section, we have carefully and methodically confirmed both the validity 
and dimensionality of EO. We have reported these results in the first results chapter 
of this thesis since EO is a common thread in the entire work. In the following section 
we discuss country rankings based on EO and its sub-constructs and assess, using 
descriptive statistics, the relative importance of the constructs. 
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3.6 Results 
We start by ascertaining whether EO and its sub-constructs meet the normality 
assumptions. Table 9 presents the descriptive statistics for EO, risk taking, 
proactiveness and innovativeness. The mean and the median differ for all the 
constructs, indicating the presence of skewness. EO, proactiveness and 
innovativeness are all positively skewed whereas risk taking is negatively skewed. 
Additionally, EO and all its sub-constructs are leptokurtic with a peaked mean and 
fatter tails than the normal distribution and the Bera-Jarque statistic firmly rejects 
normality (p<0.01) for EO and all its sub-constructs.  
It is interesting to note that risk taking has the highest mean, whereas innovativeness 
has the highest standard deviation confirming our observation that the variance in 
innovative effort amongst countries is higher compared to the variation in risk taking 
and proactiveness. Furthermore, Singapore has the maximum individual score 
attained in a calendar year between 1980 and 2008 for proactiveness, risk taking 
and EO, whereas Israel has the highest score for innovativeness, attained in 2008. 
In contrast, the African countries Mozambique and Lesotho have the lowest scores 
for proactiveness and EO respectively. 
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics of EO and its sub-constructs 
 EO Risk Innov Proact 
 Mean -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 Median -0.08 0.12 -0.42 -0.20 
 Maximum 3.92 1.88 4.06 6.83 
 Minimum -2.45 -4.01 -0.74 -0.83 
 Std. Dev. 0.74 0.69 0.95 0.78 
 Skewness 0.88 -0.90 1.91 3.77 
 Kurtosis 5.57 4.77 6.08 24.44 
     
 Jarque-Bera 850.84 593.03 2734.70 51406.08 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
     
 Sum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1137.34 1062.81 2441.81 1460.17 
     
 Observations 2104.00 2223.00 2726.00 2389.00 
     
Notes: 
1. Proact represents proactiveness, Risk represents risk taking and Innov represents innovativeness 
Table 10 presents the correlations of EO, risk taking innovativeness and 
proactiveness with several pertinent variables. In the previous section, we validated 
EO as higher order construct using high technology exports. In this section we 
assess whether risk taking, proactiveness and innovativeness measure what they 
purport to measure.  
First, we have argued that proactiveness reflects the activities of search and 
discovery at the international level. Pietrobelli (1996) suggests that the foreign 
education of students and workers could be an indicator of this search activity. Due 
to data limitations and the need to preserve our sample we could not use the 
outbound enrolment ratio as an indicator. However, we can use it to assess 
construct validity of proactiveness by evaluating whether, for those countries where 
data availability is not an issue, the outbound enrolment ratio positively correlated to 
proactiveness. Table 10 confirms that the outbound enrolment ratio has a higher 
association with proactiveness compared to the other two sub-constructs of EO and 
this is significant at the 1% level.   
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Second, we have argued that risk taking at the firm level would, through the 
diversification effect, reflect reduced aggregate level volatility. In order to establish 
the construct validity of risk taking we need to ascertain whether this is indeed the 
case. We find that the correlation between risk taking and growth volatility is negative 
(p<0.01), thus validating risk taking. Third, we operationalised innovativeness as a 
composite of innovative input, scientific output and technological output. The validity 
of this construct is supported by its high correlation with the human capital variables, 
in particular tertiary education.  
Table 10: Correlations of the sub-constructs of EO 
          
 EO Proact  Innov  Risk  Outbound  Tertiary  Secondary  Gdpvol  High_Tech  
EO  1.00         
          
Proact  0.76*** 1.00        
          
Innov  0.66*** 0.24*** 1.00       
          
Risk  0.84*** 0.43*** 0.36*** 1.00      
          
Outbound  0.44*** 0.40*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 1.00     
          
Tertiary 0.63*** 0.38*** 0.64*** 0.42*** 0.34*** 1.00    
          
Secondary 0.66*** 0.35*** 0.56*** 0.54*** 0.37*** 0.77*** 1.00   
          
Gdpvol  -0.13*** 0.08 -0.29*** -0.14*** -0.06 -0.01 0.06 1.00  
          
High_Tech 0.53*** 0.46*** 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.10 0.27*** 0.23*** -0.13*** 1.00 
          
          
         Notes: 
1. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
2. Proact represents proactiveness, Risk represents risk taking, Innov represents innovativeness, High-tech represents high 
technology exports, Outbound represents outbound tertiary enrolment and Gdpvol represents GDP volatility 
3.6.1 Country rankings 
Table 11 illustrates country rankings based on risk taking, innovativeness, 
proactiveness, EO as well as its deviation. We define the deviation of EO (EOdev) as 
the increase or decrease in EO over a five year period. Table 11 displays the 20 and 
10 best and worst performing countries on each measure, respectively. The rankings 
seem to vary based on level of development for some of the constructs. High income 
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countries, for example Switzerland and Sweden, dominate both the innovation and 
EO rankings whereas low and middle income countries fare poorly. On the other 
hand, the top ranking countries on proactiveness and risk taking include both 
developed and middle income countries, in particular the former Eastern Bloc 
countries. Nevertheless, the laggards on these two sub-constructs are middle-to-low 
income countries. Appendix A2 displays the full country rankings on EO. 
The top 20 ranking countries on the deviation of EO include countries across all 
levels of development. For example, both Vietnam, which is a low income country 
and Ireland, a high income country, attain top 20 rankings. However, the stragglers 
as illustrated in Figure 1, who do not seem to be improving their entrepreneurial 
score at all, are almost exclusively middle income countries, such as South Africa 
and Argentina. Figure 2 illustrates the consequences of a lack of innovativeness, 
proactiveness and risk taking. Countries with a constant EO hardly exhibit any 
growth in GDP per capita over the 29 year period under investigation. 
In sum, from these results we can conclude that developed countries score 
reasonably well on EO whereas the innovative capabilities of developing countries 
are poor. In addition, it is notable that whilst countries across all levels of 
development are improving their EO scores, there is a select group of mainly middle 
income countries that seems to be stuck in an entrepreneurial trap with their EO 
static over 29 years. 
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Table 11: Country rankings 
 
 
INNOV  PROACT  RISK  EODEV  EO   
Country Mean Country Mean Country Mean Country Mean Country Mean Std. 
Dev. 
1. Switzerland 2.85 Singapore 3.71 Singapore 1.50 Azerbaijan 0.78 Singapore 2.46 0.81 
2. Sweden 2.84 Ireland 2.25 Botswana 0.93 Lao PDR 0.70 Ireland 2.26 0.64 
3. United States 2.82 Belgium 1.95 China 0.77 Belgium 0.69 Belgium 1.39 0.32 
4. Israel 2.56 Azerbaijan 1.09 Ireland 0.76 Iceland 0.64 Switzerland 1.36 0.27 
5. Japan 2.40 Estonia 1.03 Algeria 0.74 Ireland 0.59 Sweden 1.04 0.46 
6. Finland 1.96 Hungary 0.96 Malaysia 0.73 Armenia 0.51 Japan 1.03 0.16 
7. Germany 1.75 Malaysia 0.91 Czech Republic 0.71 Hungary 0.46 Netherlands 0.92 0.30 
8. Canada 1.49 Netherlands 0.72 Norway 0.65 Estonia 0.44 Iceland 0.91 0.49 
9. Netherlands 1.48 Panama 0.66 Switzerland 0.62 Cambodia 0.43 Denmark 0.85 0.38 
10. United Kingdom 1.47 Slovakia 0.66 Estonia 0.62 Singapore 0.41 Finland 0.80 0.50 
11. Denmark 1.47 Czech Republic 0.54 Japan 0.60 Vietnam 0.37 United States 0.79 0.21 
12. France 1.33 Bulgaria 0.49 Thailand 0.59 Georgia 0.36 Estonia 0.78 0.38 
13. Australia 1.04 Slovenia 0.39 Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0.58 Bulgaria 0.32 Germany 0.73 0.22 
14. Belgium 1.03 Switzerland 0.34 Slovakia 0.57 Kazakhstan 0.32 Norway 0.68 0.26 
15. Norway 1.03 Latvia 0.32 Saudi Arabia 0.57 Croatia 0.31 Czech 
Republic 
0.67 0.22 
16. Austria 0.98 Lithuania 0.31 Australia 0.55 Mongolia 0.29 Canada 0.64 0.31 
17. Iceland 0.89 Sweden 0.31 Spain 0.51 China 0.29 Malaysia 0.62 0.42 
18. New Zealand 0.66 Ukraine 0.29 Austria 0.48 Uganda 0.28 Austria 0.58 0.41 
19. Singapore 0.62 Kazakhstan 0.29 Russia 0.48 Denmark 0.28 Slovenia 0.56 0.29 
20. Slovenia 0.39 Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0.24 Slovenia 0.47 Slovenia 0.28 Azerbaijan 0.56 0.78 
Bottom 10           
83. Pakistan -0.65 Turkey -0.48 Georgia -0.95 Argentina 0.04 Cambodia -0.82 0.42 
84. Saudi Arabia -0.65 Mozambique -0.49 Burkina Faso -1.08 Philippines 0.03 Pakistan -0.83 0.14 
85. Thailand -0.66 Brazil -0.52 Madagascar -1.08 Algeria 0.02 Kyrgyzstan -0.90 0.19 
86. Lesotho -0.66 Uganda -0.52 Sudan -1.12 Jamaica 0.01 Madagascar -0.94 0.34 
87. Sri Lanka -0.67 Iran -0.53 Kyrgyzstan -1.18 Egypt 0.01 Sudan -1.02 0.36 
88. Zambia -0.68 Ethiopia -0.57 Mozambique -1.28 Panama 0.00 Mozambique -1.03 0.44 
89. Ecuador -0.69 Pakistan -0.57 Cambodia -1.31 South Africa -0.03 Burkina Faso -1.07 0.13 
90. Indonesia -0.71 Sudan -0.59 Uganda -1.43 Paraguay -0.03 Lesotho -1.09 0.63 
91. Honduras -0.71 India -0.66 Ethiopia -1.45 Kuwait -0.08 Uganda -1.13 0.40 
93. Guatemala -0.72 Burkina Faso -0.68 Lesotho -1.71 Tajikistan -0.18 Ethiopia -1.20 0.27 
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Figure 1: Middle Income EO trap 
 
 
Figure 2: Middle income trap 
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between 1980 and 2008. It also attains a high ranking of 19 on the innovativeness 
measure. Singapore’s case seems to confirm our hypothesis that technological 
diffusion and upgrading amongst countries is a joint function of risk taking, 
innovativeness and proactiveness. Firstly, it proactively attracted 12.17% of GDP in 
FDI, exported a staggering 183.73% and earned 2.9% of GDP by commercialising 
and diffusing technology. Secondly, Singapore’s innovative capacity was upgraded 
by investing on average 1.35% of GDP in R&D, resulting in 0.35 scientific journals 
published per thousand people as well as 0.34 US patents awarded per ten 
thousand people. Thirdly, Singapore took risks, saved and invested 46.80% and 
33.77% of GDP, respectively. As a result its economy was further diversified and 
primary agriculture’s contribution to GDP was reduced from a low 1.57% in 1980 to 
an even lower 0.045% of GDP in 2008. 
 
Figure 3: Singapore vs Ethiopia EO 
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Figure 4: Singapore vs Ethiopia GDP per capita 
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capita more than tenfold from US $221.65 to US $2402.78 in 2008 by taking risks 
and shifting its economy toward new sectors, reducing agriculture’s contribution from 
30.17% in 1980 to 10.73% in 2008.  China increased its EO and as a result lifted 
millions of people out of poverty. In contrast, Ethiopia’s or more broadly Africa’s 
failure to diversify its economy and upgrade its technological capabilities led to 
stagnation, with GDP per capita increasing by a woeful US45$ over 29 years from 
US $155.37 to US $201.66 in 2008, leaving millions of the country’s citizens 
struggling to barely feed themselves. Figure 3 vividly illustrates the differing paths 
Singapore and Ethiopia took with a large and an increasing EO gap between the two 
countries. The resultant GDP per capita gap is illustrated by Figure 4, with Singapore 
attaining a GDP per capita level a 100 times greater that of Ethiopia.  
3.7 Discussion  
In this chapter, we have confirmed EO as an aggregate level, reflective, 
unidimensional second-order construct with three indicators that covary: risk taking, 
innovativeness and proactiveness. We cogently operationalised aggregate level 
indicators of risk taking, innovativeness and proactiveness, using objective measures 
and through factor analysis, confirmed the validity and dimensionality of the sub-
constructs of EO.   
Innovativeness was validated as a composite of innovative input, scientific output 
and technological output. Thus, addressing concerns in literature about the individual 
indicators (Schmookler, 1966, Hall et al., 2001 and Pakes and Griliches, 1980). In 
addition, innovativeness’ high correlation with tertiary education established its 
construct validity.  Second, proactiveness was established as a construct that best 
reflects the activities of search and discovery at the international level empirically 
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confirming Archibugi and Coco’s (2005) contention that some countries may be 
heavy producers of new knowledge although they are sluggish in applying it. On the 
other hand, other countries may quickly appropriate and apply technology developed 
elsewhere. A significant correlation with the outbound enrolment ratio established 
proactiveness’ validity.  
Third, we empirically confirmed risk taking as capital accumulation in highly uncertain 
sectors. Our contention that adjusted agricultural value-added reflects the propensity 
to diversify and invest in these risky sectors, the domestic savings rate reflects the 
ability to do so over time and gross investment is an imperfect measure of the 
magnitude of investment is corroborated. Comin and Philippon’s (2006) argument 
that risk taking at firm-level should, through the diversification effect, result in lower 
volatility at the aggregate level was supported by correlation analysis, helping to 
establish the construct’s validity.   
With the sub-constructs of EO defined and validated, we proceeded to confirm 
Miller’s (1983) conceptualisation of EO, at the aggregate level, as a reflective, 
unidimensional, second-order construct with three indicators: risk taking, 
innovativeness and proactiveness. These three variables loaded significantly on the 
same factor confirming our assertions.  Moreover, the factor analysis results showed 
that the indicators of EO covary, implying that they are complementary and not 
substitutes. In addition, construct validity was established by showing that EO has a 
higher correlation with high technology exports than any of its sub-constructs.  
In the introduction, we noted the anomaly that although corporate entrepreneurship 
literature has converged on EO as the appropriate description of entrepreneurial 
behaviour, literature at the aggregate level, which purports to aggregate firm level 
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behaviour, still measures entrepreneurship as a stock variable and considers only 
one of its composite elements, innovation, as reflective of entrepreneurial behaviour. 
Our conceptualisation of EO addresses the concern that we cannot measure 
entrepreneurship and technological progress by merely counting the number of 
entrepreneurs in a country. Therefore, Banerjee and Duflo’s (2007) warning not to 
romanticize these penniless entrepreneurs has been heeded. Similarly, Acs et al.’s 
(2005) concern that invention does not adequately account for differences in growth 
outcomes has been addressed. Our measure considers all of the composite 
elements of EO as a reflection of entrepreneurial behaviour, not only R&D 
expenditure.  
Furthermore, we have also addressed the issue of the unit of analysis and 
essentially confirmed Miller’s (2011) contention that EO can manifest at the level of 
the nation state.  In addition, as we hypothesized, the question of whether one nation 
state can devote more resources to innovative activity, take risks and invest more in 
longer term projects with uncertain outcomes as well as be more proactive in 
diversifying its economic base than others, has been answered in the affirmative. 
Although entrepreneurship is a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon that varies 
according to culture, geography, policies and institutions, we have developed a 
single aggregated theory-based indicator that helps capture this complexity. In 
particular, we argue that it is the manifestation of this EO that is the critical variable 
that defines whether a country is entrepreneurial or not.  
3.8 Conclusion 
In sum, in this chapter we have theoretically defined and empirically confirmed 
aggregated theory-based single synthetic indicators of innovativeness, risk taking 
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and proactiveness. In addition, the manifestation of entrepreneurship, EO, has also 
been confirmed and validated as an aggregate level second-order construct that is a 
joint function of enhancing innovative capabilities, and investing in risky, unique and 
uncertain sectors, as well as proactively seeking new markets and advanced 
technology. In the following chapter, we shall evaluate its determinants and drivers 
and try to clarify why rates of EO differ across countries. 
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Chapter 4 
THE DETERMINANTS OF EO: AN AGGREGATE ANALYIS 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, we have defined the sub-constructs of EO and carefully 
and methodically confirmed both the validity and dimensionality of EO. However, we 
have a limited understanding of why rates of EO vary across countries. Therefore, 
this chapter investigates the determinants and drivers of EO.  The question we ask 
is: why are some countries more innovative, risk taking and pro-active than others? 
To answer this question, we test whether financial market development, social 
cohesion, human capital and the control of corruption have a positive association 
with EO and whether this impact varies with the level of development. Summary 
statistics of determinants of EO and the results emanating from regression analysis 
are presented, discussed and compared with findings in literature. 
Economics literature suggests institutions and policy variables such as the stock of 
human capital are possible antecedents of economic growth as they enable 
entrepreneurship. The first school of thought in economics literature propagated by 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) underscores the primacy of institutions as predictors of 
economic growth. They posit that large deviations in GDP per capita across 
countries emanate from differences in the quality of institutions which can shape 
political and economic incentives in society.  As a result, institutions can either 
promote growth or hinder it. As Adam Smith (1904, p. 472) observed:  
“Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a 
regular administration of justice, in which people do not feel themselves secure in the 
possession of their property, in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly 
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employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay. Commerce 
and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in which there is not a certain 
degree of confidence in the justice of government” 
In contrast, the second school of thought advanced by Glaeser et al. (2004) 
highlights the importance of human and physical capital accumulation. They contend 
that growth in GDP per capita is driven by policy variables that even benevolent 
dictators can pursue. They maintain that “countries that emerge from poverty 
accumulate human and physical capital under dictatorships, and then, once they 
become richer, are increasingly likely to improve their institutions” (Glaeser et al., 
2004, p. 298). This argument which deems human capital as a critical prerequisite 
for growth has found empirical support. Firstly, Stokke (2008) finds that human 
capital is the critical factor that determines a country’s ability to imitate and learn 
advanced foreign technologies.  In addition, Lee and Kim (2009) establish that 
human capital is an important policy variable that facilitates technological upgrading 
amongst countries, therefore enabling economic growth. Lastly, Dakhli and De 
Clercq (2004) find strong support for the positive relationship between human capital 
and innovation. 
A more nuanced view has been developed by Lee and Kim (2009) that integrates 
both institutions and policy variables. Lee and Kim (2009) argue that the factors that 
drive GDP growth differ according to the stage of that country’s development. They 
suggest that there are two stages of development. The first one involves the 
transition from low-to-middle income and growth in this stage might be facilitated by 
improving institutions and primary/secondary education. The second stage involves 
transitioning from middle-to-high income and technological upgrading and growth in 
this stage involves improving innovative capabilities. Therefore focussing on 
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increasing R&D investment and improving human capital accumulation might be 
more appropriate for countries transitioning from middle to high income (Lee and 
Kim, 2009). 
However, as scholars have debated whether policies or institutions facilitate 
economic growth and sought to provide evidence for one view or the other, they 
have failed to ask the critical question they implicitly assume: Do institutions or 
policies enhance entrepreneurship or as Adam Smith suggests commerce and 
manufactures? The correct line of argument is that the quality of institutions shape 
economic incentives that entrepreneurial firms face, thus facilitating commerce and 
manufactures which then leads to economic growth. Similarly, human capital 
determines entrepreneurial firms’ ability to imitate and learn advanced foreign 
technologies which results in economic growth. In essence, institutions and policies 
alter the ability and incentives of firms to innovate and proactively take risks. The 
clear causal link theoretically is from institutions and policies to entrepreneurship. 
Nevertheless, scholars simply link institutional and policy variables to growth instead 
of defining entrepreneurship at the aggregate level and establishing the 
hypothesized causal link. We maintain that institutions and policies by themselves do 
not increase output. Entrepreneurial firms and entrepreneurs do. Therefore, 
institutions and policies are, correctly, the enablers of risk taking, proactiveness and 
innovativeness and not directly economic growth.  
In this chapter, we address this oversight and evaluate institutional and policy 
variables as determinants of the manifestation of entrepreneurship at the aggregate 
level, EO. Abramovitz (1994, p. 24) suggests, the determinants and drivers of 
technological upgrading are the “countries’ level of education and technical 
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competence, the commercial, industrial and financial institutions that bear on their 
abilities to finance and operate modern, large-scale business, and the political and 
social characteristics that influence the risks, the incentives and the personal 
rewards of economic activity”. Therefore, we investigate financial market 
development, social cohesion, human capital and the control of corruption as 
potentially important factors that may affect the rate of entrepreneurship across 
countries (Biggs and Srivastava, 1996, Aterido et. al, 2009).  
We select these four measures as determinants of EO because they alter the ability 
and incentives of firms to be entrepreneurial. First, we submit that good institutions, 
that reduce levels of corruption and arbitrary discrimination, would support EO since 
risk bearing and innovating require, at a minimum, the assurance the rewards will 
accrue to the risk taker. Second, we note that the proactive actions necessary to 
attack new markets require purposeful, cohesive action that is more likely in 
relatively equal societies with agreed on long-term objectives than other scenarios. 
Third, we posit that financial institutions are important because they evaluate and 
finance entrepreneurs’ innovation and launching of new products to market 
(Schumpeter, 1912) and thus their relative absence would inhibit EO (King and 
Levine, 1993).  Lastly, we contend that high stocks of human capital enhance 
entrepreneurship by enabling knowledge acquisition and better quality innovation 
(Larroulet and Couyoumdjian, 2009).  
However, we also note that EO and its drivers are different in diverse kinds of 
contexts. Since economic growth in Schumpeterian theory is highly context-
dependent, we would expect the effect of institutions and the stock of human capital 
on entrepreneurship to vary depending on the distance to the technological frontier. 
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For example, as Lee and Kim (2009) note, tertiary education may be more important 
than secondary education for technological upgrading in middle-to-higher income 
countries whereas institutions may be more important for low income countries. Thus 
a greater understanding of these differences in EO amongst countries shaped by 
these drivers may assist firms, investors and government policy makers in spurring 
economic growth. Consequently, ascertaining the impact of financial market 
development, social cohesion, the control of corruption and the stock of human 
capital would enable countries to implement appropriate policies for 
entrepreneurship led growth. 
4.1 Research Design 
As discussed in chapter 3, we use secondary, longitudinal, panel data that contains 
both cross-sectional and time series elements in order to investigate the relation 
between EO and its determinants. The data set is constructed from the CANA panel 
database and the World Development Indicators (WDI). Our sampling frame is the 
134 nation states that have been in existence for more than 10 years and are 
represented in both the CANA and the World Bank’s WDI databases. The complete 
sample covers data on 93 countries, of which 16 are African.  
4.1.1 Independent variables 
Our independent variables are: financial market development, corruption, social 
cohesion and human capital. First, to measure banking development, an important 
construct because financial institutions evaluate and finance entrepreneurs’ 
innovation and launching of new products to market (Schumpeter, 1942), we assess 
financial depth (size) of financial institutions. Following Čihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen 
and Levine (2012), we adopt the private credit to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio 
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in order to operationalise banking development. The private credit to gross domestic 
product (GDP) ratio measures domestic private credit granted to the real sector by 
commercial banks as percentage of local currency GDP. Due to data limitations and 
the need to preserve our longitudinal data sample, particularly of African countries, 
we do not use an indicator of the size of financial markets as a measure of financial 
development. As Table 12 shows, when we include stock market to GDP ratio the 
observations are almost halved from 2726 to 1425. Nevertheless, as the indicator of 
domestic credit is highly correlated with the stock market to GDP ratio, we would 
expect it to ameliorate some of the negative impact of excluding this measure of 
financial market development. 
Table 12: Correlation matrix of the indicators of financial development 
  
Sample (adjusted): 1988 2008  
Included observations: 1425 after adjustments  
     Private credit to GDP  Stock market to GDP   
Private credit to GDP  1.00   
    
Stock market to GDP 0.54*** 1.00  
    
    
Notes: 
1. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 
Second, following Asiedu and Villamil (2000) and Wei (2000), we use the control of 
corruption and inequality as proxies of institutions because firstly, unlike governance 
measures they have a direct association with EO. For example, innovation, risk 
taking and proactiveness can take place in an autocracy such as China or a 
democracy, such as Sweden. However, corruption in either of these countries would 
alter the calculus of entrepreneurial firms. They would have to decide whether to use 
valuable resources on rent seeking and bribery or innovation and risk taking.  
Similarly, inequality occasioned by arbitrary discrimination alters the opportunity set 
faced by talented individuals from minority groups. Exclusion from educational 
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opportunities and business leadership reduces both the human and entrepreneurial 
capital stock with possibly dire consequences for EO. Literature suggests that ethnic 
heterogeneity (Easterly, 2006), a measure of the chances of people belonging to 
different ethno-linguistic groups and youth unemployment, which reflects a failure to 
mobilize existing resources and build productive skills (Sala-i-Martín, Bilbao-Osorio, 
Blanke, Crotti,  Hanouz, Geiger and Ko, 2012), are valid indicators of social 
cohesion. However, due to data limitations and the need to preserve our longitudinal 
data sample, particularly of African countries, we do not adopt these indicators. As 
an illustration, when we control for inequality using the Gini coefficient, African 
countries in our analysis are reduced from 16 to 7. If we were to also include youth 
unemployment, they would be further reduced rendering any analysis of the impact 
of social cohesion on Africa meaningless. Thus we employ only the Gini coefficient 
to calibrate economic gulfs in nation states (Rodrik, 1999).  
Inequality may be an important antecedent to EO because social exclusion 
occasioned by high inequality may lead to low future prospects for the youth and can 
stimulate political volatility which would render technological upgrading redundant. In 
addition, the proactive actions necessary to attack new markets require purposeful, 
cohesive action that relatively equal societies engender. Therefore, inequality is an 
important indicator for operationalising whether a country is indeed socially cohesive 
enough to bear the risks occasioned by an entrepreneurial orientation. 
Moreover, corruption has generally been determined using perception based indices 
(Olken and Pande, 2011). Anokhin and Schulze (2009) suggest that the variables 
employed in creating these indicators include the frequency of bribes, the size of 
bribes and political corruption by national leaders. Olken and Pande (2011) submit 
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that perception surveys have superior coverage across a wider range of countries 
compared to objective measures of corruption. Thus we employ the Corruption 
Perception Index from Transparency International Index sourced from the CANA 
database which ranges from 0 (indicating high corruption) to 10 (indicating low 
corruption). We term this indicator the control of corruption in order to simplify 
analysis.  
Lastly, analogous to Lee and Kim (2009), we calibrate the level of human capital by 
using both the secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios. The secondary enrolment 
ratio is defined as ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the 
age group that officially corresponds to the secondary level. Similarly, the tertiary 
enrolment ratio is characterised as the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to 
the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the tertiary level. Lee 
and Kim (2009) find that tertiary education and secondary education have a 
divergent impact on economic growth depending on the level of development. They 
maintain that this is due to the need for middle income countries to undertake 
process innovation, adaptations and improvements of technological capabilities in 
order to grow. Since these are essentially outcomes of EO, we investigate both the 
secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios as determinants of EO. 
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Table 13: Descriptive statistics of the determinants of EO 
 Control of 
corruption 
Gini Index Domestic Credit Tertiary Secondary 
 Mean 4.77 37.56 63.29 26.60 72.42 
 Median 4.07 35.29 53.30 22.58 80.18 
 Maximum 10.00 77.60 312.78 98.79 170.95 
 Minimum 1.00 12.10 -121.63 0.00 1.11 
 Std. Dev. 2.27 10.81 53.19 20.88 30.48 
 Skewness 0.74 0.56 1.12 0.78 -0.40 
 Kurtosis 2.42 2.67 5.63 2.91 2.53 
      
 Jarque-Bera 288.44 112.58 1360.20 276.49 99.27 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      
 Sum 13013.23 74058.90 172532.90 72499.96 197414.00 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 14017.21 230285.00 7709368.00 1188312.00 2531987.00 
      
 Observations 2726.00 1972.00 2726.00 2726.00 2726.00 
 
 
 
Table 13 presents the descriptive statistics for the control of corruption, the Gini 
Index, domestic credit to the private sector to GDP ratio as well as both measures of 
human capital, the tertiary enrolment ratio and the secondary enrolment ratio. The 
control of corruption, domestic credit to the private sector to GDP ratio as well as 
both measures of human capital have data on 93 countries, of which 16 are African 
whereas the Gini Index has data on only 68 countries, of which only 7 are African. 
 We begin by evaluating whether the normality assumptions are violated by 
assessing the third and the fourth moment of the normal distribution. The mean and 
the median differ substantially for all the four individual variables, indicating the 
presence of skewness. The control of corruption, the GINI Index, domestic credit to 
the private sector to GDP ratio as well as the tertiary enrolment ratio are all positively 
skewed whereas the secondary enrolment ratio is negatively skewed. Moreover, all 
the determinants of EO are largely mesokurtic (the distribution is flat relative to the 
normal distribution) except for domestic credit which is leptokurtic. The Bera-Jarque 
statistic firmly rejects normality (p<0.01) for all the determinants of EO.  
111 | P a g e  
 
Furthermore, we analyse the maxima and the minima to begin to decipher patterns 
amongst countries. First, Japan attained the highest ratio of domestic credit to GDP 
of 312% in the year 2005 whereas Tajikistan in 1992 had the lowest score in the 
sample of -121%. Second, Denmark and Finland attain the perfect score for the 
control of corruption in the year 2000. In contrast, Pakistan achieved the lowest 
possible reading of 1 on Transparency International’s measure in 1996. Third, China 
has the lowest inequality score of 12 in 1982 while Zambia has the highest Gini 
coefficient. Lastly, Finland and Australia have the highest score for tertiary and 
secondary education, respectively whereas the African countries Botswana and 
Mozambique have the lowest scores for tertiary and secondary education, 
respectively. 
Table 14: Country Rankings: Determinants 
Dcredit  Corruption  Gini Index Tertiary  Secondary 
Country  Mean Country  Mean Country  Mean Country  Mean Country  Mean 
1.Japan 268.54 1.Denmark 9.630 1.Zambia 62.91 1.Canada 69.80 1.Australia 120.98 
2.United States 174.73 2.New Zealand 9.407 2.Brazil 58.73 2.Finland 68.69 2.Belgium 120.37 
3.Switzerland 164.27 3.Finland 9.334 3.Burkina Faso 56.84 3.United States 67.85 3.Denmark 116.83 
4.Malaysia 157.74 4.Iceland 9.323 4.South Africa 55.49 4.Slovakia 58.60 4.Netherlands 116.37 
5.Netherlands 134.07 5.Singapore 9.223 5.Chile 55.21 5.Norway 56.75 5.Sweden 113.91 
6.South Africa 130.40 6.Sweden 9.185 6.Guatemala 54.95 6.New Zealand 55.48 6.Finland 113.59 
7.Canada 128.05 7.Canada 9.082 7.Colombia 54.79 7.Australia 55.41 7.Norway 107.37 
8.Germany 117.41 8.Netherlands 8.846 8.Thailand 52.78 8.Sweden 52.46 8.Spain 105.39 
9.Spain 117.19 9.Norway 8.777 9.Mexico 51.65 9.Belgium 49.39 9.Ireland 103.53 
10.Austria 116.13 10.Australia 8.723 10.El Salvador 50.93 10.UK 47.96 10.New Zealand 102.49 
Bottom 5          
89.Lithuania 6.64 89.Russia 2.465 64.Iceland 25.08 89.Lesotho 2.18 89.Senegal 16.10 
90.Kyrgyzstan 5.04 90.Azerbaijan 2.349 65.Sweden 24.33 90.Ethiopia 2.06 90.Ethiopia 15.66 
91.Lao PDR 4.49 91.Madagascar 2.034 66.Finland 24.08 91.Cambodia 1.80 91.Uganda 13.01 
92.Tajikistan -27.14 92.Honduras 1.935 67.Czech Republic 23.95 92.Mozambique 1.52 92.Burkina Faso 8.33 
93.Botswana -29.73 93.Paraguay 1.602 68.Slovenia 23.65 93.Burkina Faso 1.42 93.Mozambique 7.97 
 
Table 14 summarises the country rankings based on the country score on each of 
the determinants averaged over 29 years over the period in 1980-2008. The 
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rankings confirm the pattern that was emerging when we analysed maxima and 
minima. African countries score poorly on measures of inequality as well as both the 
human capital measures. Developed countries tend to achieve the highest scores 
across all the variables. Middle income countries perform poorly on both the 
extension of credit to the private sector and the control of corruption. Interestingly, 
South Africa seems to have a schizophrenic character. It achieves a top 10 ranking 
on two seemingly contradictory measures, the Gini Index and the extension of credit 
to the private sector, unlike its other middle income peers. 
4.1.2 Dependent variable 
 
As previously discussed in chapter 3, we adopted and confirmed Miller’s (1983) 
conceptualisation of EO as a reflective, unidimensional, second order construct. As a 
second order construct, EO’s indicators are risk taking, innovativeness and 
proactiveness. Correlations and exploratory factor analysis were used to confirm 
both the validity and dimensionality of EO. Table 15 displays the mean, standard 
deviation and rank of EO for the selected countries between 1980 and 2008. The 
means of the determinants of EO are also displayed. The top 10 EO countries are all 
high income countries, with Singapore achieving the highest average EO score over 
29 years. The top 10 all score highly on the control of corruption, domestic credit and 
tertiary education. However, Singapore scores disappointingly on inequality with a 
Gini Index of 46.02 which is substantially above the sample average of 37.56.  
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Table 15: Rankings of EO and its determinants 
EO 
Rank 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Control of 
Corruption 
Gini Index Domestic 
credit 
Tertiary 
1 Singapore 2.46 0.81 9.22 46.02 81.94 32.62 
2 Ireland 2.26 0.64 8.38 33.06 87.80 38.00 
3 Belgium 1.39 0.32 6.13 27.04 100.38 49.39 
4 Switzerland 1.36 0.27 8.64 33.15 164.27 33.45 
5 Sweden 1.04 0.46 9.18 24.33 111.74 52.46 
6 Japan 1.03 0.16 6.57 29.81 268.54 38.27 
7 Netherlands 0.92 0.30 8.85 29.03 134.07 46.47 
8 Iceland 0.91 0.49 9.32 25.08 86.71 34.87 
9 Denmark 0.85 0.38 9.63 30.75 93.23 47.43 
10 Finland 0.80 0.50 9.33 24.08 66.92 68.69 
 Selected Developed 
11 United States 0.79 0.21 7.66 40.28 174.73 67.85 
13 Germany 0.73 0.22 8.06 27.55 117.41 35.92 
16 Canada 0.64 0.31 9.08 30.03 128.05 69.80 
21 United Kingdom 0.53 0.18 8.71 31.16 112.39 47.96 
38 Portugal 0.13 0.13 6.35 35.78 106.58 37.14 
 Selected African       
25 Botswana 0.50 0.18 6.06 NA -29.73 2.78 
52 South Africa -0.06 0.15 5.03 55.49 130.40 16.98 
80 Senegal -0.64 0.16 3.49 NA 30.24 4.11 
92 Lesotho -1.09 0.63 3.43 NA 9.94 2.18 
93 Ethiopia -1.20 0.27 3.37 39.34 36.06 2.06 
 Selected Eastern European and former Soviet Union 
15 Czech Republic 0.67 0.22 4.84 23.95 71.04 23.16 
19 Slovenia 0.56 0.29 5.27 23.65 30.39 43.42 
33 Russia 0.19 0.19 2.46 37.78 22.68 30.37 
66 Georgia -0.34 0.29 3.36 37.49 11.01 40.11 
87 Kyrgyzstan -0.90 0.19 4.16 39.07 5.04 28.65 
 Selected Latin American 
45 Chile 0.04 0.28 7.03 55.21 85.58 28.04 
60 Brazil -0.23 0.11 3.85 58.73 86.00 10.59 
63 Argentina -0.29 0.14 4.09 46.38 37.52 43.56 
71 Uruguay -0.44 0.18 3.95 43.00 50.33 29.85 
77 Bolivia -0.55 0.17 2.96 NA 42.71 29.39 
 Selected Asian       
17 Malaysia 0.62 0.42 5.36 47.34 157.74 17.86 
     31 China 0.22 0.45 2.68 26.24 98.35 7.27 
     32 Thailand 0.19 0.32 2.90 52.78 112.16 23.75 
74 India -0.49 0.30 2.87 32.32 52.59 7.23 
     75 Sri Lanka -0.50 0.16 3.65 NA 41.39 18.65 
46 All 0.00 0.74 4.77 37.56 63.29 26.60 
 
Former Eastern Bloc countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia rank highly 
on EO, inequality and tertiary enrolment exceeding some developed countries, for 
instance the United Kingdom. Likewise, one of the fastest growing countries over the 
past 30 years, China, scores highly on EO at number 31 realising a higher grade 
than both Portugal and Russia. However, China’s performance on the determinants 
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is mixed. It ranks very poorly on corruption and tertiary education, achieving scores 
well below the sample average whereas it attains a high score on inequality and 
access to credit by the private sector. 
On the other hand, African countries attain very low scores on EO and its 
determinants, with Lesotho and Ethiopia ranking last and second last, respectively. 
South Africa is ranked in the middle, number 52 out of 93 countries. South Africa 
seems to have a similar profile to Latin American countries such as Chile, Brazil, 
Argentina and Uruguay. They all attain average EO scores of around zero, have high 
inequality, well-developed financial systems and are moderately corrupt. However, 
whereas the Latin American group tends to score highly on tertiary enrolment, South 
Africa performs poorly on this measure compared to them.  
Figures 5 to 7 illustrate tertiary education, domestic credit and EO, respectively in 
selected countries. The figures illustrate that countries that have high human capital 
as well as developed banking systems seem to attain a high EO.  
 
Figure 5: Tertiary education 
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Figure 6: Domestic Credit 
 
 
Figure 7: EO 
Table 16 presents the correlations between EO, its sub-constructs innovativeness, 
risk taking and proactiveness and the determinants, the control of corruption, 
domestic credit as well as the human capital variables tertiary enrolment and 
secondary enrolment. As Table 16 demonstrates, EO is significantly and positively 
(p<0.00) correlated to the control of corruption, domestic credit, tertiary enrolment 
and secondary enrolment and as expected, it is negatively related to the measure of 
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taking and proactiveness, are positively (p<0.00) correlated to the control of 
corruption, domestic credit, tertiary enrolment and secondary enrolment whereas 
they are negatively related to the Gini Index. Lastly, EO has a higher association with 
both human capital variables than its sub-constructs, further enhancing the reliability 
and nomological validity of this research. 
Table 16: Correlation matrix of the sub-constructs of EO, EO and its determinants 
         
 EO Innov   Proact  Risk  Corrupt  Domestic 
credit  
Gini 
Index  
Tertiary  Secondary 
EO 1.00         
          
Innov 0.70*** 1.00        
          
Proact 0.76*** 0.25*** 1.00       
          
Risk 0.81*** 0.35*** 0.43*** 1.00      
 0.00 0.00 0.00 -----       
          
Corrupt 0.67*** 0.72*** 0.30*** 0.42*** 1.00     
          
Domestic 
credit  0.53*** 0.59*** 0.18*** 0.38*** 0.47*** 1.00    
          
Gini Index  -0.40*** -0.44*** -0.12*** -0.27*** -0.35*** -0.16*** 1.00   
          
Tertiary 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.52*** 0.41*** -0.35*** 1.00  
          
Secondary  0.66*** 0.56*** 0.35*** 0.53*** 0.55*** 0.37*** -0.49*** 0.77*** 1.00 
Notes: 
1. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
2. Innov, Proact and Risk represent innovativeness, proactiveness and risk taking respectively. Corrupt indicates the control of 
corruption. 
4.1.3 Estimation Methodology 
We use a panel data set of 93 countries created from multiple data sources to 
conduct the necessary statistical analysis. Brooks (2008) notes that when using a 
panel data set we do not assume that the observations are independently distributed 
since panel data is comprised of both time series and cross sectional elements. 
Moreover, he suggests that panel data is superior to both time series and cross 
sectional data since it increases the degrees of freedom, reduces the collinearity 
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among the independent variables and enables a researcher to control for 
unobservable individual differences and subtleties. 
In our empirical specification, EO is the dependent variable whereas the control of 
corruption, financial development, social cohesion and human capital are our 
dependent variables. EO is composed of several persistent series such as FDI and 
R&D, therefore lagged EO is also likely to be associated with current EO. Hasan and 
Tucci (2010) suggest that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are biased and 
inconsistent when there are inter-relationships between both the dependent and 
independent variables in the regression specification.  We thus evaluate a linear 
dynamic panel-data model to capture the effect of the lagged dependent variables on 
the current dependent variables.  
Moreover, entrepreneurship and institutional variables may also possibly be 
endogenous because of omitted variables and reverse causality (Li et al., 2012). For 
example, financial market development might be occasioned by financial institutions 
with a high EO using innovative methods to increase credit availability to the private 
sector. Likewise, reverse causality cannot be dismissed since countries with a high 
EO might attain a higher stock of human capital.  A high EO may increase demand, 
and as a result wages, for knowledge workers in innovative sectors and workers may 
in turn respond to higher returns to education by staying longer in school.  
Hasan and Tucci (2010) suggest that this endogeneity can be somewhat ameliorated 
by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure for panel estimation. The 
GMM technique was specifically devised to mitigate the econometric problems 
caused by unobserved country specific effects and endogeneity in growth 
regressions. Blundell and Bond (1998) developed a system GMM estimator which 
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combines equations of the first differences instrumented by lagged levels with an 
additional set of equations in levels instrumented by lagged first-differences. First-
differencing and lagging allows us to correct for endogeneity bias, check for 
unobserved heterogeneity and the associated omitted variable bias, as well as for 
the time-invariant component of the measurement error. Blundell and Bond (1998) 
argue that the system GMM estimator is superior to the difference estimator since: 
• it mitigates the poor instruments problem by using additional moment 
conditions, 
• it is less biased than the difference GMM estimator (Hayakawa, 2007) and, 
• the two-step estimator is asymptotically efficient and robust to all kinds of 
heteroskedasticity.   
Li et al. (2012) state that system GMM is not subject to weak instrument and finite 
sample biases and therefore it may have better finite sample properties. Roodman 
(2009) suggests that system GMM estimators are best suited for panels with large 
cross-sectional variables and fewer time periods. In particular, panels (similar to our 
data) with a linear functional relationship, an autoregressive dependent variable, 
fixed country effects, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are appropriate for 
system GMM.  Moreover, system GMM are advantageous because they employ 
extra moment conditions that rely on stationary conditions of the first observations 
(Dutta, Sobel and Roy, 2012). We therefore adopt the system GMM estimators to 
analyse our data.  
The equation takes the following form: 
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𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡−1+ 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 +𝛼4𝑆𝑜𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝜃𝑖 
+𝛼7𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                             (11)                                                                                                                                
Where EOit is entrepreneurial orientation in country i at time t, the lag EOit-1 
represents the expected persistence of EO as we would expect it to manifest over 
time and takes into account serial correlation, CORRUit represent our measure of 
corruption, FINDEVit measures financial development, SOCOit calibrates social 
cohesion and HUMANCAPit evaluates human capital. In addition, 𝜃i is the measure 
of time-invariant country fixed effects, Zt is the vector for time dummies and 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents the random error term.  
4.1.4 Reliability and Validity 
In our estimation strategy, we utilise the two-step dynamic GMM estimator, which is 
asymptotically efficient and vigorous to heteroskedasticity. In addition, we only use 
internal instruments and external instruments are not used. Blundell and Bond (1998) 
suggest that in system GMM, instrument validity can be ascertained by employing 
two tests.  
Firstly, we have to ascertain whether the model is identified or not. A model is 
identified if and only if its parameters can be consistently estimated from 
observables.  Blundell and Bond (1998) propose using the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions which tests the overall validity of the instruments by analysing 
the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation process. The 
Sargan test evaluates whether the instrumental variables used in the regression are 
uncorrelated to some residuals. If they are uncorrelated, the instruments are deemed 
valid.  
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Secondly, Hasan and Tucci (2010) suggest the autoregressive (AR) test. The AR 
test examines serial correlation in the error terms in both the difference regression 
and the lagged difference-level regression. The differenced error term is permitted to 
be to be AR (1). However, AR (2) serial correlation in the differenced error term 
contravenes the assumption of the GMM technique. Following Hasan and Tucci 
(2010), we will report the p-value of the Sargan test, the p-value of the AR (2) tests. 
If the p-values of the AR (2) test and the Sargan test are not significant (>0.05), we 
will not reject the null hypotheses of over-identification and no second order auto 
correlation of error terms. We would therefore conclude that the estimation supports 
the validity of the instruments implying that the estimated coefficients are free of 
endogeneity bias. 
Although the Sargan test and the AR (2) test are helpful in determining the validity of 
instruments, Roodman (2009) submits that we should also mind and report the 
instrument rank. The Instrument rank is merely the number of linearly independent 
instruments used in estimation the regression. Roodman (2009) argues that in 
dynamic GMM, a high instrument rank can lead to endogenous variables being over 
fit and the power of the Hansen test being reduced. He suggests that a revealing 
sign of instrument invalidity is a Sargan test statistic of 1.00. In addition, Roodman 
(2007) recommends that, to ensure instrument validity, the ratio of the number of 
cross sections (n) to the  instrument rank (i) should be greater than 1, that is, r = n/i 
=>1. Further, he notes that an r < 1, increases the chances of the regression yielding 
significant results even though there is no underlying association between variables. 
Therefore, following Asiedu and Lien (2011), we report the instrument count and r for 
all our regressions and where r< 1, we reduce the instrument rank by restricting the 
number of lags of the dependent variable that can be used as instruments. 
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4.2 Estimation Results 
 
We begin by assessing the correlation matrix of the independent and control 
variables for collinearity. As Table 17 indicates, the pairwise correlation coefficients 
show that multicollinearity may be a problem between the human capital variables 
(0.78) as well as the control variable wealth (GDP) and the control of corruption (0. 
82). Hair et al. (2010) argues that multicollinearity can affect the ability of a 
researcher to represent and understand the effect of each IV in the regression. 
Furthermore, they note that multicollinearity affects not only the coefficients or the 
overall model but it can also result in the regression coefficient having the wrong 
sign.  
Nonetheless, Hair et al. (2010) suggest that in some cases this reversal of signs is 
expected and desirable due to the suppression effect. The suppression effect helps 
in determining the “true relationship between the dependent and the IVs has been 
hidden in the bivariate correlations. By adding additional independent variables  
some unwanted shared variance is accounted for and the remaining unique variance 
allows for the estimated coefficients to be in the expected direction” (Hair et al., 
2010, p. 203). As expected, the control of corruption is correlated to all the 
determinants and the control variable except for inequality which is negatively related 
to all the indicators. 
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Table 17: Correlation matrix of IVs (combined sample) 
 
     
        Corruption Domestic credit Secondary Tertiary Gini Index GDP per capita 
Corruption 1.00      
       
Domestic credit  0.48*** 1.00     
       
Secondary 0.59*** 0.37*** 1.00    
       
Tertiary 0.55*** 0.38*** 0.78*** 1.00   
       
          Gini Index  -0.39*** -0.21*** -0.50*** -0.40*** 1.00  
       
GDP per capita  0.82*** 0.57*** 0.65*** 0.64*** -0.50*** 1.00 
       
       
     Notes: 
1. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
2. GDP per capita is measured in US 2005$. 
 
We then run system GMM regressions for all the 93 countries in our sample that vary 
with the choice of policy and institutional variables. In all the regressions, the log of 
GDP per capita in 2005 US dollars is included as the basic control variable and EO 
is the dependent variable. The Sargan and AR (2) tests in the system GMM 
regressions are not significant (p >0.05), thus we do not reject the null hypotheses of 
over-identification and no second order auto correlation of error terms. Furthermore, 
r > 1 in all the regressions, suggesting that the Sargan test has sufficient power, and 
therefore the instruments are valid. The results are displayed in Table 18.  
The control variable the log of GDP carries a positive sign and it is significant at the 
10% level. The estimated coefficient of lagged EO is positive and significant 
(p<0.01), indicating that EO is persistent and justifying our decision to use the 
system GMM estimator. Model (1) presents the regression where the control of 
corruption is the only explanatory variable. The estimated coefficient is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. However, when we control for inequality in Model (7), the 
coefficient of the control of corruption changes sign and becomes positive (p<0.01). 
This positive association between EO and the control of corruption is positive and 
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robust to the addition of domestic credit, tertiary and secondary education as 
independent variables. This suggests that, all else being equal, lower perceptions of 
corruption are positively associated with EO in relatively equal societies whereas in 
countries where distributional conflict may exist, they may not be. These results find 
support in Olken’s (2005) findings that perceptions of corruption may be influenced 
by social trust.  
Table 18: GMM analysis with the determinants as predictors of EO (combined sample) 
Dependent 
variable: EO 
          
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
EO(-1) 0.57 
71.88*** 
0.66 
76.51*** 
0.64 
75.39*** 
0.66 
70.38*** 
0.59 
49.91*** 
0.65 
29.31*** 
0.69 
29.28*** 
0.63 
26.73*** 
0.67 
29.89*** 
0.62 
20.11*** 
Log (GDP) 0.19 
11.46*** 
0.11 
6.31*** 
0.14 
6.53*** 
0.23 
9.38*** 
0.17 
5.82*** 
0.12 
2.78*** 
0.15 
3.32*** 
0.14 
3.08*** 
- 0.10 
1.68* 
Corruption -0.08 
-12.43*** 
 
    0.17 
12.38*** 
0.17 
13.72*** 
0.14 
8.99*** 
0.16 
9.72*** 
0.15 
9.05*** 
Domestic 
credit 
 -0.00 
-1.85** 
     0.00 
6.29*** 
 
0.00 
9.99*** 
0.00 
8.32*** 
Tertiary   -0.00 
-3.22*** 
 0.01 
9.82*** 
0.00 
4.48*** 
  -0.00 
-0.58 
-0.00 
-1.96** 
Secondary   0.00 
4.53*** 
 0.00 
0.43 
0.00 
3.11*** 
  0.01 
4.98*** 
0.00 
3.47*** 
Gini Index    -0.00 
-7.69*** 
-0.00 
-4.21*** 
0.00 
0.93 
0.00 
0.69 
0.00 
2.64*** 
0.00 
2.03** 
0.00 
2.08** 
Number of 
observations 
1879 1879 1879 1370 1370 1370 1370 1370 1375 1370 
J statistic 81.86 82.50 79.70 55.24 54.37 57.43 55.93 55.75 59.25 57.07 
Prob(J-
statistic) 
0.33 0.31 0.39 0.35 0.38 0.28 0.33 0.34 0.23 0.29 
AR(2) 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 
No of cross 
sections 
92 92 92 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
Instrument 
rank 
80 80 81 55 57 58 56 57 58 59 
N/I 1.15 1.15 1.14 1.24 1.19 1.17 1.21 1.19 1.17 1.15 
Notes: 
1. The dependent variable is EO assessed during the period 1982-2008 using an unbalanced panel with 27 periods included and 93 
cross-sections. 
2. The regressions including the GINI Index have 27 periods and 68 cross-sections. 
3. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance of the t-value at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
In model (2), we assess the relationship between the provision of domestic credit to 
the private sector and EO. The estimated coefficient is negative and this result is 
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significant at the 5% level. However, when we control for corruption and inequality in 
model (8), the sign of the coefficient of domestic credit changes from negative to 
positive. This result is significant at the 1% level. This outcome is robust to adding 
additional independent variables such as human capital and wealth (log of GDP). We 
can surmise that, for all 93 countries in the sample, the domestic credit to the private 
sector to GDP ratio enhances risk taking, innovativeness and proactiveness provided 
that the country is relatively equal and corruption is comparatively modest. This 
finding aligns with Black and Moersch (1998) assertion that where there is poor 
corporate governance and corruption, banking development may hinder EO. 
In model (3), we evaluate the relation between human capital variables and EO. As 
previously indicated, the human capital variables are highly collinear. However, we 
insert them jointly in the regression to evaluate Lee and Kim’s (2009) finding that 
tertiary education and secondary education’s relative importance to technological 
upgrading depends on the level of development. The tertiary variable is negatively 
associated with EO (p<0.01) whereas the secondary education variable is positively 
associated with EO (p<0.01). However, when we control for inequality in model (5) 
and both inequality and corruption in model (6), tertiary education becomes positively 
associated with EO (p<0.01), implying high corruption and inequality may hinder the 
association between tertiary education and EO. The relationship between secondary 
education and EO on the other hand remains positive and significant at the 1% level 
and robust to the addition of domestic credit, inequality and wealth as additional 
predictors (model 10). In contrast, adding the domestic credit and wealth to the 
regression renders the association between EO and tertiary education insignificant. 
From these results, we can infer that, for the combined sample and after controlling 
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for the other determinants of EO and wealth, secondary education is more robust as 
a predictor of EO compared to tertiary education.  
In model (4) we investigate the relation between inequality and EO which we find to 
be negative (p<0.01). However, when we include in the regression the control of 
corruption and financial development in model (7) and wealth in model (10), the 
relation becomes positive and significant (p<0.01), with the suppression effect once 
again being demonstrated. This relation remains robust to the addition of the human 
capital variables to the regression. We therefore conclude that in countries with low 
corruption, high human capital development as well as a highly developed banking 
system, inequality is positively associated with EO. This finding confirms Barro 
(2000) and Forbes (2000) finding that the impact of inequality may vary with the level 
of development. 
4.2.1 Results of middle-to-high income countries 
Following Lee and Kim (2009), we categorise countries whose GDP per capita in 
2000 is higher than US $3000$as middle-to-high income countries whereas 
countries whose GDP is lower than US $3000 are classified as low income 
countries. Table 19 presents the correlation matrix of the independent and control 
variables for middle-to-high income countries. Once again, the association between 
the human capital variables (0.70) and wealth and the control of corruption (0.75) 
may indicate potential problems with multicollinearity and the institutional variables 
have the expected associations. 
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Table 19: Correlation matrix of IVs (middle-to-high income sample) 
     
        Corruption Domestic 
credit  
 Secondary Tertiary            Gini Index GDP per capita 
Corrupt 1.00      
       
Domestic credit  0.37*** 1.00     
       
Secondary 0.49*** 0.27*** 1.00    
       
Tertiary 0.44*** 0.26*** 0.70*** 1.00   
       
               Gini Index  -0.38*** -0.09*** -0.55*** -0.39*** 1.00  
       
GDP per capita  0.75*** 0.50*** 0.62*** 0.56*** -0.53*** 1.00 
       
       
       
     Notes: 
1. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
2. GDP per capita is measured in US 2005$. 
 
Table 20 presents the results for system GMM regressions for all the 51 countries 
that fall under the middle-to-high income category. We drop the log of GDP per 
capita in 2005 US dollars as a control variable since we have divided the sample into 
two, based on income. However, we use wealth as a robustness measure in model 
(10). Similar to the analysis where we include all countries, EO remains the sole 
dependent variable. The Sargan and AR (2) tests in the system GMM regressions 
are not significant (p >0.05), therefore we cannot reject the null hypotheses of over-
identification and no second order auto correlation of error terms. Furthermore, r => 
1 in all the regressions, suggesting that the Sargan test has sufficient power, and the 
instruments are thus valid.   
With validity established, we proceed to investigate the control of corruption variable 
as a determinant of corruption. The estimated coefficient of lagged EO remains 
positive and significant at the 1% level, further vindicating our decision to use the 
system GMM estimator. Low perceptions of corruption are positively associated with 
EO (Model 1) and this result is significant at the 1% level. In contrast to the results 
emanating from regression analysis using the combined sample, the positive 
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relationship between EO and the control of corruption in middle-to-high countries is 
positive and robust to the addition of domestic credit, tertiary and secondary 
education, the Gini Index as well as wealth as independent variables. This suggests 
that, all else being equal, lower perceptions of corruption are positively associated 
with EO in middle-to-high income countries and that Olken’s (2005) findings that 
perceptions of corruption are influenced by social trust may not apply to middle-to-
high income countries.  
Similarly, in model (2) positive relation between the provision of domestic credit to 
the private sector is positive and significant at the 1% level. This result is robust to 
the addition of the control of corruption, inequality as well as human capital and 
wealth as control variables. Model (3) provides support for Lee and Kim’s (2009) 
assertion that tertiary education is more significant for middle-to-high income 
countries compared to secondary education as a predictor of EO. However, when we 
control for domestic credit, financial development and the control of corruption, the 
variable tertiary education becomes insignificant whereas the secondary education 
variable remains positively and significantly associated with EO (p<0.01). These 
results indicate that tertiary education is strongly associated with financial 
development, the control of corruption and wealth in middle-to-high income 
countries.  
We also evaluate the relation between EO and inequality which is persistently 
negative (models 4 and 10, p<0.01), in contrast to the sample as whole. However, 
when we account for the control of corruption, financial development as well as 
human capital in model (9) this association becomes insignificant.  We add wealth in 
model (10) to assess the robustness of our results. The association between the 
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control corruption, domestic credit and the human capital variables and EO hardly 
changes with the inclusion of wealth. Further, wealth itself is not significant at the 
10% level. However, the relation between inequality and EO remains negative and 
strengthened, and becomes significant at the 1% level with the suppression effect 
once again being demonstrated.  
Table 20:  GMM analysis with the determinants as predictor variable (Middle-to-high income sample) 
Dependent 
variable: EO 
          
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
EO(-1) 1.06 
31.32*** 
0.77 
44.42*** 
0.87 
57.57*** 
0.98 
142.36*** 
1.09 
43.34*** 
0.95 
24.18*** 
1.00 
36.21*** 
0.96 
37.97*** 
0.94 
35.01*** 
0.87 
16.51*** 
Log(GDP) - - - - - - - - - -0.25 
-1.34 
Corruption 0.47 
7.93*** 
   0.47 
11.02*** 
0.55 
8.57*** 
0.55 
14.64*** 
0.44 
14.61*** 
0.50 
18.01*** 
0.39 
14.84*** 
Domestic 
credit 
 0.00 
7.47*** 
     0.00 
3.55*** 
0.00 
1.71* 
0.00 
4.18*** 
Tertiary   0.01 
7.36*** 
  0.00 
1.87* 
0.00 
2.15** 
 0.00 
1.29 
0.00 
0.85 
Secondary   -0.00 
-2.68*** 
 
  0.00 
2.37*** 
0.00 
2.91*** 
 0.00 
4.79*** 
0.00 
2.00** 
Gini Index    -0.00 
-3.39*** 
-0.00 
-0.37 
 -0.00 
-1.61 
-0.00 
-1.10 
-0.00 
-1.37 
-0.01 
-2.81*** 
Number of 
observations 
1036 1036 1036 888 888 1036 888 888 888 883 
J statistic 
26.17 28.63 35.53 33.85 27.58 24.85 25.38 28.65 26.26 30.60 
Prob(J-
statistic) 
0.45 0.33 0.10 0.14 0.38 0.53 0.50 0.33 0.45 0.24 
AR(2) 0.59 0.26 0.26 0.13 0.21 0.91 0.34 0.23 0.31 0.28 
No of cross 
sections 
51 51 51 44 44 51 44 44 44 44 
Instrument 
rank 
28 28 29 28 29 30 31 30 32 33 
N/I 1.82 1.82 1.76 1.57 1.52 1.70 1.42 1.47 1.38 1.33 
Notes: 
1. The dependent variable is EO assessed during the period 1982-2008 using an unbalanced panel with 27 periods included and 51 
cross-sections. 
2. The regressions including the Gini Index have 27 periods and 44 cross-sections. 
3. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance of the t-value at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
4.2.2 Results low income countries 
Table 21 presents the correlation matrix of the independent and control variables for 
low income countries. The correlations between all the independent variables (IVs), 
except for human capital indicators, are all less than 0.80. Similar to our findings for 
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the combined sample and middle-to-high income countries, the correlation between 
tertiary and secondary education (0.82) may indicate potential problems with 
multicollinearity. Interestingly and contrary to our previous findings in the combined 
sample as well as middle-to-high income countries, the correlation between 
inequality and reduced perception of corruption, although weak, is positive in low 
income countries. In addition, the association between inequality and GDP per capita 
is not significant. The control of corruption has the expected relationships with the 
other determinants. 
Table 21: Correlations matrix of the IVs (low income sample) 
     
 Corruption  Domestic 
credit  
Secondary  Tertiary  Gini Index  GDP per capita 
Corruption  1.00      
       
Domestic credit  0.09** 1.00     
       
Secondary 0.14*** -0.02 1.00    
       
Tertiary   0.09** -0.02 0.82*** 1.00   
       
Gini Index  0.09** -0.09** -0.25*** -0.04 1.00  
       
GDP per capita  0.29*** 0.23*** 0.51*** 0.49*** 0.05 1.00 
     Notes: 
1. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
2. GDP per capita is measured in US 2005$ 
 
Table 22 presents the results for system GMM regressions for all the 41 countries 
that fall under the low income classification. Similar to the regression for high income 
countries, the log of GDP per capita is used as a robustness measure in model (11) 
and EO remains as the only dependent variable. The Sargan and AR (2) tests are 
satisfactory. Furthermore, r =>1 in all the regressions, thereby supporting 
identification and instrument validity. The lag of EO is also positively related to EO in 
all the regressions and this is significant at the 5% level.  
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We begin by assessing the relation between the control of corruption and EO in 
Model (1) which we find is persistently negative for low income countries and this 
finding is significant at the 1% level. Model (5) indicates that this negative association 
between EO and low corruption may be affected by inequality validating Olken’s 
(2005) assertion that perceptions of corruption are influenced by social trust. 
However, in model (11) we control for domestic credit, inequality, tertiary and 
secondary education, as well as wealth and confirm that low levels of corruption in 
low income countries are negatively related to EO and this is significant at the 1% 
level. These results provide credence to Ehrlich and Lui‘s (1999) and Aidt et al.’s 
(2008) view that corruption may moderate the negative impact of bureaucratic 
inefficiency on enterprise. 
Likewise, instead of the positive relation between the provision of domestic credit to 
the private sector and EO that we find in middle-to-high income countries, this 
relation is negative in low income countries as displayed in model (2) (p< 0.05). The 
inclusion of the control of corruption in model (5) renders the relationship insignificant 
although it is still negative. However, the addition of inequality as well as human 
capital and wealth as control variables in model (11) negates the influence of low 
corruption and the resulting negative relationship is significant at the 1% level. These 
results support Shen and Lee’s (2006) assertions that banking development may 
hinder economic growth, in particular in Latin American, Sub-Saharan African and 
East Asian countries. 
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Table 22: GMM analysis determinants of EO (low income countries sample) 
Dependen
t variable: 
EO 
           
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
EO(-1) 0.80 
27.23*** 
0.93 
52.03*** 
0.71 
16.21*** 
0.91 
231.71*** 
0.89 
25.36*** 
0.52 
10.24*** 
0.73 
8.63*** 
0.80 
28.43*** 
0.89 
20.15*** 
0.70 
8.59*** 
0.15 
2.12** 
Log(GDP) - - - - - - - - - - 0.59 
2.25** 
Corruptio
n 
-0.14 
-7.19*** 
   -0.01 
-0.61 
-0.13 
-5.26*** 
0.06 
1.26 
-0.14 
-7.28*** 
-0.01 
-0.32 
0.61 
0.03 
-0.12 
-4.74*** 
Domestic 
credit 
 -0.00 
-2.22** 
     -0.00 
-0.88 
-0.00 
-2.59*** 
-0.00 
-1.54 
-0.01 
-3.24*** 
Tertiary   0.01 
3.90*** 
  0.02 
4.39*** 
0.02 
3.78*** 
  0.02 
3.82*** 
0.01 
1.52 
Secondary   0.01 
4.14*** 
  -0.13 
-5.26*** 
 
0.02 
8.40*** 
  0.02 
6.88*** 
0.02 
6.10*** 
 
Gini Index    -0.00 
-3.33*** 
-0.00 
-2.84*** 
 -0.00 
-1.07 
 -0.00 
-1.04 
-0.01 
-3.09*** 
-0.01 
-2.01** 
Number 
of observ 
855 855 855 470 470 855 470 855 470 470 470 
J statistic 
28.03 29.17 25.32 21.68 21.64 23.07 17.55 28.63 20.40 15.97 19.69 
Prob(J-
statistic) 0.36 0.30 0.50 0.42 0.36 0.63 0.49 0.33 0.37 0.53 0.23 
AR(2) 0.61 0.28 0.17 0.90 0.94 0.53 0.81 0.57 0.88 0.42 0.94 
No of 
cross 
sections 
41 41 41 23 23 41 23 41 23 23 23 
Instrumen
t rank 
28 28 29 23 23 30 23 29 23 23 23 
N/I 1.46 1.46 1.41 1 1 1.37 1 1.41 1 1 1 
Notes: 
1. The dependent variable is EO assessed during the period 1982-2008 using an unbalanced panel with 27 periods included and 41 
cross-sections. 
2. The regressions including the GINI Index have 27 periods and 23 cross-sections. 
3. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance of the t-value at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Model (3) evaluates tertiary education and secondary education as predictors of EO 
in low income countries. Although both tertiary education and secondary education 
are significant (p<0.01), secondary education has a larger t-statistic. However, 
controlling for wealth in Model (11) renders tertiary indicator insignificant whereas the 
secondary education variable remains positively associated with EO and significant 
at the 1% level. These results confirm a high association between tertiary education 
and wealth that we found in middle-to-high income countries with suppression effects 
reducing the impact of tertiary education on EO and thus contradicting Lee and Kim’s 
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(2009) assertion that tertiary education is more important than secondary education 
for technological upgrading middle-to-high income countries. 
In model (4), we evaluate the association between EO and inequality. The 
relationship between inequality and EO is persistently negative.  Including  the 
control of corruption, banking development as well as human capital as IVs in model 
(10) does not change the negative association between EO and inequality (p<0.01). 
Similarly, adding wealth to the regression in model (11) does not, unsurprisingly, 
alter the finding that in low income countries inequality inhibits EO (p<0.05).  
Furthermore, we include wealth in model (11) to assess the robustness of our 
results. We find that the association between the control of corruption and domestic 
credit variables with EO become significant at the 1% level and wealth itself is 
significant at the 1% level. In addition, the relation between tertiary education and 
EO loses its significance whereas inequality remains negatively related to EO 
(p<0.01). These findings imply that there is significant within sample variation in the 
association between EO and its determinants amongst low income countries. 
Therefore there might be other factors besides income, such as geography, that 
might explain this within sample variation of the determinants of EO.  
In the following section we test whether financial market development, social 
cohesion, human capital, R&D and the control of corruption have a positive 
association with EO in a sub-sample of low income countries of Africa. In addition we 
assess whether indeed the impact of the determinants on EO in Africa is different 
compared to that of its low income counterparts. 
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4.2.2 Results from Africa 
Table 23 presents the correlation matrix of the independent and control variables for 
African countries. Unlike both high income and other low income countries, the 
correlations between independent variables (IVs) are high. Specifically, the 
correlations between tertiary and secondary education (0.95), GDP and domestic 
credit (0.78), GDP and tertiary education (0.83), GDP and secondary education 
(0.89) and domestic credit and secondary education (0.71) indicate potential 
problems with multicollinearity.  
Hair et al. (2010) suggest that multicollinearity may reduce our ability to assess 
whether the estimated regression coefficients are significant in particular, as in the 
African case, if the sample size is small. They suggest that understanding the 
bivariate association between IV and the DV may help us understand the broader 
relationship in the presence of multicollinearity. Therefore, in order to ameliorate the 
potential impact of multicollinearity and the small sample size, we enter the 
determinants in models 1 to 4 individually in the regression to assess their 
relationships and we compare the results to models 9 to 11. To ensure validity, we 
further triangulate African results using the results of low income countries as a basis 
for comparison. 
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Table 23: Correlations Africa 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary     
              
 Corruption  Domestic 
credit  
Gini Index  Secondary  Tertiary  GDP  
Corruption  1.00      
       
Domestic credit  0.69*** 1.00     
       
Gini Index  0.17*** 0.15*** 1.00    
       
Secondary  0.41*** 0.71*** -0.09 1.00   
       
Tertiary 0.42*** 0.68*** -0.08 0.95*** 1.00  
       
GDP 0.64*** 0.78*** 0.03 0.89*** 0.83*** 1.00 
       
       
     Notes: 
1. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
2. GDP per capita is measured in US 2005$ 
 
Table 24 presents the results for system GMM regressions for the 16 African 
countries. It’s important to note that when we control for inequality, the sample size 
drops to seven. Thus we drop the inequality measure in our robustness regressions 
models 10 and 11. Moreover, we include natural resource rents, since African 
countries are large oil and mineral exporters, and the log of GDP per capita as 
control variables in the robustness model (11). EO is the only dependent variable. 
The Sargan and AR (2) tests are satisfactory and r => 1 in all the regressions 
supporting identification and instrument validity.  Further, we note that although the 
lag of EO is positively related to EO, it is not persistent in African countries. In 
models 7, 9, 10 and 11, after controlling for all the determinants and the control 
variables, the EO lag loses its significance. In contrast, in both middle-to-high and 
low income countries the lag of EO is persistent.    
We begin by evaluating the effects of corruption on EO in Africa. We find that 
reduced perceptions of corruption in Africa are negatively related to EO (p<0.01). 
However, as model (5) and (9) illustrate this negative association may be 
ameliorated somewhat by reducing inequality. Similar to the broader low income 
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sample, adding domestic credit, inequality, tertiary, secondary education as well as 
wealth, as IVs and control variables, does not reduce the negative impact of low 
perceptions of corruption in African countries. This finding is significant at the 1% 
level.  
Table 24: GMM analysis determinants of EO (African sample) 
 
Notes: 
1. The dependent variable is EO assessed during the period 1982-2008 using an unbalanced panel with 27 periods included and 16 
cross-sections. 
2. The regressions including the GINI Index have 27 periods and 7 cross-sections. 
3. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance of the t-value at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
 
 
Dependen
t variable: 
EO 
           
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
EO(-1) 0.79 
289.92*** 
0.95 
94.03*** 
0.92 
45.32*** 
0.63 
5.93*** 
0.46 
1.87* 
0.78 
164.14*** 
0.45 
1.41 
0.70 
48.67*** 
0.56 
0.99 
0.20 
2.19** 
0.19 
1.85* 
Log (GDP) - - - - - - - - - 0.94 
5.74*** 
0.92 
6.81*** 
Natural 
resource 
Rents 
- - - - - - - - - - 0.02 
1.88* 
Corruption -0.17 
-26.49*** 
- - - -0.07 
-0.82 
-0.17 
-21.42*** 
-0.08 
-0.75 
-0.19 
-16.67*** 
-0.12 
-0.34 
-0.26 
-4.25*** 
-0.28 
-7.61*** 
Domestic 
credit 
- -0.00 
-5.26*** 
- - - 0.00 
0.64 
-0.00 
-0.40 
 -0.00 
-0.54 
-0.00 
-0.49 
-0.00 
-0.31 
Tertiary - - -0.01 
-3.76*** 
- - - - -0.01 
-1.61 
0.02 
0.57 
-0.02 
-1.44 
-0.01 
-0.26 
Secondary   0.01 
5.08*** 
    0.01 
4.71*** 
0.01 
0.23 
0.01 
2.03** 
0.01 
1.79* 
Gini Index    -0.00 
-0.52 
0.01 
1.53 
 0.01 
1.82* 
 
 0.00 
0.23 
  
Number of 
observation
s 
400 400 400 165 165 165 165 400 165 400 397 
J statistic 
15.77 11.91 9.49 6.66 2.07 15.15 1.97 11.08 1.31 8.64 5.78 
Prob (J-
statistic) 0.33 0.61 0.74 0.25 0.72 0.30 0.58 0.52 0.25 0.57 0.76 
AR(2)  0.84 0.88 0.78 0.58 0.17 0.83 0.20 0.87 0.24 0.22 0.28 
No of cross 
sections 
16 16 16 7 7 7 7 16 7 16 16 
Instrument 
rank 
16 16 16 7 7 7 7 16 7 16 16 
N/I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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We proceed to investigate the relation between the provision of domestic credit to 
the private sector and EO in African countries. Model (2) seems to suggest that, as 
in other low income countries, banking development is negatively related to EO in 
Africa (p<0.01). However, the addition of inequality, the control of corruption, human 
capital, natural resource rents and wealth as IVs in models 6 to 11, renders the 
relation insignificant although the sign remains negative.  Based on these results, we 
can surmise that the relationship between domestic credit to the private sector and 
EO in African countries is insignificant unlike in the broader sample of low income 
countries where the relation is significant and negative.  
In addition, we also evaluated the association between human capital variables and 
EO in Africa. We find that there are three important results. First, tertiary education is 
either negatively related to EO (model 3) or its association with EO is insignificant 
(models 8, 9, 10 and 11). Second, although secondary education is more important 
as a predictor of EO than tertiary education in Africa (model 3), adding domestic 
credit, financial development, natural resource rents, wealth and the control of 
corruption as IVs and control variables, renders the association between secondary 
education and EO marginal, being significant only at the 10% (model 11). Third, the 
association between both tertiary and secondary education and EO is insignificant 
after we account for inequality (model 9) suggesting that inequality may very well 
reduce the returns to human capital in Africa.  
Although we cannot ascertain any definitive findings about the relationship between 
inequality and EO in African countries since the sample size is small at 7 when we 
include the Gini Index, however, the results in models (5) and (9) seem to suggest 
inequality may have a negative impact on the association between the control of 
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corruption, human capital, the lag of EO and EO in Africa. As previously canvassed 
in model (5), inequality renders the strong negative association between low 
corruption and EO redundant. Similarly, in model (9), inequality renders the 
association between both human capital variables and EO insignificant and 
additionally, EO loses its persistence.  
Lastly, in our robustness regressions, we add wealth in model (10) and wealth and 
natural resources in model (11). In both models and similar to the broader sample of 
low income countries, wealth is also positively associated with EO in Africa (p<0.01). 
Likewise, natural resources also enhance EO in Africa. However, this relationship is 
weak, being significant only at the 10% level. 
4.3 Discussion 
In the preceding section, we have investigated the relation between EO and what we 
argue are its enablers, and made a number of significant findings. First, we 
confirmed that in the overall (combined) sample and middle-to-high income 
countries, low levels of corruption are positively associated with EO. This result finds 
support in Anokhin and Schulze’s (2009) assertion that reduced corruption enhances 
investment in innovation and entrepreneurship. It further supports Baumol’s (1990) 
assertion that the control of corruption can facilitate productive entrepreneurship, 
thus resulting in innovation. 
However, the finding that low perceptions of corruption are positively associated with 
EO does not seem to apply in low income countries and Africa. In these countries, 
we find a persistent and significant negative relationship between low corruption and 
EO, supporting Ehrlich and Lui‘s (1999) and Aidt et al.’s (2008) view that corruption 
may moderate the relation between growth and bureaucratic inefficiency. The line of 
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argument is that corruption ameliorates bureaucratic inefficiency that is prevalent in 
developing countries and may therefore support EO. This negative relation between 
EO and low perceptions of corruption is reduced somewhat by controlling for 
inequality, supporting Olken’s (2005) assertion that perceptions of corruption are 
influenced by social trust. Nevertheless, our results suggest that Olken’s (2005) 
thesis applies only to low income and African countries. For middle-to-high income 
countries, the positive association between EO and low corruption is unaffected by 
inequality. 
Secondly, we found that for the whole sample, banking development enhances risk 
taking, innovativeness and proactiveness, provided that the country is relatively 
equal and corruption is comparatively modest. The positive association of domestic 
credit extension to the private sector with EO was also supported in middle-to-high 
income countries, vindicating Levine’s (2005) assertion that banking development 
supports entrepreneurship and consequently improves the rate of economic growth. 
However, Levine’s (2005) thesis seems to be contingent on the level of development.  
In low income countries and Africa, we found that banking development hinders EO, 
validating Khan and Senhadji (2003), Zhang (2003) and Shen and Lee’s (2006) 
contention that banking development impedes growth especially in Latin American, 
Sub-Saharan African and East Asian countries with corrupt political systems and 
weak institution.  
Similar to the relationship between EO and the control of corruption, this negative 
association between banking development and EO in low income countries is 
ameliorated somewhat by inequality and the control of corruption. These results 
seem to point to the importance of institutions in facilitating a positive relationship 
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between banking development and EO. A plausible explanation for this finding is that 
in low income countries with weak institutions, credit may be allocated corruptly to 
people of the same ethnic group leading to resources being wasted in inefficient 
projects.  In addition, Levine (2002) suggests large banks with market power may 
extract rents and a greater share of future profits from firms than they should and 
further, in firms with poor cooperate governance, banks may connive with inefficient 
managers if these managers serve their interests (Black and Moersch, 1998).  
As a conjecture, we suspect that for developing countries it may not be the size of 
the banking sector that matters but rather which projects or sectors credit is allocated 
to. In particular, the critical factor for technological upgrading in developing countries, 
may be the manipulation and reduction of interest rates in industries targeted for 
catch up (Lee and Mathews, 2009), rather than banking development. In contrast, in 
middle-to-high income countries, due to better quality institutions that reduce 
corruption and arbitrary discrimination, credit is allocated more efficiently enhancing 
risk taking, innovativeness and proactiveness and consequently, technological 
upgrading. 
Thirdly, we assessed the relation between human capital variables and EO. Across 
the different samples we found that, after accounting for collinearity, they are 
positively and significantly related EO. However, we noted that in Africa inequality 
and natural resource rents hinder the relationship between human capital and EO. 
Although the association is positive, it is weak suggesting natural resource wealth 
and inequality may very well reduce the returns to human capital in Africa. Overall 
though, we find that the human capital variables are more important than the 
institutional variables, the control of corruption and inequality, in influencing EO in 
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low income countries, supporting Glaeser et al.’s (2004) contention that Western 
colonizers facilitated development in their colonies through the higher human capital 
they possessed, not institutions. Similarly, Millan et al.’s (2012) finding that a high 
share of people in a region holding tertiary education is also positively associated 
with the entrepreneurial productivity provides further credence to these results.  
In contrast, Lee and Kim’s (2009) assertion that secondary education is significant in 
enabling technological upgrading in low income countries whereas higher education 
is the “binding constraint” in middle-to-high income countries, could not be 
supported. We found that after controlling for low corruption, banking development, 
inequality and wealth, secondary education was still positively associated with EO 
whereas tertiary education was not. We suggest that there may be two reasons for 
this finding. Firstly, tertiary education is highly correlated to low corruption, banking 
development and wealth. However, Lee and Kim (2009) did not control for these 
variables and therefore the indicated relationship they find may be spurious and 
largely due to omitted variable bias. Secondly, secondary education is a feeder to 
the tertiary sector and both these variables are highly correlated. Therefore, it is a 
misnomer to suggest that a country can have a strong tertiary education system 
without having a strong secondary system. In fact our results suggest that a strong 
secondary education system may be a prerequisite for an effective higher education 
system. 
Fourthly, we evaluated the association between EO and inequality. We find that 
inequality is highly collinear with reduced corruption, human capital and banking 
development. Due to this collinearity, we could not definitively establish a direct 
causal link between inequality and EO. For example, for the sample, as a whole, 
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inequality is positively related to EO. However, the relationship between EO and 
inequality, for both the middle-to-high and low income samples, is negative 
suggesting that the non-linearity may not be due to the level of development. 
Literature has also found contradictory results between income inequality and 
growth. Forbes (2000), Aghion and Howitt (2002) and Okun (1975) find a positive 
association whereas Persson and Tabellini (1994), Acemoglu (1998) and 
Sukiassyan (2007) find a negative relation. Amos (1988), Barro (2000) and Banerjee 
and Duflo (2003) suggest the relation is inconclusive.  
A possible reason for these seemingly contradictory findings is that inequality 
partially shapes the relation between institutions and policies, and EO. Easterly 
(2006) contends that these results emanate from the fact that the casual direction 
runs from inequality to institutions and policies, which then leads to economic 
development. He argues that divisions along ethnic and class lines place severe 
constraints on institutional and policy reforms. Therefore the strength of institutions 
and the implementation of growth promoting policies may be partially determined by 
social cohesion.  
Our results seem to support this assertion as inequality has a significant impact on 
the association that the perceptions of corruption, banking development, human 
capital have with EO, even though the direct relation with EO is contingent.  First, we 
find that high inequality increases perceptions of corruption, confirming Olken’s 
(2005) contention that perceptions of corruption are affected by social trust. Second, 
the results suggest that high inequality negates the potentially positive impact of 
banking development on EO since distributional conflict may lead to credit being 
allocated inefficiently to favoured constituencies, and thus hindering innovativeness, 
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risk taking and proactiveness. Third, inequality seemingly reduces the returns to 
higher education, in low income countries as well as secondary education, in Africa. 
Galor and Zeira (1988, 1993) explain this finding by submitting that due to credit 
market imperfections, inequality may result in an under-investment in human capital, 
thus hindering EO. These results also confirm Persson and Tabellini’s (1991) thesis 
that in a society with distributional conflict, growth promoting activities such as the 
production of knowledge are likely to be constrained. 
Lastly, we assessed wealth, the lag of EO and natural resource rents as control 
variables. We found that wealth is not positively related to EO in middle-to-high 
income countries whereas it is positively associated with EO in Africa and the 
broader sample of low income countries. Moreover, natural resources were 
marginally (significant at the 10% level) positively related to EO in African countries.  
Finally and interestingly, although the lag of EO is positively related to EO across all 
levels of development, it is not always persistent in African countries. This suggests 
that EO and possibly growth, is highly volatile in Africa. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In sum, we have investigated the determinants and drivers of EO.  The question we 
asked is: why are some countries more innovative, risk taking and proactive than 
others? We found that the control of corruption, banking development, inequality and 
human capital influence the level of EO that countries possess. However, these 
results suggest that this impact is non-linear with threshold effects and is contingent 
on the level of development and institutions, which are in turn shaped by inequality.  
In this chapter, we have evaluated and confirmed the direct association between 
institutional and policy variables and the manifestation of entrepreneurship EO, 
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addressing our concerns about this oversight in literature. In the following chapter we 
will investigate the relation between EO and growth. In addition, we will address 
whether first, the determinants of EO enhance the relation between EO and growth 
and second, whether as we have argued, the association is between institutions, 
policies and EO which then leads to growth or the other way around. 
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Chapter 5 
THE IMPACT OF EO (AND ITS’ DETERMINANTS) ON ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
Introduction 
The annual gross domestic product (GDP) is a proxy for economic well-being and a 
measure of prosperity. GDP growth in developed countries has improved living 
standards and increased life expectancy and some developing countries similarly are 
following suit. Rapid economic growth in China has reduced the number of people 
living in poverty from 53 percent to 8 percent (Ravallion and Chen 2007). Similarly, 
Brazil and India grew at 6.6% and 8.8% in 2010, respectively, lifting millions of 
people out of poverty. In contrast, the relative absence of economic growth in some 
poor countries, especially those in Africa, has left millions of people living in abject 
conditions. 
But how can this process of economic growth, which leads to a higher GDP per 
person and increased welfare, be initiated? To answer this question, we have argued 
for the Schumpeterian paradigm which suggests that growth is generated by a 
random sequence of quality-improving innovations and embodies Schumpeter’s 
(1942) idea of “creative destruction”. The Schumpeterian paradigm is gaining 
increasing importance in the literature. In fact, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) 
suggest that the success or failure of a transition economy depends on its’ 
entrepreneurial dynamics. Moreover, know-how associated with the generation and 
exploitation of knowledge has become much more critical for economic growth 
recently for both rich and poor countries (Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008). Gilbert et al. 
(2004) concur and argue that entrepreneurship policies are emerging as one of the 
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most essential instruments for economic growth. Just as monetary and fiscal policies 
were important for creating employment and growth in the post-war economy, 
entrepreneurship policy is likely to emerge as the most important policy instrument 
for a global and knowledge-based economy.  
However, the empirical link between entrepreneurship and growth is tenuous. 
Studies grounded on GEM evidence suggest the relationship between 
entrepreneurial activity and a country’s level of economic development is U-shaped 
(Wennekers et al., 2005). In addition, in developing countries, entrepreneurship and 
job creation are positively associated only if self-employment and informal 
companies are disregarded from the study (Ghani et al., 2011a and 2011c) and 
informal entrepreneurs are generally not seen as drivers of economic growth (Beck 
et al., 2003).  
The entrepreneurship-growth link has also been questioned in developed countries. 
Koellinger (2008) finds that the majority of business start-ups in high income 
countries also engages in marginal, replicative economic activity or fails soon after 
their foundation. He contends that the potential impact of these marginal firms on the 
macro-economy is trivial. Likewise, Bowen and de Clercq (2008) submit that 
marginal entrepreneurs in developed countries are motivated by a lack of 
employment alternatives and thus,  an upsurge in unemployment during recessions 
prompts growth in marginal entrepreneurship (Thurik, Carree, Van Stel and 
Audretsch, 2008 and Faria, Cuestas and Mourelle, 2010). Therefore, in both 
developed and developing economies counting the number of informal, replicative 
entrepreneurs does not assist us in measuring entrepreneurship or its impact on 
growth. 
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Nevertheless, entrepreneurship at the aggregate level has traditionally been 
measured as a stock variable. Scholars have used stock variables that largely 
measure replicative entrepreneurship: the self-employment ratio, total 
entrepreneurial activity (TEA) of the GEM, opportunity entrepreneurship and the ratio 
between necessity and opportunity; as indicators entrepreneurship (Koellinger and 
Thurik, 2012). However, Baumol et al. (2007, p. 3) note that “replicative 
entrepreneurship is important in most economies because it represents a route out 
of poverty, a means by which people with little capital, education, or experience can 
earn a living. But if economic growth is the object of interest, then it is the innovative 
entrepreneur who matters.” And similarly, Banerjee and Duflo (2007, p. 162) warn 
that “it is important not to romanticize these penniless entrepreneurs.” 
The entrepreneurship-growth link is tenuous not only because of the misspecification 
of entrepreneurship as a stock variable but also because in empirical endogenous 
growth work, technological change is reduced to invention. Although both 
endogenous and neoclassical growth theory contend that technological upgrading, 
which is occasioned by entrepreneurship, is vital for economic growth, this 
technological change is merely defined as expenditure on R&D in empirical work. 
However, Minniti and Lévesque (2010) argue that literature on economic growth 
concentrates on R&D since historically there has been a positive association 
between growth and sustained research investments. However, Acs et al. (2005) 
note that countries, such as Sweden and Japan, which have large R&D expenditure 
compared to China, have experienced zero or low growth whereas China has grown 
significantly with minimal R&D expenditure (Hsiao and Shen, 2003).   
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Moreover, entrepreneurial processes are not linear, as Schumpeterian theory 
submits; and therefore, they may appear differently in Zambia, say, compared to 
Sweden. Therefore, at the country level, policies and levels of institutional 
development can impact the character of the EO-growth relationship (Johns, 2006). 
First, high corruption may increase levels of uncertainty and transactions cost for an 
entrepreneur (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). Therefore, reducing corruption may 
increase the number of innovative opportunities that are exploited; resulting in higher 
productivity and investment. Moreover, in many unequal societies the existence of 
unproductive, parasitic elites may frustrate entrepreneurship (Baumol, Litan and 
Schramm, 2007); in other words, in a society with distributional conflict, growth 
promoting activities, such as the accumulation of capital and the production of 
knowledge, are likely to be constrained (Persson and Tabellini, 1991).  
Furthermore, financial sector distortions can inhibit EO and consequently decrease 
the rate of economic growth (King and Levine, 1993). Financial institutions are 
important because they evaluate and finance entrepreneurs’ innovation and 
launching of new products to market (Schumpeter, 1912) as well as ease the trading, 
hedging, and pooling of risk which encourages investment in projects with higher risk 
and superior expected returns (Devereux and Smith, 1994 and Obstfeld, 1995). 
Therefore, countries with poor levels of financial market development are unable to 
support infant industries and EO since firms are credit and equity rationed (Ayyagari, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008). Lastly, human capital is deemed to facilitate 
EO by enhancing the ability of a country to imitate and learn advanced technologies 
that originate from within and offshore (Stokke, 2008); increasing the absorption of 
spill-overs from FDI (Borensztein, Gregorio and Lee, 1998); and significantly 
increasing entry by knowledge-based firms (Baptista and Mendonça, 2010).   
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In this chapter we seek to answer three questions. First, does EO have a positive 
impact on economic growth at the aggregate level? Second, is this impact enhanced 
by human capital, financial development, inequality and corruption? Third, does the 
impact of EO on growth vary depending on the country’s level of development?  
Our line of argument is, first - entrepreneurship at the macro-level encompasses 
innovation, proactiveness and risk taking. Thus measuring it as a stock variable is 
not helpful in assessing whether indeed a country is entrepreneurial or not. Further, 
although innovation is a critical element of EO, it is not sufficient for growth. An 
inventive country still needs to take risks and proactively seek opportunities in order 
to grow. Thus a more accurate characterisation of entrepreneurship at the macro-
level is EO and in particular, it is the manifestation of this innovative activity, risk 
taking and proactiveness that facilitates technological change and therefore, 
economic growth. 
Second, institutions and policies alter the ability and incentives of firms to innovate 
and proactively take risks; and therefore, as established in the previous chapter, the 
clear causal link is from institutions and policies to entrepreneurship. The quality of 
institutions shape economic incentives that entrepreneurial firms face, increasing or 
decreasing returns to private capital, and thus determining commerce and 
manufactures. Similarly, human capital determines entrepreneurial firms’ ability to 
imitate and learn advanced foreign technologies; however, it is this very learning that 
leads to economic growth, not human capital per se. Therefore, institutions and 
policies are first, predictors of EO; and second, they enhance the relationship 
between EO and growth. Simply put, controlling for the same level of EO, for 
example, between China and the UK, the UK will have a higher GDP per capita than 
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China since it has better governance, more effective financial institutions and a 
higher stock of human capital. 
Moreover, we take into account context by evaluating the impact of the hypothesized 
determinants (enablers) on the EO-growth relation whilst controlling for the distance 
to the technological frontier. This is important since a greater understanding of policy 
and institutional differences that may shape EO, and consequently growth, in both 
developing and developed countries, may assist firms, investors and government 
policy makers in spurring economic development.  
5.1 Research Design 
Similar to chapter 4, we use secondary, longitudinal, panel data set constructed from 
the CANA panel database and the World Development Indicators (WDI). The data 
set contains both cross-sectional and time series elements which will assist us to 
investigate the longitudinal association between EO and growth. The complete 
sample covers data on 93 countries, of which 16 are African, during the period 1980-
2008.  
5.1.1 Independent variables 
To answer the question of whether EO is positively related to growth, EO and the 
determinants: financial market development, corruption, social cohesion and human 
capital are employed as IVs. Firstly, we evaluate EO based on Miller’s (1983) 
characterisation as a reflective, unidimensional, second order construct. EO’s first 
order indicators are risk taking, innovativeness and proactiveness and we assess 
both the level and the deviation of EO against growth. The deviation of EO is defined 
as the change in EO, that is (EO – EO (-5)), over a five year period.  Secondly, 
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financial market development is measured using the private credit to gross domestic 
product (GDP). Thirdly, we employ the Gini coefficient, a measure of inequality, to 
evaluate social cohesion (Rodrik, 1999). Further, in order to measure corruption, we 
use the Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International Index. Lastly 
and analogous to Lee and Kim (2009), we operationalise the level of human capital by 
using both the secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio. 
5.1.2 Dependent variable 
 
In this chapter, we evaluate the EO-growth relation and therefore our dependent 
variable is GDP growth. We assess GDP growth over a five year period in order to 
minimise cyclical fluctuations in order to decipher the real long term impact of a 
change in EO on GDP. In addition, GDP volatility is defined as the standard 
deviation of this five year growth and it is assumed to be constant. This assumption 
is reasonable since firstly, fluctuations are evened out by calculating GDP growth as 
a 5 year rolling average and secondly, growth volatility is assumed to be mean 
reverting. Whilst we are aware that there might be structural breaks and regime 
switches in volatility that is not the focus of our work.  
Table 25 presents the descriptive statistics for GDP, the log of GDP, GDP growth, 
GDP volatility as well as EO and the deviation in EO over a five year period. The 
data is available for all 93 countries in the sample, 16 of which are African. As Table 
25 indicates, the normality assumptions are violated. The log of GDP and GDP 
growth are negatively skewed, whereas GDP volatility as well as EO and its 
deviation are positively skewed. All the variables are leptokurtic except for the log of 
GDP which is mesokurtic. The Bera-Jarque statistic firmly rejects normality (p<0.01) 
for all the variables.  
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Furthermore, we analyse the maxima and the minima to begin to decipher patterns 
amongst countries. Norway attained the highest GDP per capita, measured in US 
2005$, at $67804.55 in the year 2007 whereas Ethiopia had the lowest reading in the 
sample at $111.79 in 1992. Azerbaijan achieves both the highest annual average 
growth rate of 91% over the five year period ending in 2008 and the maximum 
growth volatility of 63% whereas Georgia suffers a growth collapse with GDP 
contracting by -149% per year over five years and lastly, the developed country, 
Austria, has the lowest growth volatility at 2.6% over a five year period.  
Table 25: Descriptive statistics of GDP per capita, GDP growth, EO and The deviation in EO 
 GDP per capita Log(GDP) GDP growth GDP volatility EO EOdev 
 Mean 10575.83 8.25 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.15 
 Median 3642.68 8.20 0.11 0.08 -0.08 0.13 
 Maximum 67804.55 11.12 0.91 0.63 3.92 1.84 
 Minimum 111.79 4.72 -1.46 0.03 -2.45 -1.40 
 Std. Dev. 13541.94 1.58 0.18 0.11 0.74 0.29 
 Skewness 1.46 -0.07 -2.03 2.65 0.88 0.69 
 Kurtosis 4.23 1.96 15.50 10.73 5.57 8.52 
       
 Jarque-Bera 1051.62 117.16 14833.00 9185.68 850.84 2191.78 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
       
 Sum 26725129.00 20852.01 197.57 301.66 0.00 245.21 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 46300000000.0
0 
6310.54 68.66 31.58 1137.34 135.66 
       
 Observations 2527.00 2527.00 2061.00 2512.00 2104.00 1627.00 
Notes: 
1.     The GDP per capita is measured in US $2005. 
2. GDP growth is calculated as GDP growth= log(GDP/GDP(-5)) 
3. The deviation in EO is also the 5 year increase or decrease in EO. 
Table 26 displays the mean, standard deviation and rank of the growth rate of 
selected countries. The mean of the deviation of EO, the initial values of both EO 
and GDP and their terminal values in 2008 are also presented. The initial values of 
both EO and GDP vary in their starting dates. For former Eastern Bloc countries, 
such as Slovenia, both the EO and GDP series start in the early nineties whereas we 
have a longer data series starting in 1980 for developed countries.  
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Interestingly the top 10 countries on the growth measure seem to differ in the level of 
development. For example, Singapore and Ireland were developed countries in 1980 
whereas Poland and Estonia were middle income and on the other hand, China and 
Vietnam were low income countries. In addition, fast growing economies seem to 
share commonality in that most of them substantially increased their EO resulting in 
both high growth and reduced growth volatility. China’s EO rose by 1.43 from a low 
base of -0.43 by increasing, as figure 11 illustrates, all the composite elements of 
EO. Similarly, as figure 12 illustrates, Singapore’s EO increased from an already 
elevated base of 1.70 to 3.40 by improving its innovative capacity and proactively 
diversifying into new markets whilst maintaining a high level of risk taking. Moreover, 
both China and Singapore share a below sample average growth volatility of 0.07.  
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Table 26: Ranking f countries on the basis of GDP growth and EO 
GDP 
Growth 
Rank 
Country  GDP 
Growth 
 Growth 
Volatility 
   EO Dev EO 
1980/initial 
   EO  
2008 
GDP 
1980/initial 
GDP 
2008 
1 China 8.55% 0.07 0.29 -0.43 1.00 221.65 2402.78 
2 Estonia 6.97% 0.04 0.44 0.31 1.02 4635.56 11796.89 
3 Armenia 6.32% 0.35 0.51 -1.21 0.04 1146.30 2265.42 
4 Cambodia 6.06% 0.09 0.43 -1.50 -0.32 241.78 588.00 
5 Vietnam 5.03% 0.07 0.37 -1.19 0.56 262.95 819.88 
6 Ireland 4.55% 0.11 0.59 0.96 2.71 16004.52 48892.70 
7 Thailand 4.52% 0.15 0.18 -0.39 0.57 881.74 3014.55 
8 Poland 4.37% 0.06 0.17 0.01 0.29 4726.74 9505.84 
9 Singapore 4.32% 0.07 0.41 1.70 3.40 9933.61 31832.71 
10 Botswana 4.12% 0.11 0.06 0.45 0.57 1842.67 6261.11 
 Bottom 5        
89 Saudi Arabia -1.00% 0.19 0.06 0.58 0.90 21432.29 15115.15 
90 Kyrgyzstan -1.37% 0.32 0.14 -1.15 -0.54 593.69 561.07 
91 Ukraine -1.73% 0.46 0.05 0.24 0.29 2677.49 2205.58 
92 Georgia -2.59% 0.62 0.36 -0.99 -0.28 2792.45 1838.74 
93 Tajikistan -4.04% 0.54 -0.18 -0.64 -1.28 774.39 395.57 
 Selected Developed       
37 United States 2.14% 0.04 0.10 0.66 1.04 26085.67 44872.65 
53 Germany 1.76% 0.04 0.17 0.57 1.01 22488.69 36468.96 
58 Canada 1.67% 0.05 0.15 0.42 1.10 24249.35 37088.02 
25 United Kingdom 2.66% 0.04 0.15 0.45 0.85 20164.59 39608.43 
29 Portugal 2.45% 0.08 0.11 -0.13 0.30 10219.50 18868.13 
 Selected African        
11 Mauritius 4.10% 0.06 0.10 -0.37 0.13 1855.48 5752.79 
85 South Africa 0.07% 0.08 -0.03 0.29 0.20 5335.26 5757.39 
84 Senegal 0.29% 0.07 0.06 -0.84 -0.40 711.88 793.10 
33 Lesotho 2.31% 0.04 0.20 -2.45 -0.79 429.97 801.45 
78 Ethiopia 0.63% 0.16 0.18 -1.78 -1.22 155.37 201.66 
 All 1.92% 0.18 0.15 NA NA NA NA 
         
Notes: 
1. The GDP per capita is measured in US $2005. 
2. GDP growth is calculated as GDP growth= log(GDP/GDP(-5)) 
3. The deviation in EO is also the 5 year increase or decrease in EO. 
 
In addition, in all the top 10 countries, except for Botswana (0.06), the average 
change in EO is higher than the sample mean of 0.15, suggesting other factors might 
be driving Botswana’s growth.  In contrast to the fast growing economies, most 
growth laggards such as Tajikistan either increased their EO marginally or it declined 
and additionally, their growth volatility is elevated.  In contrast to the other low growth 
economies, Saudi Arabia increased its EO at a rate similar to Botswana. However 
unlike Botswana, Saudi Arabia suffered a growth collapse with GDP declining from 
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US21432.29$ in 1980 to US15115.15$ in 2008. Interestingly, both Saudi Arabia and 
Botswana are major natural resources exporters.  
 
Figure 8: China EO 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Singapore EO 
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Figure 10: South Africa EO 
 
Furthermore, developed countries raised their EO moderately and as a result they 
achieved average growth performance of around 2% and low growth volatility. For 
example, the United States increased its 5 year EO by 0.10 on average, slightly 
below the sample mean of 0.15, and as a result attained a growth rate of 2.14% 
which is almost identical to the sample mean of 1.92%. On the other hand, the 
performance of African countries is mixed. Diamond rich Botswana attains the 
highest ranking at number 10 which, as discussed, is not driven by an increase in 
EO.  In contrast, South Africa is one of the worst performers on growth, ranking 
number 85 out of 93. In 1980, South Africa’s GDP per capita was US $5335.29 and 
29 years later it had increased at a pathetic 0.07% to US $5757.39. The country 
seems to have no growth drivers and unlike Botswana, it does not seem lucky 
enough to have found additional natural resources that could boost output. In 
addition, as figure 13 illustrates, South Africa does not seem to have invested and 
taken risks to upgrade its technological capabilities. It ranks number 90 out of 93 
countries in the average increase of EO over a 29 year period that covered painful 
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political and institutional reforms. EO declined from an already low score of 29 to a 
pitiful 20. In order to address South Africa’s growth challenges, policy makers may 
have to intervene, and address both the country’s innovative capabilities. In 
particular, the country must address its ability to take risks and diffuse technology as 
evidently, political and institutional reforms have failed to get the country out of its 
growth trap.   
The results in Table 26 also help us address the important issue of reverse causality. 
Reverse causality occurs when an IV that is hypothesized to cause a DV whereas it 
is the DV that causes the IV. For example, some may argue that it is not EO that 
causes growth but rather it is growth that causes EO. However, we have highlighted 
the case of both Saudi Arabia and Botswana exactly for this reason. Over the 29 
years, as figures 15 and 17 illustrate, Saudi Arabia due to the decline in its terms of 
trade, experienced a massive decline in GDP while its EO increased moderately. On 
the other hand as figures 14 and 16 illustrate, Botswana due to the discovery of 
diamonds and the resultant more stable rent stream (Auty, 2001), grew very quickly 
whereas its EO increased only marginally. Both these cases imply that growth does 
not cause EO since GDP changed significantly in both countries and EO barely 
moved. The overall results in Table 26 seem to suggest that: firstly, an increase in 
EO causes growth and not the other way around, secondly, a high EO may reduce 
growth volatility and thirdly, natural resources may have an impact on growth that is 
independent of EO.  
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Figure 11: Botswana EO 
 
 
Figure 12: Saudi Arabia EO 
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Figure 13: Botswana natural resource rents 
 
 
Figure 14: Saudi Arabia natural resource rents 
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higher correlation with growth (with a coefficient of 0.52 and this is also significant at 
the 1% level). 
Similarly, tertiary and secondary education as well as equality is also positively 
correlated to GDP growth. However, their correlation coefficients are weaker 
compared to the association between EO, its deviation and growth. Tertiary 
education has the strongest association with growth with a bivariate correlation 
coefficient of 0.24. In contrast, the bivariate correlation between the control of 
corruption and growth is not significant at the 10% level. Similarly, the bivariate 
correlation between domestic credit and growth is also not significant at the 10% 
level. Notably, we also find that the R&D to GDP ratio, which is assumed in 
economics literature to be the key driver of economic growth, is weakly related to 
growth compared to both EO and its deviation, with a correlation coefficient of 0.13 
(p<0.00).  On the other hand, growth volatility seems to be enhanced by a deviation 
in EO, human capital and GDP growth. The bivariate association between the level 
of EO and growth volatility is not significant at the 10% level. On the other hand, 
reduced corruption, a highly developed domestic banking system and high R&D 
investment reduce growth volatility and this is significant at the 1% level.  
  
160 | P a g e  
 
Table 27: Correlations matrix of GDP per capita growth, the determinants and EO 
Partial analysis controlling for: INITIALGDP        
            EO  EOdev  Corruption
  
Gini Index  Domesti
c credit  
Tertiary  Secondary  R&D GDP 
growth  
GDP vol  
EO  1.00          
           
EO dev  0.49*** 1.00         
           
Corruption  0.45*** 0.07*** 1.00        
           
Gini Index  -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.03 1.00       
Domestic 
credit  0.33*** -0.02 0.27*** 0.08*** 1.00      
           
Tertiary  0.39*** 0.18*** 0.40*** -0.25*** 0.11*** 1.00     
           
Secondary  0.43*** 0.20*** 0.41*** -0.23*** 0.11*** 0.74*** 1.00    
           
R&D 0.47*** 0.17*** 0.43*** -0.22*** 0.37*** 0.42*** 0.38*** 1.00   
           
GDP growth  0.38*** 0.52*** 0.00 -0.24*** -0.03 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.13*** 1.00  
           
GDP vol  0.03 0.15*** -0.29*** -0.02 -0.27*** 0.14*** 0.18*** -0.19*** 0.24*** 1.00 
           
           
Notes: 
1. The GDP per capita is measured in UDS 2005$ 
2. GDP growth is calculated as GDP growth= log(GDP/GDP(-5)) 
3. The deviation in EO is also the 5 year increase or decrease in EO.  
4. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance of the t-value at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
5.1.3 Estimation Methodology 
We use the same panel data set of 93 countries to firstly evaluate the impact of EO 
on GDP per capita growth. Secondly, we have argued that the impact of EO on 
growth is shaped by institutions, banking development and human capital. Therefore 
we assess how the interaction between these institutional and policy variables and 
EO would impact growth. In order to conclude that the determinant, for example 
human capital, enhances the relation between EO and economic growth, we must 
find that sign of the coefficient estimate for the interaction term between EO and 
institutional and/or policy variable is positive. 
 In our empirical specification GDP growth is the dependent variable whereas the 
control of corruption, financial development, social cohesion and human capital are 
our independent variables. GDP growth is a highly persistent series and therefore 
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lagged GDP growth is also likely to be associated with current GDP growth. Because 
of this possible persistence, we evaluate a linear dynamic panel-data model in order 
to capture the effect of the lagged dependent variables on the current dependent 
variables.  
Moreover, GDP growth and institutional variables may possibly be endogenous 
because of omitted variables and reverse causality (Li et al., 2012). For example, 
financial market development might be occasioned by high GDP growth resulting in 
increased income and thus higher savings, which then lead to increased credit 
availability for the private sector. Likewise, reverse causality cannot be dismissed 
since countries with a high GDP growth might attain a higher EO though an increase 
in the availability of opportunities occasioned by increased demand. Firms may 
respond to these opportunities by proactively investing in new capabilities to take 
advantage of increased demand for new products resulting in an increased EO at the 
aggregate level. Lastly, we follow the growth literature and control for the level of real 
per capita GDP and the population growth rate (Li et al. 2012). 
This potential endogeneity of GDP growth can be better minimised by the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure for panel estimation. In 
particular, system GMM is appropriate for panels (similar to our data) with a linear 
functional relationship, an autoregressive dependent variable, fixed country effects, 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The system GMM estimator helps us correct 
for omitted variable bias, measurement error, unobserved country heterogeneity and 
endogeneity which are likely to affect GDP growth and its determinants. We 
therefore adopt the system GMM estimators to analyse our data. We begin by 
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evaluating whether EO and its deviation enhances economic growth. The equation 
takes the following form: 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛼1(𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼3(𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡) +  𝛼6𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼6𝜃𝑖 + 𝛼7𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (12)                               
Where 𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 is entrepreneurial orientation in country i at time t and 𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 evaluates 
the 5 year deviation of EO. Entrepreneurial orientation interacts with its drivers to 
impact on growth denoted by is 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝜃𝑖  is the measure of time-invariant country 
fixed effects, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables and 𝑍𝑡 is the vector for time dummies 
and  𝜀𝑖𝑡  represents the random error term.  
We employ the two step GMM estimator in our regression, which is asymptotically 
efficient and vigorous to heteroskedasticity. In addition, we employ the Sargan test of 
over-identifying restrictions and the autoregressive (AR) test to evaluate identification 
and instrument validity. If the p-values of the AR (2) test and the Sargan test are not 
significant (p >0.05), we do not reject the null hypotheses of over-identification and 
no second order auto correlation of error terms. Additionally, following Asiedu and 
Lien (2011), we report the ratio and where r < 1, we reduce the instrument rank by 
restricting the number of lags of the dependent variable that can be used as 
instruments in order to ensure instrument validity. 
5.2 Results 
 
Table 28 presents the results for system GMM regressions for all samples. As 
previously discussed, we divided countries into middle-to-high income and low 
income based on Lee and Kim’s (2009) hypothesis that transitioning from low-to-
middle income is different from transitioning from middle-to-high income status. In 
addition, we analyse the 16 African countries separately to assess whether there are 
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different growth drivers at work in Africa. Moreover, we include natural resource 
rents to control for growth that might not emanate from the diffusion of innovation. 
Similarly, population growth as well as the log of GDP per capita is also employed as 
a control variable in all the regression models. GDP per capita growth is the only 
dependent variable and EO and the deviation in EO are the predictor variables. The 
Sargan and AR (2) tests are satisfactory and r => 1 in all the regressions supporting 
identification and instrument validity. In addition, the lag of GDP growth is positively 
associated with GDP growth in all regressions and this is significant at the 1% level.  
Table 28: GMM analysis EO and growth 
Dependen
t variable: 
GDP 
growth 
            
 All countries Middle-to-high income Low income Africa  
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Growth(-
1) 
0.80 
82.41*** 
0.60 
43.97*** 
0.59 
46.02*** 
0.39 
24.05*** 
0.31 
13.75*** 
0.34 
21.93*** 
0.86 
181.05*** 
0.68 
59.70*** 
0.66 
43.50*** 
0.71 
6.68*** 
 
0.52 
15.94*** 
 
0.55 
6.44*** 
Log(Gdp) -0.36 
-27.05*** 
-0.10 
-9.43*** 
-0.01 
-0.74 
0.03 
1.72* 
0.19 
10.45*** 
0.13 
5.64*** 
-0.42 
-28.53*** 
-0.17 
-17.68*** 
0.01 
0.51 
0.14 
0.72 
0.03 
0.26 
0.14 
0.73 
Population 
Growth 
0.03 
5.07*** 
-0.01 
-2.34*** 
-0.01 
-5.71*** 
-0.02 
-3.78*** 
-0.02 
-5.02*** 
-0.03 
-5.56*** 
0.05 
9.12*** 
 
-0.01 
-3.09*** 
-0.01 
-3.55*** 
0.01 
0.37 
 
-0.05 
-8.03*** 
-0.03 
-1.44 
 
Natural 
Resource 
Rents 
0.01 
15.72*** 
0.01 
21.19*** 
0.01 
17.83*** 
0.00 
5.66*** 
0.00 
1.27 
0.00 
0.38 
0.01 
20.52*** 
0.01 
14.87*** 
0.01 
13.36*** 
-0.00 
-1.05 
0.00 
0.31 
0.01 
2.12** 
EO 0.09 
6.24*** 
- -0.09 
-5.95*** 
0.11 
21.78*** 
- 0.05 
4.71*** 
0.14 
11.61*** 
- -0.17 
-7.45*** 
0.08 
2.15*** 
- -0.12 
-1.46 
EOdev - 0.14 
16.17*** 
0.19 
19.58*** 
- 0.11 
14.44*** 
0.094 
12.04*** 
- 0.07 
7.78*** 
0.15 
8.65*** 
- 0.05 
5.64*** 
0.13 
3.60*** 
Observ 1611 1408 1408 858 756 756 738 642 642 336 
 
315 315 
 
J statistic 
71.54 70.19 70.13 39.72 39.17 37.31 37.94 37.37 32.15 11.45 13.46 10.30 
Prob(J-
statistic) 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.38 0.41 0.61 0.41 0.26 0.41 
AR(2) 0.53 0.92 0.98 0.96 0.29 0.79 0.25 0.28 0.53 0.36 0.63 0.80 
No of 
cross 
sections 
92 90 90 50 48 48 41 41 41 16 16 16 
Instrumen
t rank 
67 67 68 40 40 40 41 41 41 16 16 16 
N/I 1.37 1.34 1.32 1.25 1.20 1.20 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Notes: 
1. The GDP per capita is measured in UDS 2005$ 
2. GDP growth is calculated as GDP growth= log(GDP/GDP(-5)) 
3. The deviation in EO is also the 5 year increase or decrease in EO.  
4. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance of the t-value at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
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In model (1), we regress the level of EO against GDP growth. We find that EO is 
positively associated with GDP growth for the combined sample and this is 
significant at the 1% level. This result is confirmed in middle-to-high and low income 
countries as well as Africa. Similarly, the deviation in EO enhances economic growth 
in all countries after controlling for wealth, natural resources and level of 
development. This finding is also significant at the 1% level. In Model (3) we enter 
both EO and the deviation into the equation to assess the relative import of both 
variables at different levels of development. We find that the deviation of EO 
suppresses the effect of the level of EO in the combined sample, low income and 
African countries implying that, since EO and the deviation are collinear, an increase 
in EO is more important for growth than the level of EO. In contrast, both the level 
and the deviation, as displayed in model (6), are important for growth in middle-to-
high income countries. This result is significant at the 1% level. 
In addition, we evaluate the impact of the control variables the log of wealth, 
population growth and natural resource rents on growth. First, the log of wealth in 
both the combined sample (models 1 to 2) and low income countries (models 7 to 8) 
has the expected negative sign suggesting that GDP per capita is negatively related 
to economic growth (p<0.01). However, controlling for both the deviation and the 
level of EO in models 3 and 9 renders the log of wealth insignificant. Similarly, the log 
of wealth is insignificant in African countries and this result is robust to controlling for 
both EO and its deviation. In contrast, in middle-to-high income countries the sign of 
the coefficient of log of wealth is positive (p<0.01). These results support 
convergence in the combined sample and low income countries. On the other hand, 
in middle-to-high income countries convergence is conditional either on a high or an 
increasing EO. It follows that a middle income country that has a low EO which does 
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not increase may fall further behind developed countries. We therefore can conclude 
that for middle income countries there is a threshold level of EO above which 
incremental increases in EO result in convergence. Otherwise failing to achieve this 
level of EO and the necessary incremental increases, may result in divergence. 
Secondly and contrary to expectation, population growth, has a positive sign in the 
combined sample as well as in low income countries when we control for the level of 
EO (models 1 and 7, p<0.01). This result indicates the presence of multicollinearity 
between EO, population growth and GDP per capita growth below a certain level of 
development. Lastly, natural resources are positively associated with growth in the 
combined sample as well as in low income countries and these findings are robust to 
controlling for EO and its deviation (models 7, 8 and 9, p<0.01). However, this 
relationship is weak in African countries (models 10 and 11), conditional on a low 
and decreasing EO (model 12, p<0.01). In contrast, in middle-to-high income 
countries an increase in EO suppresses the effect of natural resources on growth 
rendering it insignificant (models 5 and 6).. 
5.2.1 The determinants, EO and growth 
As we have established that first, EO is positively related to institutional and policy 
variables and second, EO and its incremental change are positively related to 
economic growth in both developed and developing countries, we evaluate the 
question: Do institutions and policies enhance the EO-growth relation? In order to 
conclude that an enabler, such as human capital, enhances the relation between EO 
and economic growth, we must find that sign of the coefficient estimate for the 
interaction term between EO and human capital is positive. The equation where EO 
interacts with the enablers takes the form: 
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𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛼2(𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑡) +  𝛼3(𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡) +  𝛼4(𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑆𝑜𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑡) +  𝛼5(𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡) +𝛼6𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝜃𝑖 +𝛼7𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                            (13)    
Where 𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 is entrepreneurial orientation in country I at time t, 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑡 represent our 
measure of corruption, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡  measures financial development, 𝑆𝑜𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑡  calibrates 
social cohesion and 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 evaluates human capital. Entrepreneurial 
orientation interacts with its drivers to impact on growth denoted by is 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝜃𝑖  the 
measure of time-invariant country fixed effects, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 the vector of control variables, 𝑍𝑡 
is the vector for time dummies and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents the random error term. In the 
specification where the deviation interacts with the determinants, 𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 is replaced by 
𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 in equation 13 and the other terms stay the same.  
We begin by evaluating whether reduced corruption facilitates the relationship 
between EO, its deviation and growth. To establish whether this is indeed the case, 
we assess how the interaction between the control of corruption, EO and its 
deviation would impact growth. In order to conclude that low perceptions of 
corruption enhance the relation between EO, its deviation and economic growth, we 
must find that sign of the coefficient estimate for the interaction between EO, its 
deviation and the control of corruption is positive. GDP per capita growth is the only 
dependent variable and the interaction between the control of corruption and EO and 
its deviation are the predictor variables. The log of wealth, natural resource rents and 
population growth are the control variables. The Sargan and AR (2) tests are 
satisfactory and r => 1 in all the regressions supporting identification and instrument 
validity.  In addition, the lag of GDP growth is positively associated with GDP growth 
in all regressions and this is significant at the 1% level.   
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As Table 29 indicates, the sign of the coefficient estimate for the interaction between 
the level of EO and the control of corruption is positive for the combined sample as 
well as middle-to-high income countries (p<0.01) whereas model (5) indicates that it 
is not significant in low income countries. However, as model (7) illustrates, when we 
control for inequality, the interaction term of the level of EO and low perceptions of 
corruption changes sign and turns positive. This finding implies that low perceptions 
of corruption in relatively poor but equal countries enhance the relation between the 
level of EO and growth. This is significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the effect of 
the interaction between the deviation of EO and the control of corruption enhances 
growth in the combined sample, middle-to-high income and low income countries 
(models 2, 4 and 6, p<0.01).   In model 8, we evaluate the interaction in Africa and 
find that, counterintuitively, the control of corruption hinders the relation between EO 
and growth (p<0.01). The interaction between low perceptions of corruption and the 
deviation of EO (model 9) is insignificant. Both the results of model 8 and 9 may be 
sensitive to social cohesiveness. However, due to the small sample size of 7 African 
countries (when we include inequality in the regression), we cannot ascertain 
definitively whether this is indeed the case. 
In addition, we assess the effect of the control variables: the log of wealth, natural 
resource rents and population growth on GDP per capita growth. First, the log of 
wealth indicates convergence in the combined sample, low income and African 
countries whereas middle-to-high income GDP per capita levels seem to diverge 
(p<0.01). Second, natural resource rents are positively associated with growth 
across all levels of development (p<0.01). Lastly, population growth, has a positive 
sign in the combined sample as well as in low income countries when we control for 
the level of EO (p<0.01). This result indicates the presence of multicollinearity  
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between EO, population growth and GDP per capita growth below a certain level of 
development. 
 Table 29: GMM analysis EO*Corruption 
 
Notes: 
1. The GDP per capita is measured in UDS 2005$ 
2. GDP growth is calculated as GDP growth= log(GDP/GDP(-5)) 
3. The deviation in EO is also the 5 year increase or decrease in EO.  
4. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance of the t-value at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
Secondly, we evaluate whether banking development enhances the relation between 
EO, its deviation and economic growth. We must find that sign of the coefficient 
estimate for the interaction between EO, its deviation and domestic credit is positive 
in order to conclude that banking development enhances the relation between EO 
Dependent 
variable: GDP 
growth 
         
 All Countries Middle-to-High Low income   Africa 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Growth(-1) 0.80 
658.21*** 
0.64 
49.13*** 
0.41 
30.46*** 
0.34 
21.90*** 
0.87 
26.72*** 
0.48 
6.73*** 
0.73 
14.48*** 
0.38 
3.75*** 
 
0.40 
2.79** 
Log(GDP) -0.25 
-76.01*** 
-0.14 
-11.56*** 
0.07 
2.61*** 
0.17 
12.03*** 
-0.25 
-6.51*** 
 
-0.21 
-3.50*** 
-0.14 
-1.17 
-0.15 
-1.21 
-0.32 
-2.23** 
Natural 
Resource 
Rents 
0.01 
92.32*** 
0.01 
28.65*** 
0.00 
7.44*** 
0.00 
2.28*** 
0.01 
3.49*** 
0.02 
7.49*** 
0.01 
4.37*** 
0.01 
2.22** 
0.02 
3.02*** 
Population 
Growth 
0.02 
14.40*** 
-0.01 
-2.68*** 
 
-0.017 
-4.05*** 
-0.02 
-5.38 
0.04 
1.37 
-0.03 
-2.77*** 
0.02 
1.61 
-0.11 
-3.48*** 
-0.16 
-5.20*** 
EO*Corruption 0.00 
2.85*** 
- 0.01 
12.27*** 
- -0.02 
-1.36 
- 0.02 
3.61*** 
-0.06 
-5.09*** 
- 
EOdev*Corrup
tion 
- 0.02 
13.08*** 
- 0.02 
18.82*** 
- 0.03 
3.84*** 
- - -0.02 
-1.59 
Gini Index - - - - - - -0.00 
-0.93 
- - 
Observ 1611 1408 858 756 738 642 410 336 315 
J statistic 88.31 71.30 38.89 
 
41.14 
 
25.86 
 
26.81 
 
15.51 
 
9.42 
 
14.26 
 
Prob(J-
statistic) 
0.30 0.22 0.34 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.56 0.58 0.22 
AR(2) 0.20 0.8533 0.52 0.91 0.74 0.39 0.12 0.73 0.20 
No of cross 
sections 
92 90 50 48 41 41 23 16 16 
Instrument 
rank 
87 68 41 41 27 27 23 16 16 
N/I          
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and economic growth. GDP per capita growth is the only dependent variable and the 
interaction between domestic credit and both EO and its deviation are the predictor 
variables. The log of wealth, natural resource rents and population growth are the 
control variables. As table 30 illustrates, the Sargan and AR (2) tests are satisfactory 
and r => 1 in all the regressions supporting identification and instrument validity.  
Additionally, the lag of GDP growth is positively associated with GDP growth in all 
regressions and this is significant at the 1% level,  
The results suggest that banking development enhances the relation between the 
increase in EO and economic growth. A well-developed banking sector augments 
the positive impact of the deviation of EO on growth in the combined sample as well 
both middle-to-high and low income (models 2, 4 and 6,p<0.01). On the other hand, 
the interaction between banking development and the level of EO is insignificant in 
middle-to-high income countries (model 3) whereas it lubricates the relation between 
the level EO and growth in low income countries that are socially cohesive and 
moderately corrupt (model 7). On the other hand, the impact of banking development 
on the relation between both the level and the deviation of EO and growth is 
insignificant in Africa (models 8 and 9).   
In addition, we gauge the association between the control variables, the log of 
wealth, natural resource rents and population growth, and economic growth.  The log 
of wealth indicates convergence in the combined sample and low income countries 
whereas middle-to-high income GDP per capita levels seem to diverge whereas the 
results in Africa are inconclusive. Furthermore, natural resource rents are also 
positively associated with growth across all levels of development and lastly and as 
expected, population growth is negatively related to growth across all levels of 
development.   
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Table 30: GMM analysis EO*Domestic credit 
 
 
Notes: 
1. The GDP per capita is measured in UDS 2005$ 
2. GDP growth is calculated as GDP growth= log(GDP/GDP(-5)) 
3. The deviation in EO is also the 5 year increase or decrease in EO.  
4. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance of the t-value at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
Thirdly, we analyse the impact of the human capital variables on the relation 
between EO, its deviation and growth. We have found, in chapter 4, that a higher 
stock of human capital is positively related to EO. However, does human capital 
augment the EO-growth relationship? We include natural resource rents, to control 
Dependent 
variable: GDP 
growth 
IV domestic credit 
 All Countries Middle-to-High Low income   Africa 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Growth(-1) 0.49 
56.63*** 
 
0.65 
52.46*** 
0.29 
11.10*** 
 
0.48 
123.38*** 
 
0.89 
21.51*** 
 
 
0.46 
7.18*** 
 
0.91 
34.32*** 
 
 
0.60 
9.73*** 
 
0.65 
8.88*** 
 
Log(Gdp) 0.01 
1.75* 
-0.17 
-17.32*** 
 
0.27 
9.32*** 
0.07 
8.71*** 
-0.11 
-2.65*** 
-0.21 
-3.60*** 
-0.35 
-10.70*** 
0.21 
2.59*** 
-0.15 
-4.55*** 
Natural 
Resource 
Rents 
0.00 
13.25*** 
0.01 
27.48*** 
0.00 
4.19*** 
0.00 
21.57*** 
0.01 
2.09** 
0.02 
7.46*** 
0.00 
0.52 
-0.00 
-1.35 
0.01 
2.91*** 
Population 
Growth 
-0.013 
-17.58*** 
-0.01 
-7.95*** 
 
-0.04 
-5.12*** 
-0.02 
-16.48*** 
0.05 
1.64 
-0.03 
-4.22*** 
-0.01 
-0.77 
 
-0.00 
-0.07 
-0.05 
-4.25*** 
EO*Dcredit 0.00 
11.71*** 
- 0.00 
0.34 
- -0.00 
-3.73*** 
- 0.01 
7.78*** 
0.00 
1.28 
 
EOdev*Dcred
it 
- 0.00 
8.01*** 
- 0.00 
15.44*** 
- 0.00 
4.71*** 
- - 0.00 
0.62 
Gini index - - - - - - -0.00 
-0.72 
- - 
Corruption - - - - - - -0.06            
-3.05*** 
- 
 
- 
Observ 1613 1410 858 756 738 
 
642 410 336 
 
315 
 
J statistic 83.87 
 
72.97 
 
36.65 
 
43.80 
 
27.94109 
 
26.44 
 
17.12 
 
14.57 
 
11.59 
Prob(J-
statistic) 
0.30 0.18 0.13 0.35 0.177642 0.23 0.38 0.20 0.40 
AR(2) 0.70 0.35 0.62 0.64 0.30 0.57 0.81 0.65 0.27 
No of cross 
sections 
92 90 50 48 41 41 23 16 16 
Instrument 
rank 
83 68 33 46 27 27 23 16 16 
N/I 1.11 1.32 1.52 1.04 1.52 1.52 1 1 1 
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for growth that might not emanate from the diffusion of innovation, population growth 
as well as the log of GDP per capita as control variables in all the regression models. 
GDP per capita growth is the only dependent variable and EO and the deviation in 
EO are the predictor variables. As table 31 illustrates, the Sargan and AR (2) tests 
are satisfactory and r =>1 in all the regressions supporting identification and 
instrument validity.  Further, the lag of GDP growth is positively associated with GDP 
growth in all regressions and this is significant at the 1% level.  
The interaction between tertiary education and deviation of EO is positive and 
significant across both middle-to-high income countries as well as Africa. Similarly, 
tertiary education also augments the association between the level of EO and growth 
across all levels of development. Moreover, we also assess the control variables the 
log of wealth, natural resource rents and population growth.  Similar to when we 
account for reduced corruption, the log of wealth indicates convergence in low 
income and African countries whereas middle-to-high income GDP per capita levels 
seem to diverge. Natural resource rents are also positively associated with growth 
whereas population growth is negatively related to growth across all levels of 
development. 
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Table 31: GMM analysis EO*tertiary 
 
Notes: 
1. The GDP per capita is measured in UDS 2005$ 
2. GDP growth is calculated as GDP growth= log(GDP/GDP(-5)) 
3. The deviation in EO is also the 5 year increase or decrease in EO.  
4. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance of the t-value at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
Table 32 presents the results of the interaction between EO, its deviation and 
secondary education.  The Sargan and AR (2) tests are satisfactory and r => 1 in all 
the regressions supporting identification and instrument validity.  Further, the lag of 
GDP growth is positively associated with GDP growth in all regressions and this is 
significant at the 1% level. Similar to tertiary education, secondary education 
Dependent 
variable: GDP 
growth 
 All countries  Middle-to-
high income 
 Low 
income 
 Africa  
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Growth(-1) 0.82 
66.42*** 
 
0.64 
46.25*** 
 
0.79 
112.08*** 
 
0.44 
120.62*** 
 
0.74 
21.20*** 
 
 
0.47 
6.41*** 
 
0.62 
15.14*** 
0.48 
10.66*** 
 
Log(GDP) -0.44 
-20.16*** 
-0.18 
-15.24*** 
-0.55 
-34.01*** 
-0.22 
-61.15*** 
-0.40 
-7.76*** 
-0.23 
-4.88*** 
-0.23 
-2.50*** 
-0.21 
-1.27 
Natural 
Resource 
Rents 
0.01 
10.76*** 
0.01 
26.30*** 
0.01 
11.80*** 
0.01 
29.15 
0.01 
2.25*** 
0.02 
7.58*** 
0.00 
2.35*** 
0.01 
2.48*** 
Population 
Growth 
0.03 
4.87*** 
-0.01 
-3.14*** 
0.08 
20.05*** 
0.02 
13.90*** 
0.06 
1.89* 
-0.01 
-1.30 
-0.07 
-9.07*** 
-0.05 
-2.47*** 
EO*tertiary 0.00 
7.89*** 
 0.00 
34.11*** 
 0.01 
7.55*** 
 
- 0.01 
2.42*** 
- 
EOdev*tertia
ry 
- 0.00 
13.31*** 
- 0.00 
32.80*** 
- 0.01 
3.96*** 
- 0.02 
2.30*** 
Gini index - - - - - - - - 
Corruption - - - - - - - - 
Observ 1611 
 
1408 
 
858 756 
 
738 642 336 315 
J statistic 75.39 71.65 
 
47.84 
 
41.20 24.04 
 
26.08 
 
12.69 
 
12.38 
 
Prob(J-
statistic) 
0.14 0.21 0.28 0.55 0.29 
 
0.25 0.31 0.34 
 
AR(2) 0.84 0.55 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.34 0.44 0.16 
No of cross 
sections 
92 90 50 48 41 41 16 16 
Instrument 
rank 
68 68 48 46 26 27 16 16 
N/I 1.35 1.32 1.04 1.04 1.58 1.52 1 1 
173 | P a g e  
 
enhances the relationship between both the level and the deviation of EO and 
economic growth. This result is significant at the 1% level and robust to controlling 
for wealth, natural resource rents and population growth. In addition, similar to when 
we account for tertiary education as a moderator; the log of wealth indicates 
convergence in low income and African countries whereas in middle-to-high income 
countries GDP per capita levels seem to diverge. Natural resource rents are also 
positively associated with growth across all levels of development and lastly, 
population growth is collinear with the level EO and GDP per capita growth below a 
certain level of development. 
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 Table 32: GMM analysis EO*secondary  
 Notes: 
1. The GDP per capita is measured in UDS 2005$ 
2. GDP growth is calculated as GDP growth= log(GDP/GDP(-5)) 
3. The deviation in EO is also the 5 year increase or decrease in EO.  
4. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance of the t-value at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
Lastly, in table 33, we evaluate whether social cohesion, operationalised as 
inequality, augments the relationship between both EO and its deviation, and 
economic growth. The Sargan and AR (2) tests are satisfactory and r => 1 in all the 
regressions supporting identification and instrument validity.  In addition, the lag of 
GDP growth is positively associated with GDP growth in the sample as a whole, 
middle-to-high income countries as well as low income countries. However, in Africa, 
Dependent 
variable: GDP 
growth 
DV Growth IV Secondary enrolment    
 All Countries Middle-to-High Low income  Africa 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Growth(-1) 0.80 
71.48*** 
 
0.63 
13.52*** 
 
0.53 
86.28*** 
 
0.43 
80.02*** 
 
0.93 
36.80*** 
 
0.52 
7.45*** 
 
0.70 
9.72*** 
 
0.61 
7.93*** 
 
Log(GDP) -0.35 
-22.73*** 
-0.15 
-12.15*** 
-0.04 
-2.74*** 
0.11 
10.41*** 
-0.48 
-12.15*** 
-0.21 
-4.45*** 
-0.08 
-0.76 
-0.08 
-0.71 
Natural 
Resource 
Rents 
0.01 
14.49*** 
0.01 
28.29*** 
0.00 
10.80*** 
0.00 
4.87*** 
-0.00 
-1.24 
0.02 
9.32*** 
0.00 
3.25*** 
0.01 
2.00** 
Population 
Growth 
0.02 
4.63*** 
-0.01 
-3.292*** 
-0.01 
-8.12*** 
-0.01 
-16.67*** 
0.05 
1.84*** 
-0.02 
-2.91*** 
-0.05 
-5.71*** 
-0.09 
-9.38*** 
EO*Secondary 0.00 
4.69*** 
- 0.00 
18.82*** 
- 0.01 
8.57*** 
- 0.00 
2.09** 
- 
EOdev*Second
ary 
- 0.00 
47.95*** 
- 0.00 
17.26*** 
- 0.00 
2.59*** 
- 0.00 
3.17*** 
Gini index - - - - - - - - 
Corruption - - - - - - - - 
Observ 1611 1408 858 756 738 642 336 315 
J statistic 75.42 
 
69.67 
 
47.97 42.87 
 
27.80 
 
28.21 
 
11.36 
 
14.25 
 
Prob(J-
statistic) 
0.14 0.26 
 
0.28 0.39 0.18 0.17 0.41 0.22 
AR(2) 0.44 0.69 0.23 0.32 0.42 0.52 0.48 0.18 
No of cross 
sections 
92 90 50 48 41 41 16 16 
Instrument 
rank 
68 68 48 46 27 27 16 16 
N/I 1.35 1.32 1.04 1.04 1.52 1.52 1 1 
175 | P a g e  
 
GDP growth is not persistent. In fact the results indicate lag of GDP may even be 
negatively correlated to current GDP growth (p<0.10). 
The coefficient of interaction between inequality and both the level and the change in 
EO is positive and significant at the 1% level in both the combined sample and 
middle-to-high income countries whereas it is not significant in low income countries. 
This implies that inequality in middle-to-high income countries enhances the relation 
between EO and economic growth whereas in low income countries its impact is not 
significant. In models 7 and 8, we evaluate the impact of inequality in African 
countries. The interaction with the level of EO in model (7) is insignificant whereas 
the impact of inequality on the relation between the deviation in EO and economic 
growth is negative and this is significant at the 5% level. This result suggests that 
inequality hinders the impact of an increase in EO on economic growth in African 
countries. In addition, the lag of GDP loses its significance in model (7) and when we 
interact inequality with the deviation, the lag of GDP becomes negatively correlated 
to current GDP growth (model 8, p<0.10). These results are similar to our findings in 
Chapter 4 that when we control for inequality EO loses its persistence in Africa.  
We also evaluate the control variables the log of wealth, natural resource rents and 
population growth.  The log of wealth indicates divergence in high-to-middle income 
and African countries whereas in low income countries the log of GDP per capita is 
insignificant. Natural resource rents are also positively associated with growth in 
middle-to-high income countries and the combined sample. In contrast, natural 
resources are either not significant or negatively associated with growth in low 
income and African countries. Lastly, in the presence of inequality, the relation 
between population growth and GDP per capita growth remains non-linear with 
threshold effects depending on the level of EO. 
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Table 33: GMM analysis EO*inequality 
Notes: 
1. The GDP per capita is measured in UDS 2005$ 
2. GDP growth is calculated as GDP growth= Log (GDP/GDP (-5)). 
3. The deviation in EO is also the 5 year increase or decrease in EO.  
4. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance of the t-value at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
5.2.2 Is Africa different? 
The last result amongst others, begs the question, is Africa different? Some results 
are peculiar to Africa, and imply it may very well be different. First, we find that the 
control of corruption hinders the relation between the level of EO and growth. 
Second, the impact of banking development on the relation between both the level 
Dependent 
variable: GDP 
growth 
 All 
countries 
 Middle-to-
high income 
 Low income 
countries 
 Africa  
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Growth(-1) 0.80 
48.95*** 
 
0.58 
51.17*** 
 
0.54 
52.72*** 
 
0.45 
99.52*** 
 
 
0.44 
3.40*** 
 
0.45 
4.61*** 
 
0.19 
0.81 
 
-0.25 
-1.76* 
 
Log(Gdp) -0.31 
-24.11*** 
-0.13 
-8.18*** 
-0.06 
-4.90*** 
0.08 
6.30*** 
0.14 
1.18 
-0.013 
-0.12 
0.81 
2.19** 
2.03 
2.90*** 
Natural 
Resource 
Rents 
0.01 
5.27*** 
0.01 
17.39*** 
0.00 
7.51*** 
0.00 
2.00** 
-0.01 
-3.46*** 
0.00 
0.25 
0.01 
0.94 
0.00 
0.29 
Population 
Growth 
0.02 
2.52*** 
-0.01 
-3.94*** 
-0.02 
-22.99*** 
-0.02 
-17.39*** 
-0.04 
-3.77** 
-0.03 
-2.74*** 
-0.07 
-0.19 
0.02 
0.04 
EO*Gini 
Index 
0.00 
11.82*** 
- 0.00 
25.92*** 
- 0.00 
0.73 
 -0.00 
-0.94 
 
EOdev*Gini 
Index 
- 0.00 
19.74*** 
- 0.00 
33.66*** 
- 0.00 
0.76 
- -0.01 
-2.06** 
Gini index - - - - - - - - 
Corruption - - - - - - - - 
Observ 1181 
 
1022 
 
756 
 
664 410 
 
348 140 126 
J statistic 50.73 43.53 36.59 36.72 
 
11.99 
 
8.45 
 
4.12 
 
0.68 
 
Prob(J-
statistic) 
0.20 0.45 0.54 0.44 0.29 0.59 0.13 0.71 
AR(2) 0.24 0.27 0.81 0.23 0.73 0.98 0.91 0.25 
No of cross 
sections 
68 66 44 42 23 23 7 7 
Instrument 
rank 
48 48 43 41 20 15 7 7 
N/I 1.42 1.38 1.02 1.02 1.15 1.53 1 1 
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and the deviation of EO and growth is insignificant in Africa. Third, inequality renders 
the association between the lag of GDP growth and GDP growth insignificant or 
negative (p<0.1). Lastly and most importantly, we find that inequality hinders the 
relation between an increase in EO and economic growth in Africa.  Similarly, Barro 
(1991) finds that there is a negative “Africa dummy” that hinders growth. Easterly 
and Levine (1997) argue that this dummy could be due to ethnic heterogeneity that is 
particularly prevalent in Africa. Sachs and Warner (1997) suggest low growth in 
Africa is partly attributable to limited access to the sea, a tropical climate and natural 
resource abundance.  Nevertheless, they contend that although natural factors may 
have a role in Africa’s disappointing growth outcomes, economic policies such as 
government saving, openness to international trade and good institutions are more 
important for economic growth in Africa than natural factors.  
Similar to Sachs and Warner (1997), our results suggest that the level of EO 
positively predicts GDP per capita  and the deviation of EO enhances economic 
growth in Africa after controlling for wealth, natural resources and the level of 
development. Table 34, clearly demonstrates that the level of GDP per capita is 
closely related to the level of EO and Table 36 confirms this with an indicated 
correlation coefficient of 0.72. In addition, although GDP growth is highly volatile in 
Africa, correlations confirm the findings of regression analysis that the deviation in 
EO is positively related to GDP growth. Additionally, as we found in regression 
analysis, and contrary to expectations, the relationship between natural resource 
rents and growth is weak and contingent on institutions, banking development and 
human capital.  
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Table 34: EO rankings in Africa 
  
EO 
Rank 
Country  Mean  Std. Dev.  GDP 
1 Botswana 0.50 0.18 3942.12 
2 Algeria 0.14 0.27 2636.36 
3 Mauritius -0.02 0.20 3591.76 
4 South Africa -0.06 0.15 4938.75 
5 Tunisia -0.10 0.17 2426.16 
6 Morocco -0.30 0.21 1575.56 
7 Egypt -0.39 0.15 982.24 
8 Zambia -0.59 0.23 658.28 
9 Senegal -0.64 0.17 707.63 
10 Madagascar -0.94 0.34 304.35 
11 Sudan -1.02 0.36 534.20 
12 Mozambique -1.03 0.44 220.18 
13 Burkina Faso -1.07 0.17 315.53 
14 Lesotho -1.09 0.63 569.20 
15 Uganda -1.13 0.40 245.04 
16 Ethiopia -1.20 0.27 143.83 
 All -0.53 0.59 1495.25 
Notes: 
1. The GDP per capita is measured in UDS 2005$. 
2. The average EO score is measured over the 29 years between 1980 and 2008. 
Having established that the deviation in EO is positively related to growth and 
bearing in mind that that inequality hinders this relation, we delve deeper into 
inequality in Africa. Table 35 displays the descriptive statistics of inequality for Africa, 
low and middle-to-high income countries as well as the whole sample. The table 
shows that Africa has both the highest mean and median of the Gini Index. The 
average inequality is a full standard deviation greater than that of the whole sample 
which includes African countries. Excluding African countries would lead to an even 
greater gap in inequality between Africa and the rest of the world. 
These descriptive statistics combined with the correlations as well as the regression 
findings in both chapters 4 and 5, suggest that in Africa inequality and social conflict, 
that is prevalent amongst ethnically diverse populations, may very well be the 
binding constraint on GDP growth.  
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Table 35: The descriptive statistics of inequality in Africa 
 Africa Low income Middle-to-high All 
 Mean  48.65  42.35  35.17  37.56 
 Median  46.18  40.53  32.79  35.29 
 Maximum  77.60  77.60  64.00  77.60 
 Minimum  29.49  12.10  18.10  12.10 
 Std. Dev.  10.40  10.42  10.22  10.81 
 Skewness  0.53  0.27  0.78  0.56 
 Kurtosis  2.41  3.17  2.74  2.67 
     
 Jarque-Bera  12.44  8.65  124.81  112.58 
 Probability  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00 
     
 Sum  9874.90  28249.84  41782.73  74058.90 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  21842.79  72328.84  123868.40  230285.00 
     
 Observations  203  667  1188  1972 
Notes: 
1. Inequality is measured using the Gini Index 
2. The low income, middle-to-high and combined samples include African countries. Excluding them would further reduce their 
average inequality. 
 
The impact of inequality can be insidious. It may negatively affect growth promoting 
institutions and policies, resulting in poor growth outcomes. Our findings suggest that 
inequality in Africa increases perceptions of corruption, negates the potentially 
positive impact of banking development and reduces the returns to human capital, 
thereby negatively affecting EO. As a consequence, African countries attain very low 
scores on EO and its determinants with Lesotho and Ethiopia ranking last and 
second last, respectively.  
Persson and Tabellini (1991) also confirm that in a society with distributional conflict, 
growth promoting activities such as the production of knowledge are likely to be 
constrained with the resultant negative impact on technological upgrading and 
growth. Sachs and Warner (1997) concur and assert that the lack of social cohesion 
that emanates from colonial rule may hinder the adoption of growth oriented policies. 
Therefore, inequality occasioned by arbitrary discrimination against ethnic minorities 
in African countries, results in poor human capital formation, high perceptions of 
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corruption and a lack of banking development which inhibit EO and consequently 
lead to reduced growth and increased growth volatility. 
Table 36: Correlation matrix of the determinants, EO and growth (African sample) 
Partial Covariance Analysis: Ordinary         
             EO  EOdev  Corruption
  
Domestic 
credit  
Gini Index  Tertiary  Secondary  Natural res GDP  GDP 
growth  
GDP 
volatility  
EO  1.00           
            
EOdev  0.17*** 1.00          
            
Corruption  0.23*** -0.27*** 1.00         
            
Domestic 
credit  
0.32*** -0.27*** 0.64*** 1.00        
            
Gini Index  -0.14* -0.17** 0.30*** 0.31*** 1.00       
            
Tertiary 0.78*** 0.08 0.33*** 0.45*** -0.02 1.00      
            
Secondary  0.86*** 0.07 0.25*** 0.43*** -0.02 0.94*** 1.00     
            
Natural res -0.48*** 0.16** -0.53*** -0.42*** 0.02 -0.52*** -0.53*** 1.00    
            
GDP  0.72*** -0.14* 0.57*** 0.59*** 0.17** 0.81*** 0.83*** -0.66*** 1.00   
            
GDP growth  -0.09 0.33*** -0.30*** -0.28*** -0.35*** 0.05 0.02 0.11 -0.17 1.00  
            
GDP vol  -0.36*** 0.19** -0.73*** -0.56*** -0.20** -0.50*** -0.47*** 0.74*** -0.79*** 0.05 1.00 
            
            
Notes: 
1. The GDP per capita is measured in UDS 2005$ 
2. GDP growth is calculated as GDP growth= log(GDP/GDP(-5)) and GDP vol represents 5 year GDP growth volatility 
3. The deviation in EO is also the 5 year increase or decrease in EO.  
4. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance of the t-value at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
So is Africa different? The answer may be yes and no. Similar to other countries, we 
find that the level of EO and the deviation in EO are the key drivers of economic 
growth and determinants such as human capital enhance the association between 
EO and growth. However, Africa seems to have heightened inequality which we 
argue is occasioned by arbitrary discrimination since it does not emanate from the 
growth process or from adopting a variance enhancing strategy such as EO. Instead 
it is an outcome of unjust political processes such as racial/ethnic discrimination and 
therefore it lacks social legitimacy. It is this type of inequality that results in high 
corruption, poor human capital formation and a lack of banking development and 
consequently a low and static EO which leads to poor GDP growth.  
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Despite the harmful impact that inequality has on EO, we find that an increase in EO 
is the only variable that is positively related to economic growth in Africa and natural 
resource rents are not. Therefore, increasing African countries’ innovativeness, 
proactiveness and risk taking may facilitate economic growth which in turn may bring 
about the necessary institutional legitimacy that governments need in order to 
undertake reforms that would address arbitrary discrimination and create inclusive 
societies that engender economic progress. Our assertions integrate both Easterly 
and Levine’s (1997) and Sachs and Warner’s (1997) views that while relative 
equality and social cohesion is important, economic policies that would increase 
innovativeness, proactiveness and risk taking are even more important for growth in 
Africa.  
5.2.3 Robustness Tests 
 
To evaluate the robustness of our results, firstly, we test whether the control of 
corruption, human capital, banking development and inequality have an impact on 
GDP per capita across all levels of development growth after controlling for an 
increase in EO. We have argued that what we, in literature, commonly refer to as the 
determinants of growth, are actually the determinants of EO.  As Table 37 indicates, 
with identification supported and second order autocorrelation rejected, the control of 
corruption, tertiary education, domestic credit to the private sector and inequality are 
either insignificant or negatively related to growth across all levels of development. 
However as model (3) shows, secondary education retains a relatively small residual 
impact in low income countries even after we control for a deviation in EO. These 
results largely support our assertion that for a country to grow, simply improving its 
institutions and education is necessary but not sufficient for growth.  Policy makers 
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will still have to initiate a process of technological upgrading that encompasses 
taking risks to diversify into new sectors, improving innovative capabilities and 
proactively seeking both new markets and advanced technology  
Table 37: Robustness: GMM analysis the determinants, EO and growth  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Notes: 
1. GDP per capita is measured in US 2005$ 
2. GDP growth is calculated as GDP growth= log(GDP/GDP(-5)) and GDP vol represents 5 year GDP growth volatility 
3. The deviation in EO is also the 5 year increase or decrease in EO.  
4. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance of the t-value at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
Secondly, we assess whether a stock variable, the number of new limited liability 
corporations registered in the calendar year is positively related to growth whilst 
controlling for size of the economy, population growth and a deviation in EO. We use 
the number new limited liability corporations registered because they represent 
DV: GDP per capita growth 
 All countries Middle-to-high income Low income countries 
Model 1 2 3 
Growth(-1) 0.50 
3.21*** 
 
0.39 
0.97 
 
0.03 
0.20 
 
Log(GDP) 0.32 
3.47*** 
0.14 
2.76*** 
0.65 
6.78*** 
Natural Resource Rents -0.00 
-2.36** 
-0.01 
-3.70*** 
-0.00 
-1.61 
Population Growth -0.01 
-1.69* 
-0.10 
-2.78*** 
-0.01 
-1.30 
EOdev 0.20 
3.76*** 
0.13 
4.54*** 
0.20 
5.14*** 
 
Corruption 0.00 
0.02 
0.05 
1.63 
0.01 
0.52 
Domestic credit -0.00 
-3.46*** 
-0.00 
-1.10 
-0.00 
-4.51*** 
Tertiary 0.00 
1.56 
-0.00 
-0.39 
-0.01 
-2.19** 
Secondary -0.00 
-0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
2.87*** 
Gini Index -0.00 
-1.22 
0.00 
0.50 
0.00 
0.72 
Observ 1024 664 348 
J statistic 7.84 
 
9.30 
 
10.35 
 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.55 0.41 0.32 
AR(2) 0.20 0.18 0.42 
Number of cross sections 66 42 23 
Instrument rank 19 19 19 
N/I 3.47 2.21 1.21 
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formal and possibly better resourced entities operating within formal institutions.  
Due to the sample size, we use panel least squares to estimate the regression and 
thus, the results should be treated with caution since we could not control for reverse 
causality and omitted variable bias. As Table 38 indicates, we find that new business 
registrations are not significantly, positively related to growth and this holds across 
all levels of development whereas the deviation in EO positively predicts GDP 
growth across all levels of development.  
These results support our assertion that it is the content of entrepreneurship and not 
the entry mode that is positively related to growth. Nevertheless, it is important to 
clarify that we do not imply entry and exit are not positively related to growth or that 
somehow they inhibit it. However, the point we make is that the entry mode does not 
define entrepreneurship nor is it necessary or sufficient for growth. We argue and the 
results seem to support that, it is the content of entrepreneurship, EO, that defines 
whether a country is entrepreneurial or not. 
. 
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Table 38: GMM analysis Robustness New Business and EOdev 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
1. GDP per capita is measured in US 2005$ 
2. GDP growth is calculated as GDP growth= log(GDP/GDP(-5)) and GDP vol represents 5 year GDP growth volatility 
3. The deviation in EO is also the 5 year increase or decrease in EO.  
4. ***, **, and * in the table indicate the levels of significance of the t-value at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
5.3 Discussion  
In this chapter we sought to answer three questions, the first one being whether EO 
and its deviation have a positive impact on economic growth at the aggregate level. 
To put it differently, the essential question we asked was: can one nation state 
devote more resources to innovative activity, take risks and invest more in longer 
term, uncertain outcomes whilst being more pro-active in growing and diversifying its 
economic base than others?  
The answer is, yes it can. EO and its deviation are positively associated with GDP 
growth in both middle-to-high and low income countries as well as Africa. This 
DV: GDP  per capita growth 
 Panel Least Squares  
 All countries Middle-to-high income Low income countries 
Model 1 2 3 
Growth(-1) 0.88 
54.39*** 
0.84 
36.52*** 
0.93 
41.18*** 
 
Log(GDP) -0.01 
-6.99*** 
-0.02 
-8.21*** 
-0.01 
-2.77*** 
Natural Resource Rents 0.00 
0.69 
0.00 
0.03 
 
0.00 
0.74 
 
Population Growth -0.01 
-4.39*** 
-0.01 
-3.18*** 
-0.01 
-1.22 
EOdev 0.03 
4.79*** 
0.04 
4.57*** 
0.03 
2.91*** 
New Businesses -0.00 
-0.46 
-0.00 
-0.98 
-0.00 
-0.76 
Observ 349 213 132 
R2 0.94 
 
0.92 
 
0.95 
F-statistic 813.30 401.18 
 
407.20 
Prob( F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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supports our contention that taking risks, innovating and proactively sourcing 
technology and markets leads to knowledge diffusion, technological progress and 
economic growth. And contrary to Lee and Kim’s (2009) assertion, this result holds 
across all levels of development. For example, China in 1980 was a poor country. It 
achieved its miraculous growth by dramatically improving its technological 
capabilities, investing and diversifying its industrial base and proactively seeking 
markets for its products. Its EO score improved dramatically from -0.43 to 1 and as a 
result it achieved an average GDP per capita growth of 8.55% per year between 
1980 and 2008. In contrast, although South Africa, which was a middle income 
country in 1980, undertook painful political and institutional reforms, it hardly 
invested in new industries nor did it acquire any new technological capabilities. Its 
EO declined marginally from 0. 29 to 0.20 and as a result South Africa achieved a 
poor growth rate of 0.07%.  
Therefore, we could not find support for Lee and Kim’s (2009) hypothesis that 
transitioning from low to middle income is different from transitioning from middle to 
high income status. Similarly, van Stel et al. (2005), Wong et al. (2005) and Larroulet 
and Couyoumdjian’s (2009) assertion that the link between entrepreneurship and 
growth is low in developing countries is not supported. Although, we find that new 
business registrations are not significantly, positively related to growth across all 
levels of development, the deviation in EO positively predicts GDP growth. 
Entrepreneurship, correctly defined as EO, facilitates technological upgrading and 
growth across all levels of development. These results confirm that it is the content 
of entrepreneurship and not the entry mode that is positively related to growth, and it 
follows that merely counting the number of new firms and/or the number of self-
employed will tell us very little about innovation, risk taking and pro-activeness and 
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consequently, nothing about entrepreneurship and growth. Therefore, our assertion 
that the studies assessing the entrepreneurship-growth nexus have shown 
conflicting results precisely because they have not been studying what they are 
purporting to study, is confirmed. 
Likewise, we have addressed Acs et al.’s (2005) concern that a country such as 
China can grow significantly with low levels of R&D expenditure (Hsiao and Shen, 
2003), by showing that first, growth is a joint function of innovativeness, risk taking 
and proactiveness not merely R&D and second, that it’s not only the level of EO but 
also the incremental increase of EO that drives growth. Therefore, any increase in 
EO from China’s low level will enhance GDP growth. Similarly, we have addressed 
(Minniti and Lévesque, 2010) concern that the exact nature has not been of 
association between entrepreneurship and economic growth although often 
assumed, has not been explicated. We have found that entrepreneurial countries 
have to innovative, assume risks, invest and proactively attack international and 
domestic markets in diffusing the technologies in order to grow. The evidence 
suggests a more accurate characterisation of entrepreneurship at the macro-level is 
EO. Further, it is the manifestation of this EO (i.e., innovative activity, risk taking and 
proactiveness) is the critical variable that drives growth. 
Furthermore, we have made the argument that quality institutions, that reduce levels 
of corruption and arbitrary discrimination, would support EO since risk bearing and 
innovating require, at a minimum, the assurance the rewards will accrue to the risk 
taker. Moreover, we posited that financial institutions are important because they 
evaluate and finance entrepreneurs’ innovation and launching of new products to 
market (Schumpeter, 1912) and thus their relative absence would inhibit EO (King 
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and Levine, 1993).  Similarly, we argued that high stocks of human capital enhance 
entrepreneurship by enabling knowledge acquisition and better quality innovation 
(Larroulet and Couyoumdjian, 2009). We find support for these assertions as the 
control of corruption; banking development and human capital enhance the 
relationship between an increase in EO and growth. This finding is robust and 
significant across all levels of development.  
These results find additional support in literature. Firstly, human capital enhances the 
EO-growth relation by significantly facilitating and increasing entry by knowledge-
based firms (Baptista and Mendonça, 2010). In particular, high stocks of human 
capital augment the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth by 
enabling entrepreneurs to pursue better quality opportunities (Larroulet and 
Couyoumdjian, 2009). In addition, human capital enhances the EO-growth relation 
by improving a country’s ability to imitate and learn advanced foreign technologies 
(Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Stokke, 2008). Secondly, reducing corruption facilitates 
growth by promoting productive entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990). Likewise, 
reducing corruption may lower levels of uncertainty and transactions cost, and 
consequently increase the number of positive net present value opportunities that 
can be exploited by entrepreneurial firms, thus leading to growth (Anokhin and 
Schulze, 2009).  
Thirdly, financial institutions are important for growth because they evaluate and 
finance entrepreneurs’ innovation and launching of new products to market 
(Schumpeter, 1912) and thus their absence would inhibit EO and consequently 
decrease the rate of economic growth. Furthermore, countries with high levels of 
financial market development are better able to support the growth of capital 
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intensive industries (Rajan and Zingales, 1998 and Beck et al., 2008). Financial 
institutions and markets ease the trading, hedging, and pooling of risk, thus 
impacting economic growth by varying resource distribution and savings rates, and 
this encourages investment in projects with higher risk and superior expected returns 
(Devereux and Smith, 1994; Obstfeld, 1994 and Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
Therefore, financial sector distortions can inhibit EO and consequently decrease the 
rate of economic growth (King and Levine, 1993).  
In essence, institutions and policies alter the ability and incentives of firms to 
innovate and proactively take risks and we made the point that the clear association 
theoretically is from institutions to growth. We evaluated this contention and we 
found that the control of corruption, tertiary education, domestic credit to the private 
sector and inequality are either insignificant or negatively related to growth across all 
levels of development when we control for an increase in EO. These results largely 
support our assertion that first, institutions and policies are correctly the determinants 
of EO and second, for a country to grow, simply improving its institutions and 
education is necessary but not sufficient.  Policy makers will still have to initiate a 
process of technological upgrading that encompasses taking risks to diversify into 
new sectors, improving innovative capabilities and proactively seeking both new 
markets and advanced technology.  
Furthermore, we hypothesized that the proactive actions necessary to attack new 
markets require purposeful, cohesive action that is more likely in relatively equal 
societies with agreed on long-term objectives than other scenarios. Consequently, 
we gauged whether indeed unequal societies hinder the impact of risk taking, 
innovativeness and proactiveness on growth. However, this assertion was only 
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supported in Africa. Instead we found that in the combined sample as well as middle-
to-high income countries inequality enhances the EO-growth relation whereas in low 
income countries its impact is insignificant. This finding partially confirms Barro’s 
(2000) contention that association between inequality and growth depends on the 
level of economic development as higher inequality lowers growth in poor countries 
whereas it promotes growth in developed countries. Shin (2012) explains Barro’s 
(2000) findings by suggesting that in developed countries the rich save more than 
the poor, thus enabling the capital accumulation necessary for growth. Therefore, 
any income redistribution would reduce the savings needed for investment and 
growth. In contrast, the poor are under credit constraint in developing countries. As a 
result they do not participate in investing or production activity.  
As a conjecture, we would suggest another possible reason for this finding is that EO 
is a variance enhancing strategy and thus a possible outcome of its implementation 
may be a greater variance in incomes, resulting in a higher Gini Index. This may be 
positive for growth provided that the resulting inequality is below a particular 
threshold and institutions in that particular country are strong and legitimate enough 
to mediate any distributional conflict that may arise. However, in volatile and poor 
countries, extreme levels of income inequality may lead to political and social 
instability that causes economic growth to decline due to a lack of growth 
persistence (Berg and Ostry, 2011).  
Lastly, we assessed wealth and natural resource rents as control variables. The 
results seem to suggest that the middle income trap might be due to a low EO. 
Although convergence was confirmed in low income countries, with the log of GDP 
entering the growth regression with a negative sign, in middle-to-high income 
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countries the sign is positive when EO and its incremental change are controlled for. 
This result suggests that, for middle income countries, the necessary growth needed 
to attain developed status is not automatic. It is conditional on a high and increasing 
EO. Therefore, a middle income country with a low EO which it does not increase, 
such as South Africa, may fall further behind developed countries. This finding 
receives support from Pritchett (1997) and Bairoch’s (1993) contention that wealthy 
countries are getting richer at a faster rate than poor countries. Similarly, Easterly 
and Levine (2001) suggest that empirically over the past 200–300 years the story 
has been massive divergence in GDP per capita between the rich and the poor and 
not convergence, as neoclassical theory would suggest.  
Moreover, we find that natural resources are positively associated with growth in the 
combined sample as well as in low income countries (contingent on inequality) and 
these findings are robust to controlling for EO and its deviation. In contrast, in 
middle-to-high income countries an increase in EO suppresses the effect of natural 
resources on growth rendering it insignificant. Similarly, this relationship is weak in 
African countries, conditional on a low and decreasing EO and in the presence of 
inequality; natural resources are either not significant or negatively associated with 
growth in African and low income countries, respectively.  
These results suggest that the impact of natural resources on growth in low income 
countries may be first, independent of EO and second contingent on institutions. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) suggest this may be because natural resource 
increase incentives for corruption and hinder better institutions. Van der Ploeg (2011) 
submits that natural resources may have harmful effects on the quality of the legal 
system and thus on property rights. Vicente (2010) documents an increase in 
corruption of 10% after the announcements of the oil discovery in São Tomé.  
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5.4 Conclusion 
In the review of literature, we noted the anomaly that although corporate 
entrepreneurship literature has converged on EO as the appropriate description of 
entrepreneurial behaviour, literature at the aggregate level, which purports to 
aggregate firm level behaviour, still measures entrepreneurship as a stock variable 
and considers only one of the composite elements, innovation, as reflective of 
entrepreneurial behaviour. Risk taking and proactiveness are ignored. In our view, 
we have addressed this anomaly and, similar to Schumpeter, put entrepreneurship 
at the heart of economic progress.  
Entrepreneurship defined at the aggregate level as a joint function of risk taking, 
innovativeness and proactiveness, and sustained behaviour by entrepreneurial 
states positively predicts growth. In contrast, entrepreneurship measured as a stock 
variable, that is, counting the number of “entrepreneurs” or viewed as invention, as 
Schumpeter (1911) warned, might be “downright misleading” and dangerous, leading 
to the muddle we have seen in literature and as an unintended consequence, 
poverty and destitution for millions of people. 
In addition, we have made the point that the clear association theoretically is from 
institutions and policies to growth, as institutions and policies by themselves do not 
increase output. Entrepreneurial firms and entrepreneurs do. Therefore, institutions 
and policies are the determinants of risk taking, proactiveness and innovativeness 
and not economic growth. We evaluated this contention and we found that first, 
institutions and policies are, correctly, enablers of EO and second, for a country to 
grow, simply improving its institutions and education is necessary but not sufficient 
for growth.  Policy makers will still have to initiate a process of technological 
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upgrading that encompasses taking risks to diversify into new sectors, improving 
innovative capabilities and proactively seeking both new markets and advanced 
technology.  
In summary, the results suggest that firstly, entrepreneurship, correctly defined as 
EO, is the critical variable that determines whether a country grows or does not. 
Secondly, institutions and policies are antecedents of EO, not growth. They affect 
and shape the relationship between EO and growth; however, they do not determine 
it. Lastly, the positive impact of an increase in EO on growth does not vary according 
to the country’s level of development. It is significant for both developed and 
developing countries, including Africa.  
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Chapter 6 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study sought to address the inconsistent link in theoretical and empirical 
literature between entrepreneurship and economic growth. We argued that part of 
the reason for these contradictory findings could be that entrepreneurship has been 
mispecified in the literature as entry density or R&D. Therefore, we proposed that a 
more accurate characterisation of entrepreneurship at the macro-level is 
entrepreneurial orientation (EO) and argued that it is the manifestation of this EO  
that is the critical individual variable which defines whether a country is 
entrepreneurial or not and, as a consequence, whether it will improve its productive 
capabilities or not. 
A rigorous review of literature suggested the appropriate research questions should 
be: 
1. Does entrepreneurship manifest at the aggregate level as EO? 
2. Does EO have a positive impact on economic growth? 
3. Is this economic growth impact context dependent? That is, does it vary 
depending on the country’s level of development? 
4. Further, what are the institutional drivers of EO at the aggregate level? 
5. Lastly, do these institutional enablers enhance the EO-growth relation? 
This study has made several contributions to the literature. First, we made a 
theoretical contribution by defining entrepreneurship at the aggregate level as EO, in 
contrast to its’ current characterisation in the literature as entry density and/or R&D, 
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and additionally, linking this EO to economic growth. Second, we made a significant 
methodological contribution by devising aggregate level, objective secondary 
measures of EO and its’ sub-constructs (risk taking, innovativeness and 
proactiveness). Lastly, empirically, and as hypothesized, the EO-growth relation was 
confirmed. Furthermore, banking development, human capital, social cohesion and 
the control of corruption were confirmed as policies and institutions that are 
predictors of EO, as well as enablers of the EO-growth relation.  
6.1 Defining and measuring EO (and its sub-constructs) 
In chapter 3, we sought to address the anomaly that although corporate 
entrepreneurship literature has converged on EO as the appropriate description of 
entrepreneurial behaviour, literature at the aggregate level, which purports to 
aggregate firm level behaviour, still measures entrepreneurship as a stock variable 
and considers only one of its composite elements, innovation, as reflective of 
entrepreneurial behaviour. To address this concern, we cogently operationalised 
aggregate level indicators of risk taking, innovativeness and proactiveness, using 
objective measures and, through factor analysis, confirmed the validity and 
dimensionality of EO. The significant findings were: 
 First, innovativeness was validated as a composite measure of innovative 
input, scientific output and technological output. Thus, addressing concerns in 
literature about the individual indicators.  
 Second, proactiveness was established as a construct that best reflects the 
activities of search and discovery at the international level, empirically 
confirming the contention that some countries may be heavy producers of 
new knowledge although they are sluggish in applying it. On the other hand, 
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other countries may quickly appropriate and apply technology developed 
elsewhere. 
 Third, we empirically validated risk taking as capital accumulation in highly 
uncertain sectors. Our contention that adjusted agricultural value-added 
reflects the propensity to diversify and invest in  risky sectors, the domestic 
savings rate reflects the ability to do so over time and gross investment is an 
imperfect measure of the magnitude of investment, was corroborated.  
 Lastly, with the sub-constructs of EO defined and validated, we proceeded to 
confirm our conceptualisation of EO, at the aggregate level, as a reflective, 
unidimensional, second-order construct with three indicators: risk taking, 
innovativeness and proactiveness. Moreover, the results showed that the 
indicators of EO covary, implying that they are complementary and not 
substitutes.  
6.2 The determinants of EO 
In chapter 4 we investigated the determinants and drivers of EO and evaluated the 
question: why are some countries more innovative, risk taking and proactive than 
others? To answer this question, we assessed whether financial market 
development, social cohesion (operationalised as inequality), human capital and the 
control of corruption have a positive association with EO and whether this impact 
varies with the level of development. We selected these four measures (institutions 
and policies) as potential enablers of EO because they alter the ability and incentives 
of firms to be entrepreneurial and made a number of significant findings: 
 First, we confirmed that in the overall (combined) sample and middle-to-high 
income countries, low levels of corruption are positively associated with EO. 
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However, the finding that low perceptions of corruption are positively 
associated with EO does not seem to apply in low income countries, including 
those in Africa. In these countries, we find a persistent and significant 
negative relationship between low corruption and EO, supporting the notion 
that corruption ameliorates bureaucratic inefficiency and the assertion that 
perceptions of corruption are influenced by social trust in low income 
countries.  
 Secondly, a positive association of domestic credit extension to the private 
sector with EO was also supported in middle-to-high income countries. 
However, the banking development-EO relation seems to be contingent on 
the level of development.  In low income countries and Africa, we found that 
banking development may hinder EO due to corrupt political systems and 
weak institutions.  
 Thirdly, across the different samples, we found that after accounting for 
collinearity with other variables, the human capital indicators, secondary and 
tertiary education, are positively and significantly related to EO. In addition, 
the results suggest that the human capital variables are more important than 
the institutional variables in influencing EO in low income countries. 
Furthermore, after controlling for low corruption, banking development, 
inequality and wealth, we found that secondary education was still positively 
associated with EO whereas tertiary education was not. Therefore, the results 
suggest it is a misnomer to suggest that a country can have a strong tertiary 
education system without having a strong secondary system.  
 Fourthly, we evaluated the association between EO and inequality. We found 
that inequality is highly collinear with reduced corruption, human capital and 
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banking development. Inequality had a significant impact on the association 
that the perceptions of corruption, banking development, human capital have 
with EO, even though the direct relation with EO is inconclusive. We 
suggested that a possible reason for these seemingly inconclusive findings 
could be that inequality partially shapes the relation between institutions and 
policies, and EO.  This contention was supported by our results as we found 
that high inequality increases perceptions of corruption and negates the 
potentially positive impact of banking development on EO. Moreover, 
inequality reduces the returns to higher education in low income countries as 
well as returns to secondary education in Africa. 
 Lastly, we assessed wealth, the lag of EO and natural resource rents as 
control variables. We found that wealth is not positively related to EO in 
middle-to-high income countries whereas it is positively associated with EO in 
Africa and the broader sample of low income countries. Moreover, natural 
resources were marginally (significant at the 10% level) positively related to 
EO in African countries.  Finally, the results suggest that the lag of EO is not 
always persistent in African countries implying that EO and possibly growth, 
is highly volatile in Africa. 
6.3 The impact of EO (and its’ determinants) on economic growth  
In chapter 5 we sought to answer three questions, the first being whether EO and its 
deviation have a positive impact on economic growth at the aggregate level. Second, 
we assessed whether this growth impact is contingent on the level of development, 
and third, we evaluated whether the determinants enhance this EO-economic growth 
relation.  The significant findings were:  
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 EO and its deviation are positively associated with GDP growth in both 
middle-to-high and low income countries including African countries. 
Therefore, we could not find support for the hypothesis that transitioning from 
low-to-middle income is different from transitioning from middle-to-high 
income status. Similarly, the assertion that the link between entrepreneurship 
and growth is low in developing countries is not supported.  
 New business registrations are not significantly positively related to growth 
across all levels of development, whereas the deviation in EO positively 
predicts GDP growth. These results confirm that it is the content of 
entrepreneurship and not the entry mode that is positively related to growth.  
 Growth is a joint function of innovativeness, risk taking and proactiveness not 
merely R&D and further, that it is not only the level of EO but also the 
incremental increase of EO that drives growth.  
 The control of corruption, banking development and human capital enhance 
the relationship between an increase in EO and growth. This finding is robust 
and significant across all levels of development.  
 Institutions and policies are correctly enablers of EO, and thus indirectly, of 
growth. The control of corruption, tertiary education, domestic credit to the 
private sector and inequality are either insignificant or negatively related to 
growth across all levels of development when we control for an increase in 
EO. In contrast, the deviation in EO was significantly, positively related to 
growth in all specifications across all levels of development. 
 A lack of social cohesion (proxied by inequality) hinders the impact of risk 
taking, innovativeness and proactiveness on growth only in Africa. Otherwise, 
in the combined sample as well as middle-to-high income countries, inequality 
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enhances the EO-growth relation whereas in low income countries its impact 
is insignificant.  We argued that a possible reason for this finding is that EO is 
a variance enhancing strategy and thus a possible outcome of its 
implementation may be a greater variance in incomes, resulting in a higher 
Gini Index.  
 Moreover, we assessed wealth and natural resource rents as control 
variables. Convergence was confirmed in low income countries, with the log 
of GDP entering the growth regression with a negative sign. However, in 
middle-to-high income countries the sign is positive when EO and its 
incremental change are controlled for. This result implied that, for middle 
income countries, the necessary growth needed to attain developed status is 
not automatic. It may be conditional on a high and increasing EO.  
 Lastly, we established that natural resources are positively associated with 
growth in the combined sample as well as in low income countries (contingent 
on inequality. These findings are robust to controlling for EO and its deviation. 
In contrast, in middle-to-high income countries an increase in EO swamps the 
effect of natural resources on growth, rendering it insignificant.  
6.4 Conclusion 
In summary, we have defined and developed measures of EO and its sub-constructs 
at the aggregate level. Our conceptualisation of EO addresses the concern that we 
cannot measure entrepreneurship and technological progress by merely counting the 
number of entrepreneurs in a country. Although entrepreneurship is a complex, 
multi-faceted phenomenon that varies according to culture, geography, policies and 
institutions, we have developed a single aggregated theory-based indicator that 
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helps capture this complexity. Secondly, we have investigated the determinants and 
drivers of EO and found that the control of corruption, banking development, 
inequality and human capital influence the level of EO that countries possess. 
However, these results indicate that this impact is non-linear with threshold effects 
and is contingent on the level of development and institutions, which are in turn 
shaped by inequality. Thirdly, we have established that entrepreneurship defined at 
the aggregate level, as EO, and sustained behaviour by entrepreneurial states, 
positively predicts growth and that this association is enhanced by policies and 
institutions. Furthermore, our results suggest that institutions and policies are the 
determinants of EO and not necessarily of economic growth. Policies and institutions 
by themselves do not increase output, entrepreneurial firms and entrepreneurs do.  
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Appendix A1 
List of countries   
Sample:  1980 2008   
Included observations:  2726  
Number of categories 94  
   Cumulative Cumulative 
Value Count Percent Count Percent 
Algeria 29 1.06 29 1.06 
Argentina 29 1.06 58 2.13 
Armenia 29 1.06 87 3.19 
Australia 29 1.06 116 4.26 
Austria 29 1.06 145 5.32 
Azerbaijan 29 1.06 174 6.38 
Belgium 29 1.06 203 7.45 
Bolivia 29 1.06 232 8.51 
Botswana 29 1.06 261 9.57 
Brazil 29 1.06 290 10.64 
Bulgaria 29 1.06 319 11.7 
Burkina Faso 29 1.06 348 12.77 
Cambodia 29 1.06 377 13.83 
Canada 29 1.06 406 14.89 
Chile 29 1.06 435 15.96 
China 29 1.06 464 17.02 
Colombia 29 1.06 493 18.09 
Costa Rica 29 1.06 522 19.15 
Croatia 29 1.06 551 20.21 
Czech Republic 29 1.06 580 21.28 
Denmark 29 1.06 609 22.34 
Ecuador 29 1.06 638 23.4 
Egypt 29 1.06 667 24.47 
El Salvador 29 1.06 696 25.53 
Estonia 29 1.06 725 26.6 
Ethiopia 29 1.06 754 27.66 
Finland 29 1.06 783 28.72 
France 29 1.06 812 29.79 
Georgia 29 1.06 841 30.85 
Germany 29 1.06 870 31.91 
Greece 29 1.06 899 32.98 
Guatemala 29 1.06 928 34.04 
Honduras 29 1.06 957 35.11 
Hungary 29 1.06 986 36.17 
Iceland 29 1.06 1015 37.23 
India 29 1.06 1044 38.3 
Indonesia 29 1.06 1073 39.36 
Iran 29 1.06 1102 40.43 
Ireland 29 1.06 1131 41.49 
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Israel 29 1.06 1160 42.55 
Italy 29 1.06 1189 43.62 
Jamaica 29 1.06 1218 44.68 
Japan 29 1.06 1247 45.74 
Jordan 29 1.06 1276 46.81 
Kazakhstan 29 1.06 1305 47.87 
Kuwait 29 1.06 1334 48.94 
Kyrgyzstan 29 1.06 1363 50 
Lao PDR 29 1.06 1392 51.06 
Latvia 29 1.06 1421 52.13 
Lesotho 29 1.06 1450 53.19 
Lithuania 29 1.06 1479 54.26 
Madagascar 29 1.06 1508 55.32 
Malaysia 29 1.06 1537 56.38 
Mauritius 29 1.06 1566 57.45 
Mexico 29 1.06 1595 58.51 
Mongolia 29 1.06 1624 59.57 
Morocco 29 1.06 1653 60.64 
Mozambique 29 1.06 1682 61.7 
Netherlands 29 1.06 1711 62.77 
New Zealand 29 1.06 1740 63.83 
Nicaragua 29 1.06 1769 64.89 
Norway 29 1.06 1798 65.96 
Pakistan 29 1.06 1827 67.02 
Panama 29 1.06 1856 68.09 
Paraguay 29 1.06 1885 69.15 
Peru 29 1.06 1914 70.21 
Philippines 29 1.06 1943 71.28 
Poland 29 1.06 1972 72.34 
Portugal 29 1.06 2001 73.4 
Romania 29 1.06 2030 74.47 
Russia 29 1.06 2059 75.53 
Saudi Arabia 29 1.06 2088 76.6 
Senegal 29 1.06 2117 77.66 
Singapore 29 1.06 2146 78.72 
Slovakia 29 1.06 2175 79.79 
Slovenia 29 1.06 2204 80.85 
South Africa 29 1.06 2233 81.91 
Spain 29 1.06 2262 82.98 
Sri Lanka 29 1.06 2291 84.04 
Sudan 29 1.06 2320 85.11 
Sweden 29 1.06 2349 86.17 
Switzerland 29 1.06 2378 87.23 
Tajikistan 29 1.06 2407 88.3 
Thailand 
Trinidad 
29 1.06 2436 89.36 
29 1.06 2465 90.43 
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Tunisia 29 1.06 2494 91.49 
Turkey 29 1.06 2523 92.55 
Uganda 29 1.06 2552 93.62 
Ukraine 29 1.06 2581 94.68 
United Kingdom 29 1.06 2610 95.74 
United States 29 1.06 2639 96.81 
Uruguay 29 1.06 2668 97.87 
Vietnam 29 1.06 2697 98.94 
Zambia 29 1.06 2726 100 
Total 2726 100 2726 100 
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Appendix A2 
 
Descriptive Statistics for EO  
 Included observations: 2104 
    
    
COUNTRY  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs. 
Algeria 0.135596 0.265095 26 
Argentina -0.288736 0.144867 29 
Armenia -0.782242 0.530441 17 
Australia 0.515418 0.261271 29 
Austria 0.581031 0.406352 29 
Azerbaijan 0.555941 0.783486 14 
Belgium 1.385220 0.322022 7 
Bolivia -0.546777 0.172898 29 
Botswana 0.499491 0.176951 29 
Brazil -0.228594 0.111439 29 
Bulgaria -0.039478 0.429515 19 
Burkina Faso -1.068832 0.126717 29 
Cambodia -0.823717 0.415277 16 
Canada 0.642743 0.307192 29 
Chile 0.038376 0.280050 29 
China 0.217769 0.448892 27 
Colombia -0.447046 0.156813 29 
Costa Rica -0.222616 0.212063 26 
Croatia 0.116885 0.318999 17 
Czech Republic 0.672005 0.222416 16 
Denmark 0.847821 0.377614 19 
Ecuador -0.445752 0.153160 29 
Egypt -0.393287 0.153284 29 
El Salvador -0.705425 0.104346 19 
Estonia 0.778638 0.380050 14 
Ethiopia -1.195017 0.266893 17 
Finland 0.801849 0.500840 29 
France 0.369015 0.163627 29 
Georgia -0.341992 0.289590 12 
Germany 0.733587 0.216220 18 
Greece -0.004823 0.079739 4 
Guatemala -0.608521 0.039498 8 
Honduras -0.363536 0.262040 29 
Hungary 0.517664 0.585536 19 
Iceland 0.911716 0.492789 12 
India -0.488853 0.300525 29 
Indonesia -0.183038 0.120354 28 
Iran -0.154240 0.359301 26 
Ireland 2.260473 0.637415 14 
Italy 0.172887 0.118892 19 
Jamaica 0.055483 0.049258 12 
Japan 1.033376 0.156542 15 
Jordan -0.220878 0.252053 29 
Kazakhstan 0.139101 0.373210 17 
Kuwait -0.009053 0.348591 24 
Kyrgyzstan -0.895551 0.190586 16 
Lao PDR -0.767669 0.387663 9 
Latvia 0.113633 0.277287 17 
Lesotho -1.091281 0.625161 24 
Lithuania 0.043892 0.257015 16 
Madagascar -0.942977 0.335098 28 
Malaysia 0.616733 0.415238 29 
Mauritius -0.023733 0.203019 29 
Mongolia -0.172632 0.423319 19 
Morocco -0.298779 0.207597 29 
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Mozambique -1.026571 0.439233 29 
Netherlands 0.918651 0.302818 29 
New Zealand 0.362130 0.210891 29 
Nicaragua -0.527505 0.164643 15 
Norway 0.682855 0.260035 29 
Pakistan -0.833988 0.143632 29 
Panama 0.258240 0.305027 29 
Paraguay -0.233887 0.059324 18 
Peru -0.335064 0.215979 23 
Philippines -0.407949 0.140133 29 
Poland -0.023373 0.205934 19 
Portugal 0.129687 0.129530 14 
Romania -0.260652 0.238368 19 
Russia 0.190631 0.185548 17 
Saudi Arabia 0.082151 0.368392 29 
Senegal -0.643175 0.164668 29 
Singapore 2.460334 0.806848 29 
Slovakia 0.521963 0.170390 15 
Slovenia 0.564983 0.289088 17 
South Africa -0.059576 0.148311 29 
Spain 0.381475 0.233719 14 
Sri Lanka -0.498184 0.155048 29 
Sudan -1.016779 0.359839 29 
Sweden 1.039952 0.456176 29 
Switzerland 1.356382 0.271049 19 
Tajikistan -0.733471 0.265241 17 
Thailand 0.192612 0.324743 29 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0.263573 0.354735 25 
Tunisia -0.097703 0.165411 29 
Turkey -0.435310 0.255043 29 
Uganda -1.127459 0.401596 23 
Ukraine 0.164700 0.122166 17 
United Kingdom 0.527313 0.182256 19 
United States 0.787453 0.207759 29 
Uruguay -0.444616 0.184504 26 
Vietnam 0.044960 0.431899 16 
Zambia -0.590315 0.226897 29 
All 6.75E-18 0.735403 2104 
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